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P r e s i d e n t i a l ta s k F o rc e
Confron t ing t he Ideolog y of R a dic a l E x t r e m ism

Task Force on Confronting the Ideolog y of Radical Extremism

R ew r iting the Nar r ati ve
A n I ntegrated Strateg y for Counterradica l ization

M arch 2009

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P r e s i d e n t i a l ta s k F o rc e Task Force on Confronting the Ideolog y of Radical Extremism

R ew r iting the Na r r ati v e
A n Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization
M arch 2009


All rig hts reser ved. Printed in the United States of America . No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording , or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2009 by the Washing ton Institute for Near East Policy Published in 2009 in the United States of America by the Washing ton Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washing ton, DC 20036. Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and Communication Front cover: Three young boys in a classroom are crammed into a desk designed for two at the Al-Thikafa al-Arabia (Arab Culture) elementar y school in a poor neighborhood of Baghdad. The struggling school can't afford enough desks, textbooks, and other material for students. (AP Photo/Enric F. Marti)


Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v Over view . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Extremist Ideolog y Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Efforts to Address Extremist Ideolog y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Task Force Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1. Strategic Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2. Functional Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3. Structural Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Signatories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Convenors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

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Pr eface

year since 1988, The Washing ton Institute has convened a bipartisan Presidentia l Study Group of statesmen, diplo mats, leg islators, scholars, and experts to examine the s t a t e o f th e M i d d l e E a s t a n d t o o f f e r th e i r c o l l e c ti v e a d v i c e o n M i d e a s t p o l i c y m a ki n g i n a c o m p r e h e n s i v e report to the new administration. This year, The Washing ton Institute convened three independent task forces focused on three critical and discrete issues hig h on the Middle East polic y agenda f acing the inc om ing adm in istration . In June 20 08, the Institute released the first of the three task force reports, Strengthening the Partnership, which focused on deepening U.S.-Israel cooperation in dealing with Iranian nuclear ambitions. This second report--a joint endeavor by two Institute programs, Project Fikra and the Stein Prog ram on Counterterrorism and Intelligence--represents the finding s and recommendations of the Institute's Task Force on Confronting the Ide olog y of Radical Extremism. A third report, from the Task Force on Combating Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East, is forthcoming. The Ta sk Force on Confronting the Ide olo g y of Radical Extremism met a number of times at the Institute's offices in Washing ton, D.C., where senior U.S. o f f i c i a l s -- r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e d e p a r tm e n t s o f D e f e n s e , State, and Homeland Security, as well as the National C o unt e r t e r r o r i s m C e nt e r --p r o v i d e d i l l um i n a t i n g briefing s that helped inform the task force's deliberations and, ultimately, its recommendations. Thanks go to these ag encies for their cooperation with both The Washing ton Institute and this task force. Several task force members accompanied the convenors to Europe to study firsthand both the current terrorist threat there and the approach of various European governments to counterradicalization. This group visited London, Paris, Amsterdam, and The Hague, four of the cities most critical to the success or failure of the West's global struggle with Islamist extremism. In each countr y, the group met with key policymakers, law enforcement and intelligence officials, academics, and Muslim
E A C H p r E s i d E n ti A l E l EC ti o n

community leaders to discuss these important issues. In the months following the trip, task force members have enjoyed an invaluable dialog ue with the United Kingdom's Home Office. In preparation for this report, the task force also held a small, two -day conference in Amman, Jordan, which convened regional activists and reformers with var ying backgrounds, from women's rights to journalism. Several of these Arab reformers also briefed the full task force at one of its meetings in Washington. The task force would like to acknowledg e the outstanding assistance provided by the entire staff of The Washing ton Institute in org anizing its meeting s and preparing this publication. Special thanks go to Larisa Baste, Becca Wasser, Jasmine el-Gamal, and Sana Mahmood for supporting the group's work intellectually, organizationally, and administratively. T h i s t a s k f o r c e w a s ma d e p o s s i b l e b y th e s u p p o r t of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, named in honor of Michael Stein, a founder of the Washing ton Institute ; and by Project Fikra, a pro gram that supports mainstream Muslims in the battle against extremism. Project Fikra owes its establishment to the vision, commitment, and g enerosit y of L inda , Michael, and James Keston. This report is the product of a months-long effort, including weeks of writing , drafting , editing , and critiquing ; it reflects the broad, bipartisan consensus of the task force members. Not ever y signator y endorses e v e r y j u d g m e n t o r r e c o mm e n d a t i o n i n t h e r e p o r t : m em b er s have en d o r s e d th i s rep o r t s o l e l y in th e ir i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i t i e s , a n d t h e i r e n d o r s e m e nt s d o n o t necessarily reflect those of the institutions with which they are affiliated. Finally, this report does not necessarily reflect the views of The Washing ton Institute, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. J. Scott Carpenter Michael Jacobson Matthew Levitt Convenors
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Ov erv iew

continues to fig ht militarily on multiple fronts to disrupt the efforts of alQaeda and its affiliates, the U.S. government has come slowly to the realization that militar y force alone cannot defeat radical Islamist extremism ( hereafter "radica l extremism").1 To day, there is g rowing consensus that countering the ideolog y that drives this extremism is a critical element in the overall effort to prevent and defeat the violence that emerg es from it. Despite this greater realization, a precise strateg y to effectively c o unt e r t h i s e x tr e m i s m a n d e m p o w e r m a i n s tr e a m alternatives has proved challeng ing . This issue posed a difficult challeng e to the Bush administration and r e m a i n s a d a un t i n g a n d ur g e n t t a s k f o r t h e O b a m a administration. For these reasons, the Washing ton Institute for Near East Polic y establishe d a Presidentia l Task Force on Confronting the Ideolog y of Radical Extremism. This task force is part of the Institute's quadrennial effort t o i n j e c t n e w i d e a s i nt o th e p o l i c y ma ki n g p r o c e s s a t a critical moment of transition, when g overnment is most open to new ideas. The task force is made up of a broad, bipartisan group, called together to assess our nation's existing approaches toward key topics integral to combating the spread of radical extremism. The focus of the task force included democracy pro motion, reform in Arab countries, public diplomac y, and strategic communication, as well as an exploration of the specific counterradicalization prog rams being developed by governments throughout Europe and the Middle East. Pointedly, the task force did not limit itself to considering efforts to counter only violent extremism but rather decided on a broad agenda, related to a wide spectrum of ways to understand the ideolog y that underg irds the violence. The task force also evaluated
A s t H E Un i t E d s t At E s

how effectively the U.S. government's national security apparatus is org anized to coordinate these efforts, all with an eye toward offering a set of recommendations to the new president on how to improve policy and its implementation in this critical area. Some of the key questions the task force considered in developing its recommendations were :


