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Part III

Semiotics, Natural Language and man-machine intercourse

Semiotics, natural language and man-machine intercourse

3.1. Systemisation of basic concepts of semiotics. 

The sign, the denoter, and the sign situation

Any Identified object, e.g. a certain object B, must be regarded either as a sign of something else or a "sign of itself", or - and this is more natural - as a non-sign in general. Nevertheless for an act of identification in even a standard situation it is necessary for the interpreter (Fig.7) to have a certain minimum of Internal conditions: sensors (e.g. only the sensors k in the simplest case); memory, in which evidence of the Interaction between the sensors and the identified object is imprinted, by forming the occasional imprint X" of this object (it is not necessary to use the index of zone k, since other reception zones are not examined; and an inborn, a priori, (or, if created on the basis of personal experience, a porteriori) gestalt X", i.e. a generalised intential pattern of typical constant features and properties of objects of the identified type B. And, finally, an active small area X" of the intential pattern can exist in the gestalt, as can an indicator imprint whose presence in an identified object is sufficient for the corresponding area x" of the object's occasional imprint X" to stimulate, resonantly, the gestalt X". In this case, if testimony of an act of identification having taken place is the stimulation of a gestalt, we obtain this chain of phenomena: !!B - !!X - !!x; !!X" - !!x" - !!xx - !^ox"- !^oX", as a result of which the imprint X" of active part X of object B is interpreted as an imprint of type B objects, and, consequently, object B's occasional appearance is identified by the interpretor as the appearance of an object of precisely this V type in its reception zone.

1. Active Part-X Object-B

2. Designating Part-X Object-B

3. Interpretors receptors

4. Object-C

5. Occassional X"-imprint

6. Interpreter

7. Active Part-X of occassional X" imprint Object-B

8. Resonant association - xx

9. Active Part-X" of gestalt Object-B

10. X"- gestalt Object-B

If we are only interested in identification and not in the details of its occurrence, it is more convenient to use simplified formulae for the identification process. In particular it is possible to describe only the "subject-centred" perception of the identified object by the interpretor, i.e. it is possible to fix the appearance (in the reception zone) not of object B itself but of just its active part X, and also not to draw distinctions between the occasional imprint X", its indicator part x", its gestalt indicator ^ox" and the gestalt ⁰X" itself; in that case the fact of identification can be noted as a sequence of the appearance of the original pattern X and the stimulation of its imprint X", i.e. !!X - !X", where the fact itself of the stimulation -not the appearance - of imprint X" can show that this is not an occasional imprint X", but the already formed, usual process of identification of the original pattern X.

However, if it is necessary, we can always use a fuller type description of the process of identification, right up to the reflection of types of association between imprints and properties in the act of association. Let us note in conclusion that it follows from the full schemes of identification, that it cannot be effected without occasional resemblance association in even one link(!! x" - !!xx -!^ox"). Not to take account of this fact, as we shall see, leads to serious misunderstandings in semiotics. Let us now turn to defining the simplest sign situation.

A discussion of the sign naturally evokes above all else a notion of at least two objects, one of which, for example, object B, takes the role of the sign, while the other, for example, object C, plays the role of the object which this sign (i.e. object B) is "painting to", which is "represented" by this sign, which is "denoted" or "designated" through this sign. While for the moment not defining the terms "pointing to", "represent", "denote" and "designate", let us agree to name this second object C - as distinct from objects as the sign - the denoter (from the Latin "de-notat" - denoted). Let us now Imagine that with respect to a certain interpretor A, object B is perceived as the bearer of active part X and object C as the bearer of active part Y.

Let us now determine on what basis we can name one object the denoter, and another sign of this denoter, by proceeding from our interpretation of the nature of reflection and the simplest identification mechanisms, we can start, for the sake of simplicity, from a "subject - centred" description of the identification process, i.e. we can name as the identified object its active part.

