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This book is an attempt to understand the world in which we live. Its
fundamental premise is that nationalism lies at the basis of this world. To
grasp its significance, one has to explain nationalism. The word
"nationalism" is used here as an umbrella term under which are subsumed the
related phenomena of national identity (or nationality) and consciousness,
and collectivities based on them-nations; occasionally it is employed to
refer to the articulate ideology on which national identity and
consciousness rest, though not-unless specified-to the politically
activist, xenophobic variety of national patriotism, which it frequently
designates.
The specific questions which the book addresses are why and how nationalism
emerged, why and how it was transformed in the process of transfer from one
society to another, and why and how different forms of national identity
and consciousness became translated into institutional practices and
patterns of culture, molding the social and political structures of
societies which defined themselves as nations. To answer these questions, I
focus on five major societies which were the first to do so: England,
France, Russia, Germany, and the United States of America.
The Definition of Nationalism
The specificity of nationalism, that which distinguishes nationality from
other types of identity, derives from the fact that nationalism locates the
source of individual identity within a "people," which is seen as the
bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of
collective solidarity. The "people" is the mass of a population whose
boundaries and nature are defined in various ways, but which is usually
perceived as larger than any concrete community and always as fundamentally
homogeneous, and only superficially divided by the lines of status, class,
locality, and in some cases even ethnicity. This specificity is conceptual.
The only foundation of nationalism as such, the only condition, that is,
without which no nationalism is possible, is an idea; nationalism is a
particular perspective or
a style of thought.1 The idea which lies at the core of nationalism is the
idea of the "nation."
The Origins of the Idea of the "Nation"
To understand the nature of the idea of the "nation," it might be helpful
to examine the semantic permutations which eventually resulted in it, as we
follow the history of the word. The early stages of this history were
traced by the Italian scholar Guido Zernatto.2 The origin of the word is to
be found in the Latin natio-something born. The initial concept was
derogatory: in Rome the name natio was reserved for groups of foreigners
coming from the same geographical region, whose status-because they were
foreigners- was below that of the Roman citizens. This concept was thus
similar in meaning to the Greek ta ethne, also used to designate foreigners
and, specifically, heathens, and to the Hebrew amatnim, which referred to
those who did not belong to the chosen monotheistic people. The word had
other meanings as well, but they were less common, and this one-a group of
foreigners united by place of origin-for a long time remained its primary
implication.
In this sense, of a group of foreigners united by place of origin, the word
"nation" was applied to the communities of students coming to several
universities shared by Western Christendom from loosely-geographically or
linguistically-related regions. For example, there were four nations in the
University of Paris, the great center of theological learning: "l'honorable
nation de France," "la fidele nation de Picardie," "la venerable nation de
Normandie," and "la constante nation de Germanic" The "nation de France"
included all students coming from France, Italy, and Spain; that of
"Germanie," those from England and Germany; the Picard "nation" was
reserved for the Dutch; and the Norman, for those from the Northeast. It is
important to note that the students had a national identity only in their
status as students (that is, in most cases, while residing abroad); this
identity was immediately shed when their studies were completed and they
returned home. While applied in this setting, the word "nation," on the one
hand, lost its derogatory connotation, and on the other, acquired an
additional meaning. Owing to the specific structure of university life at
the time, the communities of students functioned as support groups or
unions and, as they regularly took sides in scholastic disputations, also
developed common opinions. As a result, the word "nation" came to mean more
than a community of origin: it referred now to the community of opinion and
purpose.
As universities sent representatives to adjudicate grave ecclesiastical
questions at the Church Councils, the word underwent yet another
transformation. Since the late thirteenth century, starting at the Council
of Lyon in 1274, the new concept-"nation" as a community of opinion-was
applied to the parties of the "ecclesiastical republic." But the
individuals who composed them, the spokesmen of various intraecclesiastical
approaches, were also representatives of secular and religious potentates.
And so the word "nation" acquired another meaning, that of representatives
of cultural and political authority, or a political, cultural, and then
social elite. Zernatto cites Montesquieu, Joseph de Maistre, and
Schopenhauer to demonstrate how late this was still the accepted
significance of the word. It is impossible to mistake its meaning in the
famous passage from Esprit des lois: "Sous les deux premieres races on
assembla souvent la nation, c'est a dire, les seigneurs et les eveques; il
n'etait point des communes."3
The Zigzag Pattern of Semantic Change
At this point, where Zernatto's story breaks off, we may pause to take a
closer look at it. To an extent, the history of the word "nation" allows us
to anticipate the analysis employed in much of the book. The successive
changes in meaning combine into a pattern which, for the sake of formality,
we shall call "the zigzag pattern of semantic change." At each stage of
this development, the meaning of the word, which comes with a certain
semantic baggage, evolves out of usage in a particular situation. The
available conventional concept is applied within new circumstances, to
certain aspects of which it corresponds. However, aspects of the new
situation, which were absent in the situation in which the conventional
concept evolved, become cognitively associated with it, resulting in a
duality of meaning. The meaning of the original concept is gradually
obscured, and the new one emerges as conventional. When the word is used
again in a new situation, it is likely to be used in this new meaning, and
so on and so forth. (This pattern is depicted in Figure 1.)