In the challeng e against radical extremism, who are our allies ? How do we identif y, nurture, and support them? With whom should the Obama administration be willing to partner in this effort, both domestically and internationally ? How can the U.S. government deepen and build upon org anically emerg ing fissures within g lobal jihadist movements, including but not limited to al-Qaeda? Is the U.S. government employing all available tools in order to confront radical extremism? If not, what needs to be done to incorporate these assets into our strateg y ? How could the Obama administration best amplif y the voices of mainstream Muslims to provide a credible counternarrative to extremism? How should we stay abreast of the latest trends, patterns, and developments in radical Islamist extremism and its impact on U.S. interests ? Where should our focus be : the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, Africa, Europe, the home front ? How can the Unite d States b e b etter prepare d to prevent emergent domestic radicalization? Does the











1. For the purposes of this report, we define radical Islamist extremism to include the ideologies of takfiri jihadist groups like al-Qaeda, nationalist Islamist terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hizballah, and the so -called conveyor belt groups like Hizb al-Tahrir (HT ). While groups like HT do not perpetrate acts of terrorism per se, they help lay the groundwork for al- Qaeda's toxic message to take hold and for individuals to take action. We do not consider anti­United States or anti-West attitudes alone to constitute radicalism. The task force also disting uished between radicalization and religious piety/ devotion to Islam. The extremist ideolog y at issue is a distortion of Islam, and in fact, many who have been radicalized remain surprising ly ignorant about the religion, particularly as the radicalization process has accelerated in recent years.

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Pr esiden ti a l Ta sk Force United States need to develop its own counterradicalization prog rams ? Are there " best practices" to consider ?




Ho w s h o u l d th e Un i t e d Sta t e s m o s t e f f e c ti ve l y stimulate political pluralism and economic opportunity in Arab and Muslim societies ? Clearly there is a long -term interest in seeing more resilient societies evolve in these countries, but what is the wisest route to promoting democracy ?

Ho w e x p l i c i t l y c o n n e c t e d s h o u l d p o l i t i c a l a n d economic reform in Arab countries be in our own efforts to confront terror and radicalization? How s h o u l d t h e O b a m a a d m i n i s tr a t i o n r e c o n c i l e t h e s e often competing agendas ? Is the U.S. government organized effectively to face the transnational challenges posed by radical extremism? If not, what legal, bureaucratic, or administrative changes should the new president consider to improve the U.S. capability to counter radical extremism?



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Extr emist Ideology Today

o b A m A A dm inis t r At i on ' s E A r l y E f f or t s :

While President Obama's primar y focus since taking office has been on economic issues, he has also engaged p e r s o n a l l y i n h i g h -p r o f i l e p u b l i c d i p l o m a c y e f f o r t s from the outset. During his inaug ural address, he spoke about a new relationship between Washing ton and the "Muslim world," emphasizing a new framework based on commona lit y of interests. President Obama a lso granted an extended inter view to al-Arabiya, the UAEbased television station. President Obama appears part i c u l a r l y i nt e r e s t e d i n s e t t i n g a n e w t o n e a n d s t y l e t o America's engagement with Arab and Muslim peoples. Public diplomac y is only one part of the equation, of course, and exactly how these statements are translated into a more comprehensive polic y will be the ultimate determinant of the success of President Obama's efforts in this critical area. Wh ile the pre s i d ent 's e arl y e f f or ts an d p ersona l a t t e nt i o n t o t h e t a s k a t h a n d a r e p r o m i s i n g , h e f a c e s many toug h challeng es ahead, including a radicaliza ti o n p r o b l e m tha t ha s g r o wn i n c o m p l e x i t y o v e r th e past seven years, making simple, overarching solutions difficult and unrealistic. Al- Qaeda remains the major threat to the United States, not only due to its ability to conduct large-scale terrorist attacks against the United States and its a l l i e s , b ut a l s o b e caus e o f a l- Qae da's demonstrated ability to spread its ideolog y and propag anda far and wide from the increasing ly secure safehaven in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afg hanistan. Like-minded terrorist groups located in Asia , Africa , Europ e, and the Midd le E a st, with var ying deg re es of ties to al- Qaeda , also play a key role in radicalizing Muslim youth and encouraging them to pursue a path of violence. Beyond the terrorist groups, the radicalization phenomenon is also stoked by so -called conveyorbelt g roups, which don't explicitly endorse violence, but contribute to the underlying problems. And while Hama s and Hizba lla h don't subscrib e to a l- Qae da's global jihadist vision, they have succeeded in dramatically increasing extremism among the populations in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon. Developing a
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strateg y to address all of these differing manifestations of the extremist ideolog y will be no easy feat.
A l- Q A E d A's n A r r At i v E A n d s o m E p o s i -