With these reservations, the object X is far the interpretor A a sign of object Y as the denoter, if after the appearance of object X in interpreter A's reception field, the identification of object X, leading to the stimulation of its pattern X", causes, as a consequence of the association between pattern X" and pattern Y", the stimulation of pattern y") this is in spite of the absence of object Y in interpreter A's reception field.

The relationship between the sign and the denoter can be named the sign relationship, while the situation where a sign relationship is manifested can be called a sign situation. A sign situation defined in this way and its components can be easily described by means of our symbols : if !! X - !X" and !!Y - !Y" and, moreover, !! X - !X" - !Y", then object X is the sign and object Y is the denoter of this sign.

Let us now characterise, in terms of the interpreter's "subjective perception" that specific feature, which makes it not simply the reflecting object, but indeed the interpreter in a sign situation, i.e. an object which Interacts with other objects as with signs and their denoters.

In order to stimulate the properties Y", i.e. the pattern of a certain original pattern Y, the interpreter can use not only the interaction with this original pattern Y, but also with a certain other object X; this object, although having properties which are different from the properties Y, and being reflected in the interpreter as a separate pattern X". nevertheless leads, having interacted with the interpretor, to the stimulation of original pattern Y's pattern Y".

Consequently we can say, just from the point of view of the equivalence of the indicated final effect - the stimulation of pattern Y" - that a sign is in the simplest sign situation the substitute for, or representative of, its denoter.

Here, a necessary condition for a particular object to function in the role of another object's sign is, according to our definition, the presence of not just the interpretor but also associated patterns of the sign and denoter in the interpretor's memory and the capacity of the patterns to be stimulated both as a result of the interpreter's interaction with the original pattern, and under the influence of assocations between patterns. Consequently, instead of the various modifications of the "triangles" of G. Frege, C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, A. Church, D. Ullman, V.A. Zveginsteva and Yu. S. Stepanova among others, which have become traditional or standard, we have mapped out a " qadrilaterial" to describe even the simplest sign situation: the sign, the denoter, the pattern of the sign, and the pattern of the denoter associated with it. In other words thy sign and the denoter are preserved in our scheme; but instead of the diffuse "third angle", named either the value, or the sense, or the idea, an association of two objects has appeared -but more concrete ones: the pattern of the sign and the pattern of the denoter, which can be also called the internal sign and the internal denoter.

Here, as we have already said, the function of the sign proper is seen by us as the ability of the sign to stimulate the Internal denoter, i.e. the form of the external denoter (through the presence of associations between the internal sign and the internal denoter) and by this fact to replace the interpreter's interaction with certain properties of the external denoter by its interaction with the sign in the simplest sign situation.

It will be accepted that we have arrived at an interpretation of the nature of the sign which go back to the ideas of the founder of semiotics of systemic linguistics, I.A. Bandouin de Courtenay, and C.S. Peirce, who expressed it thus one hundred years ago and whose work is still undervalued to this day.

"The subject of semiotic analysis", according to Peirce, "is models of reflected objects consisting of a finite number of elements and the relationships linking them".

Peirce defines the sign as the element X which takes the place of a certain element Y (the denoter) for the subject (as the interpretor of the sign) in accordance with the indicator or the relationship P".

There does not appear to be any need to advance further arguments to show that Peirce's and Baudouin's concept of the nature of the sign is identical with ours as we have explained it.

Let us note just once again that in this definition the essence of the simplest variant of a sign situation is revealed. It is simple in that the "individual experience" of a single interpretor is sufficient for the development of a sign situation. It is true that it can only use this experience individually. But in spite of this limitation, the transformation of the reflecting object into the interpretor in sign situations is indicative of the rise of a new quality in the object; a capacity (more flexible than that based on mechanisms previously examined) for perceiving the high probability of an event which has not yet occurred. This takes place in particular when the appearance of the sign precedes the appearance of the denoter.

In general, moreover, through the exposure of sign relationships the interpretor enters into a closer network of interactions with the external environment through the mediation of signs, which is especially important for those interpreters whose successful functioning depends on interaction with other interpreters. In such cases signs take on a social role, and it is social signs which offer indeed the greatest scientific and practical Interest. But for the meantime we shall examine individual signs and we must establish with this, the simplest manifestation of the sign, the most important varieties of signs before going on to social signs and sign systems.

