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Kant's "What Is Enlightenment"
http://www.english.upenn.edu/~mgamer/Etexts/kant.html

EMMANUEL KANT

An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? (1784)

Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity.
Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance
from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in
lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without
guidance from another. Sapere Audel [dare to know] "Have courage to use
your own understanding!"-that is the motto of enlightenment.

Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so great a proportion of
men, long after nature has released

them from alien guidance (natura-liter maiorennes), nonetheless gladly
remain in lifelong immaturity,

and why it is so easy for others to establish themselves as their
guardians. It is so easy to be immature.

If I have a book to serve as my understanding, a pastor to serve as my
conscience, a physician to

determine my diet for me, and so on, I need not exert myself at all. I need
not think, if only I can pay:

others will readily undertake the irksome work for me. The guardians who
have so benevolently taken

over the supervision of men have carefully seen to it that the far greatest
part of them (including the

entire fair sex) regard taking the step to maturity as very dangerous, not
to mention difficult. Having first

made their domestic livestock dumb, and having carefully made sure that
these docile creatures will not

take a single step without the go-cart to which they are harnessed, these
guardians then show them the

danger that threatens them, should they attempt to walk alone. Now this
danger is not actually so great, for after falling a few times they would
in the end certainly learn to walk; but an example of this kind makes men
timid and usually frightens them out of all further attempts.

Thus, it is difficult for any individual man to work himself out of the
immaturity that has all but become his nature. He has even become fond of
this state and for the time being is actually incapable of using his own
understanding, for no one has ever allowed him to attempt it. Rules and
formulas, those -mechanical aids to the rational use, or rather misuse, of
his natural gifts, are the shackles of a permanent immaturity. Whoever
threw them off would still make only an uncertain leap over the smallest
ditch, since he is unaccustomed to this kind of free movement.
Consequently, only a few have succeeded, by cultivating their own minds, in
freeing themselves from immaturity and pursuing a secure course.

But that the public should enlighten itself is more likely; indeed, if
it is only allowed freedom, enlightenment is almost inevitable. For even
among the entrenched guardians of the great masses a few will always think
for themselves, a few who, after having themselves thrown off the yoke of
immaturity, will spread the spirit of a rational appreciation for both
their own worth and for each person's calling to think for himself. But it
should be particularly noted that if a public that was first placed in this
yoke by the guardians is suitably aroused by some of those who are
altogether incapable of enlightenment, it may force the guardians
themselves to remain under the yoke-so pernicious is it to instill
prejudices, for they finally take revenge upon their originators, or on
their descendants. Thus a public can only attain enlightenment slowly.
Perhaps a revolution can overthrow autocratic despotism and profiteering or
power-grabbing oppression, but it can never truly reform a manner of
thinking; instead, new prejudices, just like the old ones they replace,
will serve as a leash for the great unthinking mass.

Nothing is required for this enlightenment, however, except freedom;
and the freedom in question is the least harmful of all, namely, the
freedom to use reason publicly in all matters. But on all sides I hear: "Do
not argue!" The officer says, "Do not argue, drill!" The tax man says, "Do
not argue, pay!" The pastor says, "Do not argue, believe!" (Only one ruler
in the World says, "Argue as much as you want and about what you want, but
obey!") In this we have examples of pervasive restrictions on freedom. But
which restriction hinders enlightenment and which does not, but instead
actually advances it? I

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Kant's "What Is Enlightenment"
http://www.english.upenn.edu/~mgamer/Etexts/kant.html