While al-Qaeda remains the most serious threat to the United States, over the past several months, its core has experienced growing difficulty disseminating its message. Its websites are compromised, and paranoia is growing within the organization as it struggles to adapt. More significantly, the organization has been compelled to respond defensively to a small but growing chorus of Muslims who are challenging its violent tactics, especially against fellow Muslims. Former al-Qaeda supporters and extremists are turning against their old organizations, expanding existing fissures. The most prominent of the latter group is former Eg yptian Islamic Jihad head Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (also known as Dr. Fadl). Al-Qaeda often cited Dr. Fadl's previous treatises as ideological justification for its actions, but he has since firmly renounced Usama bin Laden and written a new book rejecting al-Qaeda's message and tactics. Shaikh Salman bin Fahd al-Awdah, an extremist cleric whose incarceration in the 1990s by the Saudis reportedly helped inspire bin Laden to action, went on television to decr y al-Qaeda's actions, asking bin Laden, "How much blood has been spilt ? How many innocent people, children, elderly, and women have been killed...in the name of al-Qaeda ?" B e y o n d t h e c l e r i c a l e s t a b l i s hm e n t , o t h e r f o r m e r extremists have stepped into the debate over the future of Islam, rejecting the fringe ideas advanced by extremist theoreticians. The UK-based Quilliam Foundation is the best known of the nongovernmental organizations challenging the extremist ideolog y, describing itself as the first "counter-extremism think tank ." Led by two former members of Hizb al-Tahrir, the Quilliam Foundation aims to undermine the ideolog ical foundation of radical extremism by refuting its premises. Quilliam arg ues that the ideolog y must be critiqued and refuted "wherever it is found," a process that includes develop ing an effective counternarrative to rebut the messag e
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Pr esiden ti a l Ta sk Force put forth by radical extremist organizations. Addressing local grievances is also critically important, in Quilliam's view, to ensure that the terrorists' and extremists' global narrative does not resonate in individuals' lives.
E xt r E m is t G lob A l n A r r At i v E s t il l C on v E y or - b E lt G ro U ps : Beyond al- Qaeda's terror network, there are also existing extremist groups that do not fit neatly into the terrorist categor y. These groups do not condone violence per se, but they do contribute to the radicalization process. This categor y includes groups, such as Hizb al-Tahrir (HT ) and Tabligh Jamaat, that are often referred to as "gateway" or "conveyor belt" groups. Through these groups, as the State Department describes, individuals can turn " by stages, into sympathizers, supporters, and ultimately, members of terrorist networks." HT, or the "L iberation Part y," is an internationa l Islamist group whose raison d'etre has been to propag a t e a n " Is l a m i c " w a y o f l i f e b y r e e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e ca liphate. HT plans to achie ve its ambitious obje ctives by overthrowing Arab and Middle East reg imes through militar y coups, unif ying their disparate states into a caliphate under a sing le ruler, and then wag ing war from the caliphate on the rest of the world. HT preaches a "clash of civilizations" ideolog y to its members, criticizing Western societies as immoral and destructive, which in turn intensifies the need to transform them . H T tries to c onne ct ind ividua ls' va stly r a n g i n g l o c a l g r i e va n c e s , i n c l u d i n g p er c e i ve d r a c i a l , r e l i g i o u s , a n d s o c i o e c o n o m i c d i s c r i m i na ti o n , t o th e perceived g lobal injustices faced by Muslims, such as the conflicts in Iraq and Bosnia. In essence, local prob l e m s a r e r e i nt e r p r e t e d a s l i n k s i n th e c ha i n o f g l o b a l Muslim struggle. Despite tactical differences over the short-term use of violence, HT 's goals are quite similar to those of alQaeda, and the danger posed by groups like HT should not be underestimated. There are numerous examples of individuals radicalized by these groups' toxic messag e and ideolog y who have then left to join terrorist o r g a n i z a ti o n s , s u c h a s a l- Q a e d a , tha t m o r e e x p l i c i tl y endorse violent activit y. Perhaps most famously, Syri a n -b o r n m i l i t a n t O m a r B a k r i w a s f o r m e r l y a n H T

radical message resonates with their experience and circumstances. Even as militar y success against al- Qaeda g r o w s , t h e i d e o l o g i c a l c h a l l e n g e , un l e s s c o n f r o n t e d , will continue to metastasize. Examples of how groups take advantage of the global narrative abound.

s t ron G : Despite these signs of progress, the underlying extremist narrative offered by al-Qaeda and its affiliates remains strong and compelling for many Muslims. Al-Qaeda charges that the United States and the West, more broadly, are at war with Islam and that the Muslim world must unif y to defeat this threat and reestablish the caliphate. As evidence for their narrative, extremist groups point to the war in Iraq, GuantÀnamo, Abu Ghraib, U.S. support for Israel, and Washing ton's reluctance to compel changes in authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. W h i l e r a d i c a l i z a t i o n w o u l d h a r d l y b e s ur p r i s i n g among those personally affected, such as detainees at Abu Ghraib, al-Qaeda's recruitment extends to distant witnesses of these policies. Instrumental to this wider success is the g roup's abilit y to conne ct individua ls' local grievances to the g lobal narrative. In fact, there is strong evidence that al- Qaeda's efforts to spread its destructive ideolog y have encouraged terrorist groups pre viously focuse d on more loca l targ ets, such as alQaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (formerly known as the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat), to shift their ideolog ical focus to the g lobal strug g le. By appropriating the al- Qaeda brand, other "homegrown terrorists" have become far more dangerous than they other wise would have been. And terrorists inspired by, but with no direct ties to, al- Qaeda continue to perpetuate violence globally, justified by al- Qaeda's global narrative. The reasons the extremist narrative finds fertile soil in so many societies around the world are as various as the societies themselves. Some young Muslims respond to a radicalizer 's messa g e be cause the y fe el exclude d from their societies, trapped as they are in poverty or hopelessness within authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and be yond. Others, well- off and well-e ducated, live in Western democratic nations, but struggle with issues of belonging and identity and find that the 4

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Confron t ing t he Ideolog y of R a dic a l E x t r e m ism member in London until he left to form al-Muhajiroun, a jihadist org anization that advocates the use of vio lenc e. Ric hard R e i d , th e Bri ti s h "s h o e b omb er " who attempted to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami in 20 02, belong e d to the latter group. Several of the September 11 plotters, including Mohammed Atta, read HT 's German magazine, Explizit, and attende d le ctures by one of HT 's leaders in Germany. In fact, HT has openly acknowle dg e d its associa tion with terrorist entities. In an inter view with a Pakistani newspaper in 2005, HT spokesman Naveed Butt said, "After the Iranian Revolution, Hizb's senior leaders went to see Imam Khomeini to discuss Islamization ment protections. However, by limiting its efforts to confronting only the violent extremist ideolog y, the United States has taken these legitimate concerns too far and largely ignored other groups that contribute to the underlying problems. Instead, the government has left the task of countering these other extremist groups to org anizations like Quilliam, which make the extremists the main target of their efforts. Although other groups challenge extremist ideolog y at the community level, Quilliam aims to operate globally and has a higher profile. On university c a m p u s e s a n d i n th e p u b l i c s q ua r e , Q u i l l i a m o p e n l y challeng es extremist groups and accuses them of having twisted Islam beyond all recognition. By fostering