Classification of Individual Signs. At the basis of this classification lies an analysis of the cause that leads to the rise of an association between an internal sign and an internal denoter, i.e. between pattern X" and pattern Y".

If we remember the ideas of F. de Saussure (1663 and many other scientists involved with general problems of the theory of signs, we will have noted that among all sign relationships these writers considered only the "brightest" and the "loudest" to be "truly signs" : these are Peirce's "symbols" i.e. signs whose patterns' association with the patterns of the denoters reflects neither a contiguity relationship nor a resemblance relationship between the external sign and the denoter and is therefore purely conditional and conventional .

But Peirce himself approached the problem more deeply. For him the purest signs were those which had the absolutely maximum natural potential to be members of a "sign chain" in relation to certain denoters, and they fixed these particular relationships actually in the interpreter's memory, reflecting them in the form of corresponding associations between their patterns and the patterns of the denoters. Peirce called such signs either "iconic" (when a resemblance relationship exists between sign and denoter), or "index" (when there is a contiguity relationship), or "iconic index" (when both types of relationship are present).

This depth and completeness of semiotics in comparison with Saussure's Semiology was pointed out by R. Jakobson in his works [199, p.78].

Thus, in developing ideas, we must state that there is no basis for the indicator of conditionality ("non-motivation", "convention" etc) which is popular in contemporary semiotics to be a criterion when the question whether something is a pure sign or not is being tackled. It is not the indicator of conditionality which is important, but the fact of the presence or absence of an association between X" and Y", i.e. between the patterns of the objects X and Y, before the moment of the appearance of one of these external objects, e.g. X, in the interpreter's reception zone, when the question is being decided as to whether this object X is a sign of the other object Y.

If we remember that relationships and associations between objects by resemblance, by contiguity, and by both simultaneously, and associations between the patterns of objects corresponding to these relationships can be depicted with the symbols -xx-, -xy-, -(xx,xy)-, while causal relationships can be designated by means of the arrow => then it is simple and easy to present Peirce's classification of individual signs with our system of symbols:

1. (X-xx-Y) => (X”-xx-Y”) – (icons)
2. (X-xy-Y) => (X”-xy-Y”) – (indexes)
3. (X - (xx, xy) - Y) => (X” – (xx, xy) - Y”) – (iconic indexes)
4. ((X-xx-Y) + (X-xy-Y)) №> (X”-xx-Y”) + (X”-xy-Y”) – (symbols)

In the last formula the "plus" sign is a symbol of disjunction, while the crossed-out arrow should be understood as "is not a cause of".

It is possible to divide Peirce's four sign classes just examined into two amalgamated classes: this is by a natural method, which is visibly clear from the definition of Pierce's classes in symbols. One of them consists of symbols like the signs X which are purely conditional, i.e. they are linked by their pattern X" with the pattern Y", of the denoter Y on the strength of internal causes reflecting the interpretor's preceding experience, and they are not motivated by properties of the sign or of the denoter but consequently are only internally motivated. In the second amalgamated class are included all the remaining signs, non symbol signs, on the basis that the association of their pattern X" with pattern Y" of denoter Y is motivated by properties of the sign X and the denoter Y, i.e. it is externally motivated, so that with an association of the patterns there is reflected a certain degree of natural closeness of the original patterns. Let us agree to understand the expression "motivated sign" as an abbreviation of the expression "externally motivated sign".

But signs can be classified still more "deeply", indepently of whether they are motivated or non-motivated and to what type of motivated signs they belong. This deepening can be based on a precise definition of variants not of the origin but of the state of association between the pattern X" and pattern Y". Accordingly all types of signs can be distributed into two sub-classes; usual and occasional.

If an association between an internal sign and an internal denoter has been fixed in the interpreter's memory before the given specific case of the external sign X appearing, and is only stimulated with its subsequent appearances, then X is the usual sign of denoter Y for the interpreter A.