The process of semantic transformation is constantly redirected by
structural (situational) constraints which form the new concepts (meanings
of the word); at the same time, the structural constraints are
conceptualized, interpreted, or defined in terms of the concepts (the
definition of the situation changes as the concepts evolve), which thereby
orient action. The social potency and psychological effects of this
orientation vary in accordance with the sphere of the concept's
applicability and its relative centrality in the actor's overall existence.
A student in a medieval university, defined as a member of one or another
nation, might derive therefrom an idea of the quarters he was supposed to
be lodged in, people he was likely to associate with most close!}', and
some specific opinions he was expected to hold in the course of the few
years his studies lasted. Otherwise his "national" identity, probably, did
not have much impact on his self-image or behavior; outside the narrow
sphere of the university, the concept had no applicability. The influence
of the equally transient "national" identity on a participant at a Church
Council
Conventional meaning 1
Situation 1
Situation 2
Conventional meaning 2
Conventional meaning 3
Situation 3
Conventional meaning 4
Etc.
Figure 1 The zigzag pattern of semantic change

could be more profound. Membership in a nation defined him as a person of
very high status, the impact of such definition on one's self-perception
could be permanent, and the lingering memory of nationality could affect
the person's conduct far beyond conciliar deliberations, even if his nation
no longer existed.

From "Rabble" to "Nation"
The applicability of the idea of the nation and its potency increased a
thousandfold as the meaning of the word was transformed again. At a certain
point in history-to be precise, in early sixteenth-century England-the word
"nation" in its conciliar meaning of "an elite" was applied to the
population of the country and made synonymous with the word "people." This
semantic transformation signaled the emergence of the first nation in the
world, in the sense in which the word is understood today, and launched the
era of nationalism. The stark significance of this conceptual revolution
was highlighted by the fact that, while the general referent of the word
"people" prior to its nationalization was the population of a region,
specifically it applied to the lower classes and was most frequently used
in the sense of. "rabble" or "plebs." The equation of the two concepts
implied the elevation of the populace to the position of an (at first
specifically political) elite. As a
synonym of the "nation"-an elite-the "people" lost its derogatory
connotation and, now denoting an eminently positive entity, acquired the
meaning of the bearer of sovereignty, the basis of political solidarity,
and the supreme object of loyalty. A tremendous change of attitude, which
it later reinforced, had to precede such redefinition of the situation, for
with it members of all orders of the society identified with the group,
from which earlier the better placed of them could only wish to dissociate
themselves. What brought this change about in the first place, and then
again and again, as national identity replaced other types in one country
after another, is, in every particular case, the first issue to be
accounted for, and it will be the focus of discussion in several chapters
of the book.
National identity in its distinctive modern sense is, therefore, an
identity which derives from membership in a "people," the fundamental
characteristic of which is that it is defined as a "nation." Every member
of the "people" thus interpreted partakes in its superior, elite quality,
and it is in consequence that a stratified national
population is perceived as essentially homogeneous, and the lines of status
and class as superficial. This principle lies at the basis of all
nationalisms and justifies viewing them as expressions of the same general
phenomenon. Apart from it, different nationalisms share little. The
national populations-diversely termed "peoples," "nations," and
"nationalities"-are defined in many ways, and the criteria of membership in
them vary. The multiformity which results is the source of the conceptually
evasive, Protean nature of nationalism and the cause of the perennial
frustration of its students, vainly trying to define it with the help of
one or another "objective" factor, all of which are rendered relevant to
the problem only if the national principle happens to be applied to them.
The definition of nationalism proposed here recognizes it as an "emergent
phenomenon," that is, a phenomenon whose nature-as well as the
possibilities of its development and the possibilities of the development
of the elements of which it is composed-is determined not by the character
of its elements, but by a certain organizing principle which makes these
elements into a unity and imparts to them a special significance.4
There are important exceptions to every relationship in terms of which
nationalism has ever been interpreted-whether with common territory or
common language, statehood or shared traditions, history or race. None of
these relationships has proved inevitable. But from the definition proposed
above, it follows not only that such exceptions are to be expected, but
that nationalism does not have to be related to any of these factors,
though as a rule it is related to at least some of them. In other words,
nationalism is not necessarily a form of particularism. It is a political
ideology (or a class of political ideologies deriving from the same basic
principle), and as such it does not have to be identified with any
particular community.5 A nation coextensive with humanity is in no way a
contradiction in terms. The United States of the World, which will perhaps
exist in the future, with sovereignty vested in the population, and the
various segments of the latter regarded as equal, would be a nation in the
strict sense of the word within the framework of nationalism. The United
States of America represents an approximation to precisely this state of
affairs.