" The rea so ns the e x tremist narra tive f inds fert i l e s oi l i n s o m a n y s o c i e t i e s a r o un d t h e w or l d are a s v ari ous a s the societies thems e l ves. "
a "g enuine British Islam ... fre e from the bitter politics of the Arab and Muslim world," Quilliam believes extrem ist ide olo g y can b e defeate d . Unfor tunately, there are still far too few voices like Quilliam. Identif ying and amplif ying them throug hout the world must be a key component of countering the broader ideolog y of all extremist groups, not limited to those perpetrating violence. Islamist terrorist groups like Hamas and Hizballah have also g ained power and momentum over the past eig ht years, both throug h the ballot box and throug h force. Hamas took the United States by surprise with its 20 0 6 electoral victor y in the Palestinian territories, and followed this win with an armed coup in Gaza in 20 07. Hizballah, on the other hand, has been a political party in Lebanon for many years and is currently a major power center in the Lebanese g overnment. The extent of Hizballah's control of the g overnment is best illustrated by its power to veto any g overnmental action that it opposes. Hizballah was able to achieve
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with him and to ask him to declare Khilafa . Similarly, we went to Mulla Omar to enquire whether he had declared Khilafa the goal of the Taliban. We have given a l l th e s e m o v e m e nt s a s s i s t a n c e i n f o l l o w i n g th e r o a d back to the Khilafat." HT is also growing widely in popularity, attracting thousands of people to its rallies in Europe and Asia . H T h a s b e e n e s p e c i a l l y a d e p t a t t a ki n g a d v a nt a g e o f the internet, includ ing YouTub e, to promu l g ate its messag e. This avenue of dissemination is quite effective, particularly with the younger generations of Muslims in the West.
U. s . s t r U G G l E s t o C o U n t E r C o n v E y o rb E lt G ro U ps : Attempts by the United States to defeat al-Qaeda and the broader terrorist networks have been well documented. Developing a strateg y to take on these types of conveyor-belt groups has proven more vexing. The United States has been understandably reluctant to use prosecution, designation, or other legal tools to target these groups for a variety of reasons, including concerns about abridging First Amend-

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Pr esiden ti a l Ta sk Force this greater role in the wake of its armed takeover of Beirut in early 20 08. Hamas and Hizballah's greater domestic legitimac y c o m p l i c a t e s t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f s tr a t e g i e s t o r e d u c e their appeal. Such legitimacy has been gained not only through the ballot (an approach rejected by al-Qaeda) but a lso throug h their extensive so cia l ser vices networks, ser vices that the local governments have proved unab le to provide. The 20 0 6 war b et we en Hizb a llah and Israel offers a g ood example of this. After the thirty-four-day war, Hizballah immediately stepped in and took the lead in providing financial assistance to those whose properties had been damag ed during the we now have to ask what role the Middle East will play in Europ e ." Europ e ha s attra c te d hug e num b er s o f Muslim political and economic refugees from Middle Eastern and South Asian countries in recent histor y. Some of these immigrants and their children are failing to or are not allowed to integrate into European societies, creating profound questions centering on identity. No longer identif ying with their "home" countr y and feeling excluded from and resentful toward their adopted societ y, these individuals search for belong i n g o r a c au s e . S o m e c h o o s e t o a c c ep t a n i d e o l o g y o f violence or define themselves by a radicalized form of Islam ; though their numbers are small, their potential

"Ha m a s and hizb all ah' s grea te r do mesti c l e g i t i m a c y c o m p l i c at e s t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f stra tegies t o re duce the ir appeal. "
conflict. This was a task well beyond the capabilities of the Lebanese government. Because militar y solutions ag ainst such groups are unlikely to succeed, a successful strateg y will require the emerg ence of credible, domestic political alterna tives with demonstrated ability to contend with each respective group. Such alternatives exist but are presently weak and fragmented ; far too little has been done to support them, both politically and with resources. While the pub lic and media have often focused attention on radicalization and terrorism emanating from the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, or from South Asia, extremism and the radicalization process have become key issues in a number of European countries as well. High on this list are some of the key U.S. allies in Europe, including Britain, France, Belgium, Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands. Renowned historian Bernard Lewis recently noted t h a t " i n t h e p a s t Eu r o p e p l a y e d a p r o m i n e n t , e v e n dominant role toward the Middle East ... today, instead of asking what role Europe will play in the Middle East,
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impact is larg e. R adical preachers, such as UK-based Abu Qatada and Abu Hamza, have aggressively pushed the extremist ideolog y and for a number of years ser ved as influential radicalizing forces in Britain and beyond. The terrorist cells in Britain have proven particularly d a n g ero us b e c aus e o f th e i r l i n k s t o c o re a l- Qa e d a , w h i c h h a v e o f t e n b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d t hr o u g h c o nn e c tions bet ween the Pakistani communities of Britain, Pakistan, and Kashmir. W h i l e o n l y a v e r y s ma l l p e r c e nt a g e o f r a d i c a l i z e d Muslims have turned to terrorism, those who do present a special, potential threat. Would-be terrorists from European countries face far fewer obstacles to entering and adapting to life in the Unite d States than those from the Midd le E a st. Therefore, the U.S. g overnment must pay close attention to radicalization abroad. A i d e d b y t h e t e c hn o l o g i c a l a d v a n c e m e n t s a v a i l a b l e via the internet, small cells of extremists in the United States can conne ct far more easily with like-minde d terrorists overseas.
r A di C A l iz At i on on t HE H om E f ron t :

Muslim-American communities have had a positive
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Confron t ing t he Ideolog y of R a dic a l E x t r e m ism integration experience when compared to Muslims' experience in Europe. This difference is largely attributable to the United States' inclusive, immigrant-friendly environment, stringent and well-enforced antidiscrimination policies, and--most of all--the strong belief in an equal opportunity to climb the socioeconomic ladder and achieve financial prosperity. The United States has also put in place a governmental, bureaucratic structure that seeks to protect the civil rights and civil liberties of all its citizens, including Muslims and those of Arab orig in. It has long been doing so with little fanfare or publicit y. As a beneficial byproduct, these actions may help thwart radicalization. Some of the many, little-known examples include:


Justic e D ep ar tm ent law su i ts a g a inst s c h o o ls and employers prohibiting students and employees from wearing hijabs. Justi c e D ep a r tm ent p ro s e c uti o ns o f hate crim e s against Muslims. The Department of Homeland Security's Office for Civil Liberties and Civil Rig hts, the focus of which ha s b e e n o n a d d r e s s i n g a n d r e s o l v i n g c o mp l a i nt s (including those of Muslims) associated with the no fly lists, profiling , and naturalization backlogs.