If there has not been such an association before the appearance of X and if one has not arisen in the stimulation process of pattern X" as a result of the appearance of original pattern X, then X is not the sign Y.

If however an association between X" and Y" had not existed beforehand, but arose in the stimulation process X" (even if the pattern of object X has just formed), then X must be regarded as the sign Y for interpreter A, albeit an occasional one.

An occasional association between the patterns of the original pattern, having once arisen, has a certain probability of becoming fixed and reproductive. If such a fixing is effected, the association between patterns X" and Y" will transform object X into the usual sign of object Y for interpreter A, and object Y into the usual denoter of sign X.

Moreover division of signs into inconic signs, indexes, inconic-indexes, and symbols, can be further broken down according to the new Independent basis of classification, not simply additionally into two sub-divisions. Between these bases there are correlations which are Important when the degree of probability is estimated. This relates to the extent that object X can become the sign of the object Y by a natural method without outside help, or the probability concerning the danger of object X's transformation from the sign of object Y into a non-sign because the purely conditional association is more easily "forgotten". If the properties of objects X and Y are such that if there is a high probability of a resemblance or a contiguity association (or, even more so, of a resemblance and a contiguity association at the same time), between the patterns of these objects, then there is more chance that these objects will become not only occasionally, but also usually, members of a sign situation, and there is more chance of motivation to enter into a sign relationship.

If there is little probability of a resemblance or contiguity association between the patterns of objects X and Y -a probability determined by the properties of these objects - then, even if they are participants in a sign situation, the probability of their having entered into a sign relationship, conventionally, for external rather than internal reasons, is small. The probability of one of the objects functioning occasionally as a sign of another object is also small. At the same time the chance of the loss or the "forgetting" of an association between the patterns of such objects which was established earlier is so great that the transformation of object X from the sign of object Y to a non-sign with the rare appearance of object X in the interpreter's reception zone is threatened. In this case the establishment of object X in the role of the sign of object Y can only be assisted by the very frequent appearance of object X.

And so, in deciding whether for the interpretor A object X is the sign of object Y, we have to turn our attention to the question of whether there is a usual link between the patterns of the objects X and Y. If such a link does exist, then a sign relationship does occur between X and Y; this relationship will only be revealed at the moment of object X's appearance. If there is no usual link then it has to be decided how great the probability is of the natural rise and development of an association between pattern X" and pattern Y" as a reflection of the relationships between these particular original pattern objects. If this probability is high, then equally high is the probability of the occasional entry of object X and object Y into sign relationships at the moment of object X's appearance. And, finally, if the probability of a natural association is small, and there is no usual association between the patterns of objects X and Y, then the transformation of object X into the sign of object Y for interpreter A can only be based on the introduction of conditional, conventional (usual or occasional) associations between the patterns of objects X and Y. We have not, so far, examined the mechanism of such positive associations.

Our symbols reflect clearly when a given sign, of any of Peirce's classes, is usual, and when it is occasional, because it is easy to show in the formula whether an association between the pattern x" and the pattern Y" is stimulated or is appearing for the first time. For example the distinction between the usual and occasional icon will appear thus in a formula:

1. !! X - ! X" - ! xx - ! Y"

2. !! X - ! X" - !! xx ! Y"

Obviously, if there arc many patterns in the interpreter's memory, when any original pattern appears, not only usual but also various occasional associations can be stimulated. Consequently, one and the same external object can become quite unexpectedly the occasional sign for another external object, if the pattern of the second object proves to be the final one in the chain of occasional associations of the pattern of the first with other patterns in the interpreter's memory. If however only usual links are stimulated the number of external and internal denoters, for which the given object is the sign, is strictly limited. By comparison with occasional associations, usual associations make sign relationships between objects more definite, but less flexible, and less universal.

Izaesthetic Interpreters, Izogenic patterns, Reversible Stimulations and Reflections.