The Emergence of Particularistic Nationalisms
As it is, however, nationalism is the most common and salient form of
particularism in the modern world. Moreover, if compared with the forms of
particularism it has replaced, it is a particularly effective (or,
depending on one's viewpoint, pernicious) form of particularism, because,
as every individual derives his or her identity from membership in the
community, the sense of commitment to it and its collective goals is much
more widespread. In a world divided into particular communities, national
identity tends to be associated and confounded with a community's sense of
uniqueness and the qualities contributing to it. These qualities (social,
political, cultural in the narrow sense, or ethnic)6 therefore acquire a
great significance in the formation of every specific nationalism. The
association between the nationality of a community and its uniqueness
represents the next and last transformation in the meaning of the "nation"
and may be deduced from the zigzag pattern of semantic (and by implication
social) change.
The word "nation" which, in its conciliar and at the time prevalent meaning
of an elite, was applied to the population of a specific country (England)
became cognitively associated with the existing (political, territorial,
and ethnic) connotations of a population and a country. While the
interpretation of the latter in terms of the concept "nation" modified
their significance, the concept "nation" was also transformed and-as it
carried over the connotations of a population and a country, which were
consistent with it-came to mean "a sovereign people." This new meaning
replaced that of "an elite" initially only in England. As we may judge from
Montesquieu's definition, elsewhere the older meaning long remained
dominant, but it was, eventually, supplanted.
The word "nation," meaning "sovereign people," was now applied to other
populations and countries which, like the first nation, naturally had some
political, territorial, and/or ethnic qualities to distinguish them, and
became associated with such geo-political and ethnic baggage. As a result
of this association, "nation" changed its meaning once again, coming to
signify "a unique sovereign people." (These changes are shown in Figure 2.)
The last transformation7 may be considered responsible for the conceptual
confusion reigning in the theories of nationalism. The new concept of the
nation in most cases eclipsed the one immediately preceding it, as the
latter
Medieval universities
Church councils
Population of England
Other countries
and peoples
Natio . a group
of foreigners
Nation . a community of opinion
Nation . an elite
Nation
a sovereign people
Nation
a unique people
Figure 2 The transformation of the idea of the nation


eclipsed those from which it descended, but, significantly, this did not
happen everywhere. Because of the persistence and, as we shall see, in
certain places development and extension of structural conditions
responsible for the evolution of the original, non-particularistic idea of
the nation, the two concepts now coexist.
The term "nation" applied to both conceals important differences. The
emergence of the more recent concept signified a profound transformation in
the nature of nationalism, and the two concepts under one name reflect two
radically different forms of the phenomenon (which means both two radically
different forms of national identity and consciousness, and two radically
different types of national collectivities-nations).
Types of Nationalism
The two branches of nationalism are obviously related in a significant way,
but are grounded in different values and develop for different reasons.
They too give rise to dissimilar patterns of social behavior, culture, and
political institutions, often conceptualized as expressions of unlike
"national charters."
Perhaps the most important difference concerns the relationship between
nationalism and democracy. The location of sovereignty within the people is
the recognition of the fundamental equality among its various strata, which
constitute the essence of the modern national idea, are at the same time
the basic tenets of democracy. Democracy was born with the sense of
nationality. The two are inherently linked, and neither can be fully under-
Dochapart from this connection. Nationalism was the form in which democracy
appeared in the world, contained in the idea of the nation as a butterfly
in a cocoon. Originally, nationalism developed as democracy; here the
conditions of such original development persisted, the identity between the
two was maintained. But as nationalism spread in different conditions and
the emphasis in the idea of the nation moved from the sovereign character
to the uniqueness of the people, the original equivalence between and
democratic principles was lost. One implication of this, which should be
emphasized, is that democracy may not be exportable. It may be an inherent
predisposition in certain nations ( inherent in their very definition as
nations-that is, the original national concept), yet entirely alien to
others, and the ability to adopt and develop it in the latter may require a
change of identity.
The emergence of the original (in principle, non-particularistic) idea of
the nation as a sovereign people was, evidently, predicated on a
transformation on the character of the relevant population, which suggested
the symbolic elevation of the "people" and its definition as a political
elite, in other words, on a profound change in structural conditions. The
emergence of the ensuing, particularistic, concept resulted from the
application of the original idea to conditions which did not necessarily
undergo such transformation, t was the other, in the original concept
accidental, connotations of people and country which prompted and made
possible such application. In both instances, the adoption of the idea of
the nation implied symbolic elevation of the populace (and therefore the
creation of a new social order, a new structural reality). But while in the
former case the idea was inspired by the structural context which preceded
its formation-the people acting in some way as a political elite, and
actually exercising sovereignty-in the latter case the sequence of events
was the opposite: the importation of the idea of popular sovereignty-as
part and parcel of the idea of the nation-initiated the transformation in
the social and political structure.