Law enforcement and intellig ence officials have identi f i e d p r i s o n s a n d th e i nt e rn e t a s t w o ma j o r a r e a s o f potential radica lization within the Unite d States. A good example of the former phenomenon was the 2005 plot by the Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh, in which Muslim converts who met in prison planned to attack Jewish and Israeli targets, particularly synagog ues, in California. In 2007, exemplif ying the latter area, a potential plot was disrupted in which Atlanta colleg e students had sur veille d possible targ ets in Washing ton, D.C. According to the FBI, these students were connected virtually to a global network run by British webmaster Younis Tsouli, who facilitated Internet communication

with prospective cells in Sweden, Bosnia, and Canada, among other locations. Today, U.S. authorities are increasing ly concerned about possible radicalization in the Somali-American communities. There have been a number of reports of y o un g m e n d i s a p p e a r i n g f r o m t h e s e c o mm un i t i e s i n the United States and then surfacing in Somalia, where they have g one to fig ht with the Islamist forces in the battle for control over Mog adishu (and where one of t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l s c o mm i t t e d a s u i c i d e a t t a c k ) . T h i s phenomenon of increased radicalization in the Somali expatriate communities is not limited to the Unite d States, with similar counterterrorism probes under way in Europe and Australia as well. Beyond the g lobal jihadist groups, authorities have also uncovered entities tied to Hizballah and Hamas here in the United States--thoug h this has been less of a concern in recent years. For example, in November 2008, jurors convicted the leaders of a Texas-based charity, the Holy Land Foundation, for providing sup port to Hamas and ser ving as the group's representatives in the United States. Evidence presented at the trial revealed that the defendants "provided financial support to the families of Hamas mart yrs, detainees, and activists knowing and intending that such assistance wou ld supp or t the Hama s terrorist org an ization." In July 2007, the United States added the Goodwill Charitable Office (G CO) in Dearborn, Michigan, to its terrorism blacklist for its ties to Hizballah, charging the nong overnmental org anization (NG O) with instructing "Hizballah members in the United States to send their contributions to G CO and to contact the G CO for the purpose of contributing to the Martyrs Foundation." In addition to global jihadism, the activities of groups like Hamas and Hizballah in the United States remain a concern. The vast majorit y of the Muslim and Arab American population is well integrated and rejects this violent ideolog y. Unfortunately, the U.S. government has not always empowered these communities effectively to provide an alternative to the extremist narrative.

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Efforts to A ddr ess Extr emist Ideology
E n H A n C in G C o U n t E r r A di C A l iz At i on p ro G r A ms : As countries in the Middle East and Europe have beg un to better understand the radicalization process and what feeds it, many countries have beg un to create programs to combat it. These programs are designed specifically to inter vene early in the radicalization process to prevent it from taking place or to reverse radicalization in cases where it has already occurred. European countries are developing independent approaches to preventing radicalization, though some coordination is beginning to take place. The French strateg y, for example, differs greatly from the British and Dutch approach in that France sees radicalization as a problem of social integration rather than a religious issue. As such, it maintains a strong police and intelligence presence, rather than cooperating with local imams to create a connection between them and the local community. While France is confident that this approach is highly effective, there is more widespread support for the Dutch and British method. This approach involves greater community engagement and the use of tools--imams, teachers, and social workers--already existing within the community network. In Holland, the cit y of Amsterdam has developed a particularly innovative approach to countering radic a l i z ati o n at th e l o c a l l e ve l . Am s t erd a m cre at e d a n "information house," which has developed networks in the local communities, and to whom people can turn r e g a r d i n g c o n c ern s a b o ut sp e c i f i c i n d i v i d ua l s . T h i s i n f o rma ti o n h o u s e i s d e s i g n e d t o r e s o l v e a n d a d d r e s s concerns about radicalization versus merely increased relig iosity, for example. The information house works closely with law enforcement, which is only involved if a g iven person is deemed to pose an immediate danger. Other wise, the information house itself will tr y to inter vene and defuse the situation. The British have also tried to broaden their "PREVENT," or counterradicalization, strateg y beyond the law enforcement and intelligence agencies, since other agencies' actions can also have alternatively positive or neg ative effects on communit y relations and perhaps 8

on radica lization itself. The British have e ven ta ken steps to ensure that their diplomatic corps is following throug h in implementing the "PREVENT " strateg y. Ambassadors in posts where potential threats to Brita in emanate, such as Pa kistan, are rate d on how effectively they have carried out their responsibilities in this area. Regardless of the approach, the fact of the matter is that many European countries perceive radicalization to be serious enough to develop programs to address it. Ironically, the best-known government counterradicalization program in the Middle East exists in Saudi Arabia , where the threat orig inated and from which t h e f un d s t o s u s t a i n i t o f t e n e m a n a t e . T h e p r o g r a m f o c u s e s o n r a d i c a l i z e d i n d i v i d ua l s w h o hav e n o t y e t taken violent action and attempts to reintegrate them into Saudi society. The rehabilitators help these individuals find jobs, housing , and a spouse. Saudi clerics use the Quran and other religious teachings to "reeducate" them, explaining how they were previously on the wrong path. While U.S. officials and others have been highly complementar y of the Saudi program, citing its low recidivism rates, this is a model that would not be easily replicated in the West, in part because the Saudis put tremendous pressure on the individuals' families, threatening to hold them accountable if the individual rejoins the terrorist cause.
C o U n t E r in G E xt r E m ism t H ro UG H dE m o C r At i C A nd E C on om i C r E f or m : Political and economic reform in the Middle East remains the best strategic response for overcoming the region's deep structural challenges and reducing the pool of potential recruits to radical extremism. Deeper economic reform is urg ently needed. The r e g i o n a s a w h o l e c ur r e n t l y f a c e s a y o u t h b u l g e t h a t re qu ire s 10 0 m i l l i on n e w j o b s b e cre ate d by 2 010 , according to the World Bank . Finding ways to absorb such huge numbers of young people presents a daunting challenge, especially g iven current unemployment rates of 25 percent or higher.