So far we have examined situations where objects can enter sign situations with regard to a single specific interpreter i.e. we have been examining only individual signs. In view of our discussion of the nature of the sign, we ought to regard a sign situation where an interpreter does not participate as an impossibility.

However semiotics must primarily be interested in the relationships between interpreters in a sign situation, and thus they are concerned not with individual, but social signs. Thus a new semiotic problem arises: the classification of objects and their patterns from possible sign situations in which two or more interpretors take part. The concept of izaestheticness can be applied to interpretors as it can to imprints and patterns. Interpreter A is izaesthetic with interpretor B if both of them possess the same reflection capabilities in respect of those objects which are encountered in a given environment. For example, izaestheticness is evident if Interpretors A and B, when interacting with object C, react to the same combination of properties Y from object C's full set at properties. This means that object C is "represented" as object Y for the Interpretors A and B, and is reflected in their memory in the form of sufficiently similar, isomorphic or even homomorphic patterns: Y" and Y"b.

Only when there is izaestheticness can there be hope that the occasional transformation of object X into the sign of object Y will occur (with the appearance of object X) both for interpreter A and interpretor B.

Patterns of the one original pattern, preserved in the memories of izaesthetic Interpretors (e.g. Y"a and Y"b as patterns of object Y), must be considered izogenic in accordance with definitions given previously. Let us name them initial izogenic patterns, emphasising by the term "initial" the possibility in principle of the rise of new derivative patterns which are combinations or cross-sections of initial ones.

If izogenic patterns have developed in izaesthetic interpretors from izogenic Initial patterns on the basis of interactions between initial patterns (interactions which are analagous for the interpretor) then these new patterns can be named derivative izogenic patterns.

Naturally, the higher the level of derivation, the greater is the probability of losing homomorphism, the similarity between izogenic derivative patterns.

If Interpretor A and interpretor B function in various local conditions, it does not follow from the fact of the interpretor's izaestheticness in any way that for each pattern in interpretor A there corresponds an izogenic pattern in interpretor B. But we will be primarily interested in future in combinations of izaesthetic interpretors in each of whose memories a certain area of the patterns is izogenic in respect of just one of the interpretors of this combination.

Let us now introduce concepts of reversible stimulation and reversible reflection.

If an association between two patterns is such that the stimulation of one of them causes the second to be stimulated, and the stimulation of the second leads to the stimulation of the first, we can call this type of natural stimulation reversible.

With the phrase reversible reflection we shall indicate the type of reflection by the interpretor of an external object where not only the rise of the external object X leads to the stimulation of its pattern X", but also the stimulation of the pattern X" can lead to the rise of an example of the original pattern X. Naturally the possibility of reversible reflection is determined above all by the interpreter's properties, i.e. by the presence of synchronic pattern “∆” of the resultative behaviour of the interpreter for the "manufacture" of examples of the original patterns X. The differences in the properties of these examples can be put aside for the time being.

The Communicative Situation and the Communicative Act. 

Insofar as an izogenic relationship (just like a similarity, a resemblance, or a contiguity relationship, or a relationship of isomorphism, or homomorphism etc) is at least twofold, it will be convenient, when speaking of such objects, to use collective nouns like izogenic pair, or trio etc.

Let us agree to speak in the future only of pairs of interpreters, patterns, etc. bearing in mind that the definitions that have been introduced which are valid for pairs are equally valid for three, four, or in general for any number of interpreters.

Two reflecting objects, e.g. interpreter A and interpreter B, can be called corresponding through an izogenic pair of patterns, and in each of the objects the pattern of the one particular denoter is reflected, e.g. pattern X"a and pattern X"b of denoter X, and, consequently, this pair of patterns (X"a and X"b), each of which belongs to "its" reflecting object, is izogenic.

This concept has a cumbersome name, but in practice we will not need to use it directly: it will be retained only implicitly in the terms "communicability", and "communicant", which we will not define. Let us name two interpreters "communicative" if they correspond through even just one izogenic pair of reversible patterns.

Now we can Introduce the concept, cummunicative act.