reply: The public use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone
can bring about enlightenment among mankind; the private use of reason may,
however, often be very narrowly restricted, without otherwise hindering the
progress of enlightenment. By the public use of one's own reason I
understand the use that anyone as a scholar makes of reason before the
entire literate world. I call the private use of reason that which a person
may make in a civic post or office that has been entrusted to him. Now in
many affairs conducted in the interests of a community, a certain mechanism
is required by means of which some of its members must conduct themselves
in an entirely passive manner so that through an artificial unanimity the
government may guide them toward public ends, or at least prevent them from
destroying such ends. Here one certainly must not argue, instead one must
obey. However, insofar as this part of the machine also regards himself as
a member of the community as a whole, or even of the world community, and
as a consequence addresses the public in the role of a scholar, in the
proper sense of that term, he can most certainly argue, without thereby
harming the affairs for which as a passive member he is partly responsible.
Thus it would be disastrous if an officer on duty who was given a command
by his superior were to question the appropriateness or utility of the
order. He must obey. But as a scholar he cannot be justly constrained from
making comments about errors in military service, or from placing them
before the public for its judgment. The citizen cannot refuse to pay the
taxes imposed on him; indeed, impertinent criticism of such levies, when
they should be paid by him, can be punished as a scandal (since it can lead
to widespread insubordination). But the same person does not act contrary
to civic duty when, as a scholar, he publicly expresses his thoughts
regarding the impropriety or even injustice of such taxes. Likewise a
pastor is bound to instruct his catecumens and congregation in accordance
with the symbol of the church he serves, for he was appointed on that
condition. But as a scholar he has complete freedom, indeed even the
calling, to impart to the public all of his carefully considered and well-
intentioned thoughts concerning mistaken aspects of that symbol, as well as
his suggestions for the better arrangement of religious and church matters.
Nothing in this can weigh on his conscience. What he teaches in consequence
of his office as a servant of the church he sets out as something with
regard to which he has no discretion to teach in accord with his own
lights; rather, he offers it under the direction and in the name of
another. He will say, "Our church teaches this or that and these are the
demonstrations it uses." He thereby extracts for his congregation all
practical uses from precepts to which he would not himself subscribe with
complete conviction, but whose presentation he can nonetheless undertake,
since it is not entirely impossible that truth lies hidden in them, and, in
any case, nothing contrary to the very nature of religion is to be found in
them. If he believed he could find anything of the latter sort in them, he
could not in good conscience serve in his position; he would have to
resign. Thus an appointed teacher's use of his reason for the sake of his
congregation is merely private, because, however large the congregation is,
this use is always only domestic; in this regard, as a priest, he is not
free and cannot be such because he is acting under instructions from
someone else. By contrast, the cleric-as a scholar who speaks through his
writings to the public as such, i.e., the world-enjoys in this public use
of reason an unrestricted freedom to use his own rational capacities and to
speak his own mind. For that the (spiritual) guardians of a people should
themselves be immature is an absurdity that would insure the perpetuation
of absurdities.

But would a society of pastors, perhaps a church assembly or venerable
presbytery (as those among the Dutch call themselves), not be justified in
binding itself by oath to a certain unalterable symbol in order to secure a
constant guardianship over each of its members and through them over the
people, and this for all time: I say that this is wholly impossible. Such a
contract, whose intention is to preclude forever all further enlightenment
of the human race, is absolutely null and void, even if it should be
ratified by the supreme power, by parliaments, and by the most solemn peace
treaties. One age cannot bind itself, and thus conspire, to place a
succeeding one in a condition whereby it would be impossible for the later
age to expand its knowledge (particularly where it is so very important),
to rid itself of errors,and generally to increase its enlightenment. That
would be a crime against human nature, whose essential destiny lies
precisely in such progress; subsequent generations are thus completely
justified in dismissing such agreements as unauthorized and criminal. The
criterion of everything that can be agreed upon as a law by a people lies
in this question: Can a people impose such a law on itself? Now it might be
possible, in anticipation of a better state of affairs, to introduce a
provisional order for a specific, short time, all the while giving all
citizens, especially clergy, in their role as scholars, the freedom to
comment publicly, i.e., in writing, on the present institution's
shortcomings. The provisional order might

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Kant's "What Is Enlightenment"
http://www.english.upenn.edu/~mgamer/Etexts/kant.html