As it did so, the nature of sovereignty was inevitably reinterpreted. The
observable sovereignty of the people (its nationality) in the former case
could only mean that some individuals, who were of the people, exercised
sovereignty. The idea of the nation (which implied sovereignty of the
people acknowledged this experience and rationalized it. The national
principle that emerged was individualistic: sovereignty of the people was
the implication of the actual sovereignty of individuals; it was because
these individuals (of the people) actually exercised sovereignty that they
were members of a nation. The theoretical sovereignty of the people in the
latter case, by contrast, was an implication of the people's uniqueness,
its very being a distinct people, because this was the meaning of the
nation, and the nation was, by definition, sovereign. The national
principle was collectivistic; it reflected the collective being.
Collectivistic ideologies are inherently authoritarian, for, when the
collectivity is seen in unitary terms , it tends to assume the character of
a collective individual possessed of a single will, and someone is bound to
be its interpreter. The reification of a community introduces (or
preserves) fundamental inequality between those of its few members who are
qualified to interpret the collective will and the many who have no such
qualifications; the select few dictate to the masses who must obey.
These two dissimilar interpretations of popular sovereignty underlie the
basic types of nationalism, which one may classify as individualistic-
libertarian and collectivistic-authoritarian. In addition, nationalism may
be distinguished according to criteria of membership in the national
collectivity, which may be either "civic," that is, identical with
citizenship, or "ethnic." In the former case, nationality is at least in
principle open and voluntaristic; it can and sometimes must be acquired. In
the latter, it is believed to be inherent-one can neither acquire it if one
does not have it, nor change it if one does; it has nothing to do with
individual will, but constitutes a genetic characteristic. Individualistic
nationalism cannot be but civic, but civic nationalism can also be
collectivistic. More often, though, collectivistic nationalism takes on the
form of ethnic particularism, while ethnic nationalism is necessarily
collectivistic. (These concepts are summarized in Figure 3.)
It must be kept in mind, of course, that these are only categories which
serve to pinpoint certain characteristic tendencies within different-
specific-nationalisms. They should be regarded as models which can be
approximated, but are unlikely to be fully realized. In reality, obviously,
the
Civic
Ethnic
Individualistic-libertarian Collectivistic-authoritarian
|Type I |Void |
|Type II|Type |
| |III |


Figure 3 Types of nationalism
most common type is a mixed one. But the compositions of the mixtures vary
significantly enough to justify their classification in these terms and
render it a useful analytical tool.
Distinctiveness of National Identity
Nationalism being defined as a specific conceptual perspective, it is
evident that to understand national identity one must explain how this
perspective-the fundamental idea of the nation and its various
interpretations- emerged. Clearly, national identity should not be confused
with other types of identity which do not share this perspective, and it
cannot be explained in general terms or in terms which may explain any
other type of identity. This point is worth reiterating, for national
identity is frequently equated with collective identity as such.
Nationalism is not related to membership in all human communities, but only
in communities defined as "nations." National identity is different from an
exclusively religious or a class identity. Nor is it a synonym for an
exclusively or primarily linguistic or territorial identity, or a political
identity of a certain kind (such, for instance, as an identity derived from
being a subject of a particular dynasty), or even a unique identity, that
is, a sense of French-ness, Englishness, or Germanity, all of which are
commonly associated with national identity. Such other identities are
discussed in this book only if they influence the formation of national
identity and are as a result essential to its understanding, which is not
always the case. Frequently a unique identity (the character of which,
depending on the source of uniqueness, may be religious or linguistic,
territorial or political) exists centuries before the national identity is
formed, in no way guaranteeing and anticipating it; such was the case in
France and to a certain extent in Germany. In other cases, the sense of
uniqueness may be articulated simultaneously with the emergence of the
national identity, as happened in England and, most certainly, in Russia.
It is even possible, though very unusual, for national identity to predate
the formation of a unique identity; the development of identity in America
followed this course. National identity is not a generic identity; it is
specific. Generating an identity may be a psychological necessity, a given
of human nature. Generating national identity is not. It is important to
keep this distinction in mind.
In ethnic nationalisms, "nationality" became a synonym of "ethnicity," and
national identity is often perceived as a reflection or awareness of
possession of "primordial" or inherited group characteristics, components
of "ethnicity," such as language, customs, territorial affiliation, and
physical type. Such objective "ethnicity" in itself, however,, does not
represent an identity, not even an "ethnic" identity. The possession of
some sort of "ethnic" endowment is close to universal, yet the identity of
a person born in England of English parentage and English-speaking may be
that of a Christian; the identity of a person born and living in France,
speaking French, unmistakably French in habits and tastes, that of a
nobleman; their "ethnicity" being quite irrelevant to their motives and
actions, and seen, if at all noticed, as purely accidental. An essential
characteristic of any identity is that it is necessary the view the
concerned actor has of himself or herself. It therefore either exists or
does not; it cannot be asleep and then be awakened, as some sort of
disease. It cannot be presumed on the basis of any objective
characteristics, however closely associated with it in other cases.