The stimulation of one of the patterns of an pair, e.g. X"a, which beings about the stimulation of another pattern of this pair. e.g. X"b, owing to the communicability of the two interpreters (A and B), which have a common reception zone, can be called a communicative act between these interpreters; while the interpreters themselves can be called communicants.

Situations in which mutual relationships between communicants exist, influencing in some way or other the bringing about of an act of communication, can be called communicative. In communicative situations we find as initial and final events acts like: !X"a - !X"b.

We must next examine various types of communicative situations and determine bases for comparing sign systems. Here we shall need not only simplified sign situation schemes, but also more detailed ones, reflecting the fact of not simply the stimulation of a pattern when an original pattern appears in the reflecting object's reception zone, but also certain intermediate stages of the change from interaction with the original pattern to the resulting stimulation of the pattern. In those cases when it is simply a question of identifying object A, i.e. when it is taking the role of a "sign of itself", we shall talk of a pre-sign situation. In this respect communicative situations can also be divided into "pre-sign" and "sign" situations. Let us dwell on this in a little more detail.

Pre-sign, and the simplest sign, communication. Following the definitions we have arrived at by this point, we can easily establish that the simplest communicative situation can be based on pre-sign semiotic acts. Let us call it conditionally a pre-sign communicative situation.

We can describe it with our symbols of stimulation appearance and sequence in time:

X"a - !!X - !X"b

This formula reflects the fact that the stimulation of pattern X" of object X in a certain interpreter A (i.e. the stimulation of X"a) leads, thanks to reversible reflection, to the appearance of an example of the original pattern X, so that the Interaction of this example of the original pattern with interpreter B causes the stimulation of pattern X" of original pattern X (i.e. the stimulation X"b) in the interpreter B.

X"a and X"b are by nature izogenic and consequently we are concerned with a cause where the stimulation of one of the patterns of the izogennic pair leads to the stimulation of the other (!X"a - !X"b). Such a type of interaction of the interpreters comes under the heading, "communicative".

In a given communicative situation we start with the patterns already present and the ability of the interpretors to only reproduce procedures of identification and reversible reproduction; this can also be reflected in the formula !X"a - !xx - !! X - ! xx - ! X"b, where xx is the conditional designation of a resemblance association between patterns and original patterns, we see that if relationships between the patterns and original patterns are stimulated but do not appear, these relationships, having already formed, are usual.

Let us now imagine a situation of pre-sign communication, showing by "int" the internal world of the interpretors and by "ext" the external environment in the reception zone of these interpretors.

int A                    ext                         int B

! X"a ——————— !!X ————————— !X"b

When necessary it is possible to also reflect in schemes the usualness of relationships between links of the chain under examination. And, finally, we can now imagine a situation which, although It is the simplest. Is a proper sign situation and not a pre-sign communicative situation. It arises when an izogenic pattern, stimulated in the memory of one of the communicants, has no "direct exit" to the memory of another in the form of the direct imposition on it of its characteristics. Then communication can be based only on the use of internal reflection mechanisms which have formed during the development of the interpreter's capacities to react izaesthetically to some objects as signs of other objects, and to enter into a pre-sign communication with each other through the presence of izogenic patterns in them which permit reversible reflection.

The essence of these concepts of a sign, though not a pre-sign, communicative situation can be more easily shown in the following scheme:

Formula P.236   just below middle

int A               ext              int B

These events however can be shown as formulae, with a contiguity association between Y" and X" shown as -yx-, and with the fact of the usualness both of associations between patterns in the memory of each interpreter, and of the reversible reflection duly emphasised.

!Y"a - !yx - !Xa - ! xx - !!X - ! xx - !X"b - !xy - !Y"b

The end result of the communication is the stimulation of Y"b under the influence of the stimulation of the izogenic pattern Y"a; or: ! Y"a - !Y"b. In such simplified formulae it is not shown how the sign communication arose (on the basis of usual or occasional links).