last until insight into the nature of these matters had become so
widespread and obvious that the combined (if not unanimous) voices of the
populace could propose to the crown that it take under its protection those
congregations that, in accord with their newly gained insight, had
organized themselves under altered religious institutions, but without
interfering with those wishing to allow matters to remain as before.
However, it is absolutely forbidden that they unite into a religious
organization that nobody may for the duration of a man's lifetime publicly
question, for so do-ing would deny, render fruitless, and make detrimental
to succeeding generations an era in man's progress toward improvement. A
man may put off enlightenment with regard to what he ought to know, though
only for a short time and for his own person; but to renounce it for
himself, or, even more, for subsequent generations, is to violate and
trample man's divine rights underfoot. And what a people may not decree for
itself may still less be imposed on it by a monarch, for his lawgiving
authority rests on his unification of the people's collective will in his
own. If he only sees to it that all genuine or purported improvement is
consonant with civil order, he can allow his subjects to do what they find
necessary to their spiritual well-being, which is not his affair. However,
he must prevent anyone from forcibly interfering with another's working as
best he can to determine and promote his well-being. It detracts from his
own majesty when he interferes in these matters, since the writings in
which his subjects attempt to clarify their insights lend value to his
conception of governance. This holds whether he acts from his own highest
insight-whereby he calls upon himself the reproach, "Caesar non eat supra
grammaticos."'-as well as, indeed even more, when he despoils his highest
authority by supporting the spiritual despotism of some tyrants in his
state over his other subjects.

If it is now asked, "Do we presently live in an enlightened age?" the
answer is, "No, but we do live in an age of enlightenment." As matters now
stand, a great deal is still lacking in order for men as a whole to be, or
even to put themselves into a position to be able without external guidance
to apply understanding confidently to religious issues. But we do have
clear indications that the way is now being opened for men to proceed
freely in this direction and that the obstacles to general enlightenment-to
their release from their self-imposed immaturity-are gradually diminishing.
In this regard, this age is the age of enlightenment, the century of
Frederick.

A prince who does not find it beneath him to say that he takes it to be
his duty to prescribe nothing, but rather to allow men complete freedom in
religious matters-who thereby renounces the arrogant title of tolerance-is
himself enlightened and deserves to be praised by a grateful present and by
posterity as the first, at least where the government is concerned, to
release the human race from immaturity and to leave everyone free to use
his own reason in all matters of conscience. Under his rule, venerable
pastors, in their role as scholars and without prejudice to their official
duties, may freely and openly set out for the world's scrutiny their
judgments and views, even where these occasionally differ from the accepted
symbol. Still greater freedom is afforded to those who are not restricted
by an official post. This spirit of freedom is expanding even where it must
struggle against the external obstacles of governments that misunderstand
their own function. Such governments are illuminated by the example that
the existence of freedom need not give cause for the least concern
regarding public order and harmony in the commonwealth. If only they
refrain from inventing artifices to keep themselves in it, men will
gradually raise themselves from barbarism.

I have focused on religious matters in setting out my main point
concerning enlightenment, i.e., man's emergence from self-imposed
immaturity, first because our rulers have no interest in assuming the role
of their subjects' guardians with respect to the arts and sciences, and
secondly because that form of immaturity is both the most pernicious and
disgraceful of all. But the manner of thinking of a head of state who
favors religious enlightenment goes even further, for he realizes that
there is no danger to his legislation in allowing his subjects to use
reason publicly and to set before the world their thoughts concerning
better formulations of his laws, even if this involves frank criticism of
legislation currently in effect. We have before us a shining example, with
respect to which no monarch surpasses the one whom we honor.

But only a ruler who is himself enlightened and has no dread of
shadows, yet who likewise has a well-disciplined, numerous army to
guarantee public peace, can say what no republic may dare, namely:

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Kant's "What Is Enlightenment"
http://www.english.upenn.edu/~mgamer/Etexts/kant.html

"Argue as much as you want and about what you want, but obey!" Here as
elsewhere, when things are considered in broad perspective, a strange,
unexpected pattern in human affairs reveals itself, one in which almost
everything is paradoxical. A greater degree of civil freedom seems
advantageous to a people's spiritual freedom; yet the former established
impassable boundaries for the latter; conversely, a lesser degree of civil
freedom provides enough room for all fully to expand their abilities. Thus,
once nature has removed the hard shell from this kernel for which she has
most fondly cared, namely, the inclination to and vocation for free
thinking, the kernel gradually reacts on a people's mentality (whereby they
become increasingly able to act freely), and it finally even influences the
principles of government, which finds that it can profit by treating men,
who are now more than machines, in accord with their dignity.

I. Kant
Konigsberg in Prussia, 30 September 1784

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