Identity is perception. If a particular identity does not mean anything to
the population does not have this particular identity.
The "ethnicity" of a community (its being an "ethnic community")
presupposes the uniformity and antiquity of its origins, as a result of
which it may be viewed as a natural grouping and its characteristics as
inherent in the population. Such inherent characteristics do regularly form
the basis of the group's sense of particularity, or what has been here
referred to as its unique identity. Yet ethnicity does not generate unique
identity. It does not, because of the available "ethnic" characteristics
only some are selected, not the same ones in every case, and the choice, in
addition to the availability or even salience of the selected qualities, is
determined by many other factors. Moreover, no clear line separates
selection from artificial construction. A language of a part may be imposed
on the entire population and declared native to the latter (or, if no part
of a population has a language to speak of, it may be outright invented).
An "ancestral" territory may be acquired in conquest, "common" history
fabricated, traditions imagined and projected into the past. One should add
to this that the unique identity of a community is not necessarily ethnic,
because the community may not see any of the (allegedly) inherent
attributes of the population as the source of its uniqueness, but may
concentrate, for example, as was the case in France, on the personal
attributes of the king or on high, academic, culture. Some populations have
no "ethnic" characteristics at all, though this is very unusual. The
population of the United States of America, the identity of which is
unmistakably national and which undoubtedly possesses a well-developed
sense of uniqueness, is a case in point: it has no "ethnic" characteristics
because its population is not an "ethnic community."
National identity frequently utilized ethnic characteristics (this is
obvious in the case of ethnic nationalisms). Yet it should be emphasized
that "ethnicity" in itself is in no way conducive to nationality. "Ethnic"
characteristics form a certain category of raw material which can be
organized and rendered meaningful in various ways, thus becoming elements
of any number of identities. National identity, in distinction, provides an
organizing principle applicable to different materials to which it then
grants meaning, transforming them thereby into elements of a specific
identity.
The Outline of the Argument
The original modern idea of the nation emerged in sixteenth-century
England, which was the first nation in the world (and the only one, with
the possible exception of Holland, for about two hundred years). The
individualistic civic nationalism which developed there was inherited by
its colonies in America, and later became characteristic of the United
States.
Particularistic nationalism, reflecting the dissociation of the meaning of
the "nation as a "people" extolled as the bearer of sovereignty, the
central object of collective loyalty, and the basis of political
solidarity, from that of an "elite," and its fusion with geo-political
and/or ethnic characteristics of particular populations, did not emerge
until the eighteenth century. This happened on the continent of Europe,
whence it started to spread all over the world. Collectivistic nationalism
appeared first, and almost simultaneously, in France and Russia, then,
close to the end of the eighteenth century and in the beginning of the
nineteenth, in German principalities. While France, from many points of
view, represented an ambivalent case (its nationalism was collectivistic
and yet civic), Russia and Germany developed clear examples of ethnic
nationalism.
"When nationalism started to spread in the eighteenth century, the
emergence of new national identities was no longer a result of original
creation, but rather of the importation of an already existing idea. The
dominance of England in eighteenth-century Europe, and then the dominance
of the West in the world, made nationality the canon. As the sphere of
influence of the core Western societies (which defined themselves as
nations) expanded, societies belonging or seeking entry to the supra-
societal system of which the West was the center had in fact no choice but
to become nations.9 The development of national identities thus was
essentially an international process, whose sources in every case but the
first lay outside the evolving nation.
At the same time, for several reasons, every nationalism was an indigenous
development. The availability of the concept alone could not have motivated
anyone to adopt a foreign model, however successful, and be the reason for
the change of identity and the transformation which such fundamental change
implied. For such a transformation to occur, influential actors must have
been willing, or forced, to undergo it. The adoption of national identity
must have been, in one way or another, in the interest of the groups which
imported it.10 Specifically, it must have been preceded by the
dissatisfaction of these groups with the identity they had previously. A
change of identity presupposed a crisis of identity.
Such was in fact the case. The dissatisfaction with the traditional
identity reflected a fundamental inconsistency between the definition of
social order it expressed and the experience of the involved actors. This
could result from the upward or downward mobility of whole strata, from the
conflation of social roles (which might imply contradictory expectations
from the same individuals), or from the appearance of new roles which did
not fit existing categories. Whatever the cause of the identity crisis, its
structural manifestation was in every case the same-"anomie." "This might
be, but was not necessarily, the condition of the society at large; it did,
however, directly affect the relevant agents (that is, those who
participated in the creation or importation of national identity). Since
the agents were different in different cases, the anomie was expressed and
experienced differently. Very often it took the form of status-
inconsistency, which, depending on its nature, could be accompanied by a
profound sense of insecurity and anxiety.