Having defined concepts of pre-sign and the simplest sign communication we are again convinced that variants of analysis of initial concepts of semiotics come in fact, with the aid of "triangles", at the primary level of detailing semiotic situations where there are no hints of the demarcation between the sign situation and the communicative situation. In particular, when it is a question of the sign characteristics of language units (the primacy of whose communicative functions is recognised by all without exception) turning to "triangles" compels researchers to look for "denoters", "referents", "things" and other "material designations" among its angles.

In the schemes we have examined which are close to the ideas of I.A. Baudouin de Courtenay, the simplest sign situation, as has been shown, contains four components as a minimum: the sign, the denoter, and their patterns, where the sign is used indeed for excluding the denoter "from the game".

For the simplest communicative sign situation a "quadrilaterial" is not sufficient - a five angles unit at least is necessary: the pattern of the sign in each of the interpreters, and finally, an example of the sign obtained as a result of reversible reflection. We are not showing (simply for the sake of simplicity and because above all it is a matter of signs), patterns of resultative behaviour in the scheme, without which reversible reflection, i.e. the manufacture of examples of signs, is impossible. But these active patterns are always Implied. Here the improbably (from the position of the classic "triangular" approach to problems of semiotic) fact that the denoter in a communicative situation is in principle not necessary is quite remarkable. It is only necessary "genetically" in the preceding phases of the formation of patterns and the transformation of the two reflecting objects into communicable interpreters.

This particular feature of communicative situations can be formulated otherwise: in the act of communication the patterns themselves, printed in the memories of the interpreters (be they initial or derivative) take on the function of Internal denoters. These denoters, as we see It, do not cease to be physically real objects in the substratum of the memory, although "communicants" have "access" to them only through the mediation of signs. Apparently one can succeed in avoiding with such an approach the paradox of the materiality of the ideal or the idealness of the material.

Types of Communicative Arcs and Links, Abstract and Concrete Links.

Let us call the chain of sequential stimulations and reflections which result in a communicative act a communicative arc, and all forms and original formed embraced by the communicative arc through sequential stimulations and reflections we can call the links of a communicative arc or communicative links.

By defining precisely what modifications can be introduced into a communicative arc without impairing the act of communication we can show the most important types of communicative systems.

One such system has already been examined. In order to characterise its particular nature, let us accept the contrast of end and non-end links of the communicative arc. In the scheme already examined Y"z and Y"b are end links. Moreover in any communicative act between communicable objects such izogenic links as the reproduced sign X, its reproducing pattern X"a, and the reproduced pattern X"b, signifying acts of pre-sign communication, are included in the communicative arc.

Let us name a communicative arc simple if, with stimulation, its end links interact directly with patterns of a sign. And then a communicative act can be called complex if any intermediate patterns are included between patterns of the signs and end patterns.

A communicative arc can be called usual if all its links remain invariable in any communication act, i.e. if associations between its links are secured, fixed, and do not depend on the stimulation or non-stimulation of patterns not belonging to a communicative arc.

We shall call a communicative arc occasional if the end izogenic homomorphic patterns of communicable objects are closed off through it, if even just one link in this arc is linked with its neighbouring link not usually but occasionally i.e. exclusively under the influence of the particular peculiar features of the concrete communication circumstances. This is shown in the first place in the dependence of associations of communication arc links on the nature of the composition of stimulated and non-stimulated patterns, which have not been Included in the communicative arc.

Naturally non-usual, i.e. occasional, links of the communicative arc links can be based for example on resemblance and contiguity associations reflecting the properties of original patterns, the patterns of which are these links. In this case we shall be concerned with the external type of motivated occasional communication. Usual communication can prove to be externally motivated in the same way.

If, though, associations between links of a communicative arc are based on a resemblance or contiguity of patterns which is not a reflection of the properties of original patterns, then such motivation can be called internal. It is effective and can promote acts of communication only if Izogenic patterns which take part in the formation of the communicative arc are so homomorphic with both communicants that they have a similarity also in those association foundations which do not reflect the properties of denoter-original patterns, but are determined exclusively by the properties of the patterns. It is clear that internally motivated communicative arcs can also be both usual and occasional.