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Confron t ing t he Ideolog y of R a dic a l E x t r e m ism From Morocco to the Persian Gulf, g overnmental experiments to revitalize or retool economies are taking place. Due to a surge in oil prices over the past few years, spectacular cash holdings have spurred the governments of the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, among others, to invest directly in meg a-projects within their countries and across the region. Saudi Arabia is establishing entirely new cities and making renewed efforts to diversif y its economy. Eg ypt has established an independent central bank, reformed its financial sector, and begun to privatize some state-owned industries, contributing to a steadily improving growth averaging 5 percent or better in the past few years. Now, with the g lobal slowdown touched off by the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, finding a way to cushion these economies will be extremely d i f f i c u l t , e s p e c i a l l y th o s e o f p o o r a n d o v e r p o p u l a t e d states like Eg ypt, perhaps fueling political instability and further radicalization. D e s p i t e g o v e r n m e n t s' e f f o r t s t o s t i m u l a t e t h e i r respective economies, little has been done to improve democratic governance. In fact, according to Freedom House, 61 percent of the countries in the reg ion are "not fre e" a s of 20 0 9, with the pa st thre e years se eing incremental and une ven prog ress in the political rights and civil liberties indices. The absence of demo cratic oversight and accountability restrains economic growth and inhibits human development, as the 20 02 and subsequent UN De velopment Prog ramme Arab Human Development reports made clear. Parliaments in the reg ion remain weak . Judiciaries lack independence. Politica l parties do not f ulfill their f unction. Independent media , where it exists at all, is small and harassed. Without such institutions, creating the necessar y transparency to provide oversight to the executive b r a n c h b e c o m e s i m p o s s i b l e , f u e l i n g f r u s tr a t i o n a n d resentment, occasionally driving individuals harboring these sentiments underground. If economic reform is to be advanced and sustained, democratic development must also take place. Results of U.S. efforts to address these challeng es have been mixed. Governments in the reg ion have yet to establish the leg al frameworks necessar y for thriving economies and functioning democracies, and the political will to implement them has been fundamenTh e Wa sh i ngton I nst i t u t e for Ne a r E a st Polic y

tally lacking. Outside actors like the United States have limited leverag e over these g overnments but can still exercise influence. The U.S. Ag enc y for International Development (USAID), the Middle East Partnership Initiative, as well as the Millennium Challenge Corpo ration (MCC) have separately made inroads in stimul a t i n g r e f o r m , b u t t h e y a r e s e v e r e l y un d e r r e s o ur c e d relative to the task at hand : yearly spending on democrac y programming for the whole of the broader Middle East remains less than 1 percent of the Pentag on's annual expenditures in Iraq alone. With the c o l lapse of o il pric es and the c ontraction of the g lobal economy, pressures on the reg ion's economies create both opportunities and challeng es for the Unite d States and its partners in the reg ion . In the short term, helping the region's governments to stabilize their economies is clearly in the U.S. interest but only if such assistance is linked to serious commitments to political reform and anticorruption measures. Other wise, any "stability" achieved will be short-lived and subject to populist reaction, leading to potentially greater dislocation later.
p A r tn E r i n G w i t H A r A b G o v E r n m E n t s :

In part because of the region's "democracy deficit," the question arises as to whether its governments in the region can be real partners with the United States in countering extremism. The Bush administration determined that altering the relationship with America's allies in Middle East was essential to creating a more lasting stability in the region, choosing to put public pressure on its "friends" to open up both their political processes and their economies. The public aspect of the "Freedom Agenda" contributed to significant friction with the governments, but reluctantly, in order to get the United States off their backs, many governments began to make both real and cosmetic changes after 2002. As the situation in postwar Iraq deterio rated, however, U.S. pressure was turned against the administration as a propaganda tool. These governments arg ued that the United States was tr ying to impose its political system on the region and claimed Iraq was proof that democracy only brings instability and insecurity.
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Pr esiden ti a l Ta sk Force A s th e a d m i n i s tr a ti o n w a s p u b l i c l y a d v o c a ti n g the Freedom Ag enda , after the September 11 attacks it came to rely on these same g overnments to quietly share intellig ence and partner with U.S. militar y and intelligence ag encies to ag gressively combat terrorism inside their countries and out. This logical cooperation between g overnments with a shared interest was not g iven ade quate context by the Unite d States, resulti n g i n a s c h i z o p hr e n i c m e s s a g e t o t h e g o v e r nm e n t s and publics of the reg ion and op ening the administration up to charg es of hypocrisy, double-standards, and inconsistenc y. With the election of Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza in 20 0 6 and the electoral g ains of the Muslim Brothers in Eg ypt, the administration was seen to shelve its reformist push altogether, further undermining its credibility in the reg ion among Arab Over the past few years, Mubarak, now eig hty, has permitted the government to undertake a series of eco nomic reforms. These reforms have contributed to a growing Eg yptian economy but have not been accompanied by concomitant political reforms. As the eco nomic reforms have beg un to trig g er political unrest, in fact, the regime has increasingly come to rely on its security forces and the defense establishment to maintain stability. The reluctance to increase political space f o r p o l i ti c a l l i b er a l s , l e f ti s t s , nati o na l i s t s , b l o g g er s , Facebook activists, and journalists has contributed to a streng thening of the only opposition with access to r e s o ur c e s a n d t h e m o s q u e , t h e b a nn e d b u t t o l e r a t e d Mus l im Bro th erh o o d . Th i s c om b inati on o f e vents potentially risks Eg ypt's stability and with it the stability of the region as a whole.