The specific nature of the change and its effects on the agents in each
case profoundly influenced the character of nationalism in it. The
underlying ideas of nationality were shaped and modified in accordance with
the situational constraints of the actors, and with the aspirations,
frustrations, and interests which these constraints generated. This often
involved reinterpreting them in terms of indigenous traditions which might
have existed alongside the dominant system of ideas in which the now
rejected traditional identity was embedded, as well as in terms of the
elements of this system of ideas itself which were not rejected. Such
reinterpretation implied incorporation of pre-national modes of thought
within the nascent national consciousness, which were then carried on in it
and reinforced.
The effects of these structural and cultural influences frequently combined
with that of a certain psychological factor which both necessitated a
reinterpretation of the imported ideas and determined the direction of such
reinterpretation. Every society importing the foreign idea of the nation
inevitably focused on the source of importation - an object of imitation by
definition - and reacted to it. Because the model was superior to the
imitator in the latter's own perception (its being a model implied that),
and the contact itself more often than not served to emphasize the latter's
inferiority, the reaction commonly assumed the form of ressentiment. A term
coined by Nietzsche and later defined and developed by Max Scheler,12
ressentiment refers to a psychological state resulting from suppressed
feelings of envy and hatred (existential envy) and the impossibility of
satisfying these feelings. The sociological basis for ressentiment-or the
structural conditions that are necessary for the development of this
psychological state-is twofold. The first condition (the structural basis
of envy itself) is the fundamental comparability between the subject and
the object of envy, or rather the belief on the part of the subject in the
fundamental equality between them, which makes them in principle
interchangeable. The second condition is the actual inequality (perceived
as not fundamental) of such dimensions that it rules out practical
achievement of the theoretically existing equality. The presence of these
conditions renders a situation ressentiment-prone irrespective of the
temperaments and psychological makeup of the individuals who compose the
relevant population. The effect produced by ressentiment is similar to that
of "anomie" and to what Furet, discussing Tocqueville's argument regarding
the emphasis on equality in pre-revolutionary France, calls "the
Tocqueville effect."13 In all these cases the creative impulse comes from
the psychologically unbearable inconsistency between several aspects of
reality.
The creative power of ressentiment-and its sociological importance-
consists in that it may eventually lead to the "transvaluation of values,"
that is, to the transformation of the value scale in a way which denigrates
the originally supreme values, replacing them with notions which are
unimportant, external, or indeed bear in the original scale the negative
sign. The term "transvaluation of values" may be somewhat misleading,
because what usually takes place is not a direct reversal of the original
hierarchy. Adopting values directly antithetical to those of another is
borrowing with the opposite sign. A society with a well-developed
institutional structure and a rich legacy of cultural traditions is not
likely to borrow lock, stock, and barrel from anywhere. However, since the
creative process resulting from ressentiment is by definition a reaction to
the values of others and not to one's own condition regardless of others,
the new system of values that emerges is necessarily influenced by the one
to which it is a reaction. It is due to this that philosophies of
ressentiment are characterized by the quality of "transparency": it is
always possible to see behind them the values they disclaim. Ressentiment
felt by the groups that imported the idea of the nation and articulated the
national consciousness of their respective societies usually resulted in
the selection out of their own indigenous traditions of elements hostile to
the original national principle and in their deliberate cultivation. In
certain cases- notably in Russia-where indigineous cultural resources were
absent or clearly insufficient, ressentiment was the singie most important
factor in determining the specific terms in which national identity was
defined. Wherever it existed, it fostered particularistic pride and
xenophobia, providing emotional nourishment for the nascent national
sentiment and sustaining it whenever it faltered.14
It is possible, then, to distinguish analytically three phases in the
formation of specific nationalisms: structural, cultural, and
psychological, each defined by the factor dominant in it. The adoption of a
new, national identity is precipitated by a regrouping within or change in
the position of influential social groups. This structural change results
in the inadequacy of the traditional definition, or identity, of the
involved groups-a crisis of identity, structurally expressed as "anomie"-
which creates among them an incentive to search for and, given the
availability, adopt a new identity. The crisis of identity as such does not
explain why the identity which is adopted is national, but only why there
is a predisposition to opt for some new identity. The fact that the
identity is national is explained, first of all, by the availability at the
time of a certain type of ideas, in the first case a result of invention,
and in the rest of an importation. (It is this dependence on the idea of
the nation, ultimately irreducible to situational givens and solely
attributable to the unpredictable ways of human creativity, that makes
national identity a matter of historical contingency rather than
necessity.) In addition, national identity is adopted because of its
ability to solve the crisis. The variation in the nature of the crises to
which all specific nationalisms owe their inception explains some of the
variation in the nature of different nationalisms.
The adjustment of the idea of the nation to the situational constraints of
the relevant agents involves its conceptualization in terms of indigenous
traditions. This conceptualization further distinguishes every national
identity.