With a usual association just through contiguity, if this contiguity is not motivated externally, we obtain the "classical" conditional sign, that is, the Peirce symbol.

Thus in the system of semiotic initial concepts we have managed to show that non-conditional signs can exist and that it is possible to understand how they are distinct -From conditional (conventional) ones, and, ipso facto, to prepare the ground for semiotic categories of units of natural language to be analysed, where the role of conventional signs is especially great in acts of communication.

However in connection with the question of the existence of sign systems using non-motivated (externally) conventional signs, let us direct our attention once again to the following: In any sign system the rise of a sign situation is not possible if the interpreter is incapable of Identifying signs as objects of a fully determined type. But for such identification the following events at least have to occur (as we saw when analysing the identification formula): the appearance (in the interpreter's reception zone) of an occasional example of an identified object A, the appearance of its active occasional part X, the appearance of the occasional Imprint X" of this part X or even the occasional Imprint x" of the indicator which is a part of the part X. Only after this, on the basis of an occasional resemblance association (and in no other way), is a usual generalised pattern "x" of the indicator stimulated; and after this a whole a posteriori or a priori gestalt ^oX" can, on the basis of the contiguity association, be stimulated, and this is the completion of the identification process:

!! A - !!X - !!X" - !!x" - !!xx - !°x" - !^oX".

Consequently, however conditional (conventional) an association is between the pattern of a sign and the pattern of a denoter, for these patterns to be stimulated, stages of unconditional (unconventional) (motivated by the sign properties) resonance stimulation of a usual generalised pattern by an occasional concrete one are essential, so that any identification Includes elements of an iconic sign situation where the function of a sign is carried out by its indicator and the function of a denoter by its full active part.

No other types of sign situations provide recognition. The Peirce concept of the symbol is not acceptable here because a unique occasional pattern in the role of an internal sign cannot in principle associate with a generalised internal denoter conventionally, while the Peirce index cannot be relevant here because a contiguity association of a generalised usual pattern created before the act of identification with an occasional unique pattern is also physically inconceivable. Only a resemblance association is possible.

Therefore we can now claim that conditional (conventional) signs, i.e. Peirce symbols, can of course exist, and do exist, but this existence would not be possible if, alongside this as an absolutely essential link, an unconditional (absolute), non-conventional, occasional resemblance association, which has developed at the moment of the sign's identification, was not used.

But then in what way can semiotic concepts which consider pure conditionally (conventionally?) an indispensible indicator of "sign-ness" remain non-contradicatory?

Many of them indeed cannot, and therefore they do not remain non-contradicatory. But some avoid contradication by means of a straightforward formal device: it is established that with each designation an "abstraction of the identification of a sign" takes place, without classification as to what sort of phenomenon this is. Everything that is not conditional (conventional) is "covered by" this eloquent expression "an abstraction of the Identification". Thus the absence of anything which is not conventional In a sign situation but which has been motivated is made visible (apparent). But, as is clear from the argument developed above, "pure conventionality" is no more than visibility (apparentness).

After this the nature of a resemblance association between an abstract and concrete pattern ceases to be mysterious. In this specific (chain) link of resemblance associations between a generalised and concrete pattern we have apparently in pure form the identification process which representatives of a gestalt psychology considered the only one found In all semiotic situations. Consequently we would be better advised to call a sign situation, where an association between an internal sign and an internal denoter is effected on the basis of a gestalt, gestalt identification, rather than "pre -sign" identification.

In summing up it must surely be recognised that the ideas concerning the ontology of semiotic processes which come above gestalt identification, and also those concepts which afford a clarification of these processes, and which have been developed in our conception produce a stricter systemic coupling than can be produced through modifying semiotic triangles. We now have a chance to examine the formation mechanisms of the components of communicative arcs and associations between the chain-links of these arcs and to define the mechanisms, extremely important for cybernetics, which identify the content in communication acts by means of various sign systems, including the most complicated of them: natural language.

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