" E g y p t r e m a i n s t h e be l lw e t h e r f or U . S . p o l i c y... a n d ... p r e s e n t s a c r u c i a l c a s e f o r appl yin g this b al an cin g fo rm u l a. "

p u b l i c s a n d s i g n a l i n g t o A r a b g o v e r nm e n t s t h a t t h e U.S. support for greater freedom within their societies was over. A key test for the Obama administration will be to determine the precise formula of cajoling and coop erating with friendly g overnments for the long -term efforts to support political and economic reform while confronting radical extremism.
E G y p t r E m A i n s t H E b E l lw E t H E r f o r U. s . p ol i C y : As the most populous Arab state and the largest recipient of U.S. economic and militar y aid in the Middle East, Eg ypt presents a crucial case for applying this balancing formula. Under the leadership of President Hosni Mubarak, Eg ypt has been a strategic partner of the United States for nearly thirty years but soon faces an inevitable transition. The Obama administration must have a clear view of how it wants to shape that transition and, if it so chooses, how it wants to redefine the partnership. 10

Despite concerns over Eg ypt's worrying political circumstances, the United States will continue to cooperate with Eg ypt on a full range of foreign policy priorities including efforts to make peace between Israel and Arab states, efforts to maintain security in the eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea, as well as efforts to confront radical extremism. However, as the administration sets priorities for continued partnership with Cairo, it should formulate new ways to secure long-term objectives while meeting short-term g oals. In exchang e for continued partnership in strateg ic, militar y, and eco nomic relations, for example, it should at the same time seek Eg ypt's commitment to an agenda of constructive regional responsibility, structural eradication of corrup tion, and an expansion of civil and political space. Prioritizing its engagement with Cairo among these various objectives requires deft and nimble diplomacy, but how well Washing ton succeeds in its larger regional polic y will be judged in large measure by how well or poorly that policy works for Eg ypt.
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Confron t ing t he Ideolog y of R a dic a l E x t r e m ism
w E A k pU b l i C d iplom A C y E f f or t s : The Bush administration tried a variety of public diplo macy efforts, some of which were more successful than others. Overall, however, it did not meet the challenges elaborated in the previous passages. In pursuing new missions, defining new strategies, and coordinating the available tools, the Obama administration should retain those elements of existing policies that have proven successful while garnering greater financial and human resources to develop a fresh approach to public diplomacy. D ur i n g t h e p a s t e i g h t y e a r s , f o r i n s t a n c e , s a t e l l i t e television has demonstrated a dramatic impact on the reg ion. Al-Jazeera Arabic, with its emphasis on sensa t i o n a l i s m f r e q u e n t l y t i n g e d w i t h a n t i -A m e r i c a n i s m , has car ved out a substantial market share. If, in earlier years, former Eg yptian leader Gama l Abdel Nasser 's myth of an Arab world was just that, today al-Jazeera may successf ully forg e such a consciousness, for better or, more likely, worse. During that same time, the U.S. tools to create alternatives proved insufficiently responsive to policy priorities and were slow to revamp for th is ne w cha l leng e. Caug ht up in h ig h ly p ar tisan infig hting , the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BB G) and Cong ress have lacke d a sense of mission and imagination and failed to provide Voice of America ( VOA), Radio Farda, and al-Hurra with consistent priorities, resources, and oversight. A s a r e s u l t , th e s e p o t enti a l l y p o w er f u l t o o l s hav e i n s t ead r e m a i ne d o n t he p e r i p he r y of p o l ic y d is c u ss i o n a n d have n o t l i ve d up t o th e i r p o t enti a l i n t e r m s o f p r o v i d i n g t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s o ur c e s o f n e w s , o p i n i o n , a n d c r o s s - c u l t ur a l c o n t e n t f o r w h i c h t h e y were desig ne d. The result has be en lost time, misse d opportunities, and, for some, falling listener/viewership. Not until S e cretar y of State Condole e zza Rice t o o k i n d e p en d ent a c ti o n i n th e 2 0 0 6 s up p l em enta l appropriations request was Cong ress forced to effectively double the B B G budg et for Iran, for instance. Ne a r l y n i n e y e a r s a f t e r S e p t e m b e r 11 a n d d e sp i t e t h e s e a d d i t i o n a l r e s o ur c e s , V O A t o d a y c o n t i n u e s t o broadcast Larr y King and other CNN "filler " content into Iran for lack of orig inal programming . Moreover, t h e b r o a d c a s t e r s r e m a i n t a r g e t s o f f r e q u e nt c r i t i c i s m

f r o m a c r o s s t h e p o l i t i c a l s p e c tr um f o r t h e i r f a i l ur e to make dramatic prog ress in reaching more of their intended audience.
pU b l i C d iplom A C y vs . bAttlE of idEAs: Part of the reason for the insufficient attention to the government's mass media, potentially one of its most important tools for engaging with foreign publics, has been a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature public diplomacy. For the balance of President Bush's two terms, a succession of undersecretaries at the State Department perceived the primar y challenge in public diplomacy as getting citizens around the world to have a more positive view of the United States. Initiatives centered on advertising campaigns, listening tours, "goodwill" ambassadors such as Cal Ripken Jr., and the like. Most of these efforts, though well-meaning , have been wholly ineffective in empowering mainstream voices at the forefront of the struggle with radical extremism. The traditional tools of public diplomacy-- exchanges, scholarships, etc.--are extremely important in exposing individuals to the best of American political culture but are extremely limited in scale and scope. Empowering those who have something at stake in their communities is far more important, even if the actors themselves have ambivalent views of the United States and its policies. L a t e i n i t s s e c o n d t e r m , t h e B u s h a d m i n i s tr a t i o n beg an to grapple with the difference between improving foreig ners' perception of the United States (conventiona l pub l ic d ip lomac y) and supp or ting ma instream Muslim voices. In 20 07, for instance, the State D e p a r tm e n t , c o g n i z a n t o f t h e n e e d t o un d e r s t a n d the rad ica l ization problem in Europ e, establ ishe d a senior-le vel position within the Bureau of European Aff a irs to work with and advise the a ssistant se cretar y of state for Europ e. The State D epar tment a lso i n i ti at e d a n a rr a y o f p ro g r a m s t o b e g i n t o i d enti f y and support mainstream Muslim voices, but many of these are so ne w that the y have yet to emb e d themselves within the bureaucrac y. G ro w in G m il i t A r y r ol E in s t r At E G i C C om m U ni C At i on s :