Finally, where the emergence of national identity is accompanied by
ressentiment, the latter leads to the emphasis on the elements of
indigenous traditions-or the construction of a new system of values-hostile
to the principles of the original nationalism. The matrix of the national
identity and consciousness in such cases evolves out of this transvaluation
of values, the results of which, together with the modifications of the
original principles reflecting the structural and cultural specificity of
each setting, are responsible for the unique, distinct character of any one
nationalism.
This bare-bones outline should be regarded as but the skeleton of a very
complex story, which can be observed in such stark nakedness only when
stripped of the resplendent historical flesh that covered it. As I tried to
reveal the skeleton in the book-through a careful study of detail and
comparison of different cases-I made every effort not to reduce the
presentation to an x-ray picture. As much as was possible within the
confines of one volume, I tried to allow the reader the opportunity to
examine the evidence that led me to these conclusions, and thus to agree or
disagree with them after reading the book.

The Nature of the Argument
This work belongs to the long tradition of sociological inquiry which seeks
to understand the nature, and to account for the emergence, of modern
society. Among its founders one finds the founding fathers of the
discipline of sociology: Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Ferdinand Toennies, as
well as such great proto-sociologists as Karl Marx and Alexis de
Tocqueville. While I have been, no doubt, influenced by the ideas of all
these great men, it is Weber's thought that I find the most congenial. I
adopt Weber's definition of
social reality as essentially symbolic, of social action as meaningfully
oriented action, and share his conviction that the study of meaningful
orientations, of the motivations of social actors, constitutes "the central
subject" of sociology.15 In this Weberian orientation my book differs from
much of the current sociological literature on modernity as well as on
nationalism, which is commonly regarded as one of the components of the
latter.
The focus of the book-throughout-is a set of ideas or, rather, several sub-
sets of a set of ideas, at the core of which lies the idea of "nation,"
which I believe forms the constitutive element of modernity. In this
belief, I reverse the order of precedence and therefore of causality, which
is usually, if sometimes tacitly, assumed to exist between national
identify and nations, and nationalism and modernity: namely that national
identity is simply the identity characteristic of nations, while
nationalism is a product or reflection of major components of
modernization. Rather than define nationalism by its modernity, I see
modernity as defined by nationalism. Weberian idea of the social provides a
rationale for this view.16
Social reality is intrinsically cultural; it is necessarily a symbolic
reality, created by the subjective meanings and perceptions of social
actors. Every social order (that is, the overall structure of a society)
represents a materialization, or objectivization, of its image shared by
those who participate in it. It exists as much in the minds of people as in
the outside world, and if it loses its grip on the minds of a sufficient
majority, or of a minority with sufficient power to impose it on others, it
cannot be sustained and is bound to vanish from the outside world as well.
The essentially symbolic character of social reality has to do with the
fundamental biological constitution of the human species. In general,
society appears to be a necessary corollary of life at the advanced stages
of biological evolution. The preservation of a species requires cooperation
of its member organisms (often to the detriment of the latter). For
animals, nature, in the form of instincts, provides detailed "models for"17
any ordinary activity; their ability to cooperate, their capacity for
integration in general and in particular, is inborn. The cardinal fact of
human existence is that humans lack built-in "models for" behavior in
groups. Social integration and cooperation are necessary for the
preservation of the human species (as well as of its individual members),
but; there is no innate knowledge of how this should be accomplished. The
lack of innate knowledge results in the need for models and blueprints, for
an image of order, or created symbolic order, among human beings. Such
symbolic order-culture-is the human equivalent of animal instincts, and is
an indispensable condition for the survival of the human species as well as
of individuals. The particular image of social order provided by a culture
forms the constitutive element of any given society. Within the limits set
by the physical and psychological parameters of human nature, symbolic
orders are widely variable, which explains the variability of human
societies.
The recognition that human society is the social aspect of life of a
certain species, and that to study it one must acknowledge this species'
specificity, its baggage of biological disabilities (such as the lack of
instincts) and abilities (for instance, creativity), implies an emphasis on
the cultural, subjective, meaning- and model-creating symbolic elements in
social reality, and makes consideration of the concepts and ideas in the
minds of people necessary for the interpretation of any social phenomenon.
In other words, since men (generically speaking) happen to be reasoning
beings and their reasoning is immediately related to their actions, one
must take their reasoning into account and look in it for an explanation of
their actions. Of course, this reasoning-the actors' ideas, volitions,
motivations-is influenced by their situational constraints, and through
these specific situational constraints is related to the structural macro-
social processes. But we can discover the relevant structural factors in
any given case only if we first concentrate on the actors-the creators and
carriers of ideas-and ascertain the situational constraints which have a
bearing on their interests and motivations.
I have no argument with the claim that structures are an extremely
important component of every social action and should necessarily be
considered as a part of its explanation: a structural analysis is a central
part of my discussion of nationalism. This view does not imply disregard
for structures. What it implies is methodological individualism and,
therefore, rejection of reification, be it of structures or of ideas. For
this reason it is equally opposed to strict sociological structuralism and
to idealism, which are akin in their tendency to reify concepts. Social
structures are relatively stable systems of social relationships and
opportunities in which individuals find themselves and by which they are
vitally affected, but over which most of them have no control and of the
exact nature of which they are usually unaware. The essence of sociological
"structuralism" consists in that structures are reified and seen as
"objective" (that is, ontologically independent of individual-subjective-
volitions) social forces which act through and move individuals, who are in
turn regarded as their vehicles and representatives. The behavior of
individuals and their beliefs, in this framework, are determined by this
"objective" reality and acquire the character of epiphenomena. Idealism
regards ideas rather than structures as the moving forces in history.
According to it, ideas beget ideas, and this symbolic generation accounts
for the phenomenon of social change. Like reified structures, ideas act
through and move individuals, seen as vehicles or representatives of
clusters of ideas. Neither "structuralism" nor idealism recognizes the
significance of the human agency, in which culture and structure are
brought together, in which each of them is every day modified and
recreated, and only by not through-which both are moved and shaped, and
given the ability to exert their influence. Both ideas and social
structures are only operationalized in men. Men (to quote Durkheim this
time) "are the only active elements of society."18 Neither structural
constraints nor ideas can beget other structural constraints and ideas.
What they can do is produce different states of mind in the individuals
within their sphere of influence. These states of mind are rationalized
and, if rationalized creatively, may result in new interpretations of
reality. These interpretations, in turn, affect structural conditions,
which then can produce other states of mind at the same time as they
directly affect states of mind, and the infinitely complex process is
endlessly and unpredictably perpetuated. Theories of social reality,
whether past or present, which disregard the human agency can never rise
above pure speculation. They belong to metaphysics.
Cultural and structural constraints always interact, and because of the
creative nature of the human agency, they rarely interact in predetermined
ways. In most cases one cannot know in advance which factor plays the role
of a cause and which is an effect in a particular stage of social formatian
and change. Social action is determined chiefly by the motivations of the
relevant actors. Motivations are formed by their beliefs and values, and at
the same time are shaped by the structural constraints of the actors, which
also affect the beliefs and values. Social action, determined by
motivations, creates structures. It follows from here that the arrow of
causality may point both ways. Moreover, the very same phenomenon at one
phase in its development may be a result, and at another-a primary factor
in the social process. Only on the basis of careful examination of all the
available evidence can one establish with certainty its place in the causal
chain.
Nationalism, among other things, connotes a species of identity, in the
psychological sense of the term, denoting self-definition. In this sense,
any identity is a set of ideas, a symbolic construct. It is a particularly
powerful construct, for it defines a person's position in his or her social
world. It carries within itself expectations from the person and from
different classes of others in the person's surroundings, and thus orients
his or her actions. The. least specialized identity, the one with the
widest circumference, that is believed to define a person's very essence
and guides his or her actions in many spheres of social existence is, of
course, the most powerful. The image of social order is reflected in it
most fully; it represents this image in a microcosm. In the course of
history people's essence has been defined by different identities. In
numerous societies religious identity performed this function. In many
others an estate or a caste identity did the same. Such generalized
identity in the modern world is the national identity.
A change of the generalized identity (for example, from religious orestate
to national) presupposes a transformation of the image of the social
order.** It may be prompted by independent structural changes-that is, the
transformation of the order itself-either as a result of the accumulation
of minute and imperceptible-in-isolation modifications, or of a one-time
cataclysmic event-a major epidemic or war or, alternatively, a sudden
emergence of great economic opportunities and even the appearance of a
particularly strong-willed ruler with peculiar ideas. (The latter, as we
shall see, is not merely a mad supposition: this was what started Russia on
its path toward nationality.) The change in the image of social order may
also reflect a desire to change an order resistant to change. In neither
case does the emergent image simply mirror the transformations already
ongoing: there is always a discrepancy between the image of reality and
reality. Whether or not inspired and triggered by them, it represents a
blueprint of a new order (a model) and, by motivating actions of
individuals harboring it, causes further transformations and gradually
modifies social structure in accordance with its tenets.
These assumptions-which allow for the causal primacy of ideas, without
denying it to structures-are consistent with the course of historical
events in the case of nationalism. Historically, the emergence of
nationalism predated the development of every significant component of
modernization. In interaction with other factors it helped to shape its
economic forces, and stamped its cultural temper. As for the political
organization and culture of modernity, its formative influence was also the
controlling one. It is nationalism which has made our world, politically,
what it is-this cannot be put strongly enough. Within the complex of
national phenomena itself, national identity preceded the formation of
nations. These social structures, a towering presence in the life of every
conscious individual (and political collectivities which are the peculiar
mark of modem society), owe their existence to the individuals' belief in
it, and their character to the nature of their ideas. But the ideas of
nationalism, which have forged social structures and suffused cultural
traditions, were also produced by structural constraints and inspired by
traditions that preceded them. Before nationalism was a cause of certain
social processes, it was an effect of others.