The Pentagon, in the mean11

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Pr esiden ti a l Ta sk Force time, has increased its capacity in this area, as it has in so many others since September 11, from humanitarian assistance to intelligence. In 2007 it established a dep uty assistant secretar y for the support of public diplo macy to fill a perceived gap in the direction of the war of ideas. The U.S. Combatant Commands, particularly Central Command, have seen the necessity to engage in "shaping " operations across its area of responsibility, in order to better position the U.S. militar y should it be forced to engage in those countries. In conflict zones, it is clear that the U.S. militar y should have the lead in developing and implementing integrated political-militar y strateg ies to ensure force protection and broader se curit y and stabilit y within their areas of responsibility. Increasingly, however, the Pentag on is developing capacities that are the proper pur view of civilian agencies that unfortunately lack the capacity of the U.S. Department of Defense. W h e n i t c o m e s t o e f f o r t s f o s t e r i n g a l t e rna ti v e s t o extremism, resources are currently hopelessly skewed between militar y and civilian ag encies. As noted earlier, annual U.S. g overnment spending on democrac y promotion and public diplomacy in the entire broader Middle East is less than 1 p ercent of the Penta g on's annual expenditures in Iraq. By the end of this decade, the Penta g on wil l have thre e times a s many Sp e cia l Op erations Forces (6 0,0 0 0) than the State Depar tment has employees (18,0 0 0 -plus in 20 0 6). Secretar y of Defense Robert Gates has recognized this problem and called for more resources for the State Department and USAID, but the Obama administration will have to do the heavy lifting necessar y to make the case for greater resources to a reluctant Congress. In addition, the effort is plag ued by a lack of coordination. While the undersecretar y of state for public diplomac y is the White House desig nee in charg e of the government's strategic communication efforts, this p o s i t i o n h a s n o a ut h o r i t y o v e r b u d g e t s a n d h a s b e e n relegated to a weak coordinating function. The underse cretar y, for instance, has no clear view of how the Combatant Commands are disposing of their extraord i n a r y r e s o ur c e s a n d i s p o w e r l e s s t o d i r e c t t h e m . A strong interagenc y process that gave the State Department greater say in these areas would ensure enhanced coordination of effort for greater effect. Recently, the g o v e r nm e n t t o o k a s t e p f o r w a r d b y e s t a b l i s h i n g a n informal "small group" including the National Counter terrorism Center (N C TC), the Centra l Intel l i gence Agency, and the Defense and State departments t o s ha r e o p e r a ti o na l d e t a i l s o f b o th o v e r t a n d c o v e r t activities in this arena . Given the challeng es outlined here, clearly an informal sharing exercise is insufficient. Along these lines, the deput y national securit y advi sor for combating terrorism is fully occupied with the militar y, law enforcement, and intellig ence aspects of counterterrorism, leaving insufficient time to focus on the ideological radicalization process. A British government official, speaking about individuals' connections to extremist ideolog y, put it best. " There is no single path that leads people to violent extremism," he said. "Social, foreign policy, economic, and personal factors all lead people to throw their lot in with extremists." Broadly speaking , in order to break this disturbing c ycle of radicalization, the United States and its allies must stimulate competition for the would-be "radi calizer," loosely defined to include al- Qaeda and likeminded groups that engage in global propaganda efforts, influential extremist clerics, and local-level recruiters. While supporting as many challengers as possible, the United States must simultaneously work with governments on greater systemic reform. Choice is a critical concept in dissuading would-be extremists from becoming violent. The more alternatives available to young people, the greater their freedom, and the more credible the voices exposing them to alternative arg uments, the less vulnerable they are to extremist ideas. However, the United States should also deepen its efforts to counter the extremist narrative, both by better using its existing mechanisms and by increasingly relying on and partnering with the private sector and NGOs.
t HE b o tt om l in E :

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Ta sk Force R ecom mendations

of radica l extremism, there are a variety of steps that the Obama administration should take. These will include a numb e r o f ke y s t r a t e g i c , f u n c t i o n a l , a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l chang es from the previous administration's approach in this area.
t o C onf ron t t H is id E olo G y

with the United States on counterterrorism matters. However, these developments alone would not end the radicalization process. The Obama administration should also focus on ensuring that the radical extremists' global narrative does not resonate with individuals' day-to -day lives. 2 . F un c t io n a l R e c o m m e n d a t io ns
2 . 1 . r E j U v E n At E E f f or t s to promo t E pro sp E r i t y, r E f or m , A nd d E mo C r A C y i n A r A b C o U n t r i E s. As a strategic response to extremism, the United States and its allies must offer a viable and attractive political alternative to the dark vision offered by radical extremist groups. Prosperous democratic societies that respect the rights of their citizens are more resilient and less susceptible to political instability and radicalization. If grievances can be expressed peacefully and mediated through democratic institutions, citizens are less apt to turn to more extreme options. Efforts to promote prosperity, democracy, and respect for human rights should, therefore, remain key aspects of this administration's foreign policy agenda, even if the rhetoric describing it changes. The key is to do it better. 2 . 1. 1. dE l ink d E mo C r A C y promo t i on

1. S t r a t e gic R e c o m m e nd a t io ns
1.1. E x pA n d foCUs from violEnt to

The Obama administration needs to view the spread of an ideolog y of radical extremism with urgency and seriousness comparable to its view of the spread of violent groups animated by that ideolog y. Obviously, the first priority for the government is to prevent and deter radical extremist groups from using violence to achieve their goals. But in addition, the government needs to elevate in bureaucratic priority and public consciousness the need to prevent and deter the spread of radical extremist ideolog y. At the same time, the United States will need to make ver y clear that it does not consider Islam itself a danger, but only the distorted version of Islam perpetrated by radical extremists.
n on v i ol E n t E xt r E m ism . 1. 2 . E m p o w E r m A i n s t r E A m m U s l i m v o i C E s.

The ultimate objective of our democracy promotion, and c efforts should be to encourage and Muslims who are competing with vision for society.
1. 3 . Ad d r E s s loCAl

public diplomacy, ounterradicalization support mainstream extremists and their

G r i E vA n C E s ,

no t

o n ly G lob A l on E s . International attention has been largely and for many good reasons focused on the global grievances cited by al-Qaeda, such as Iraq, GuantÀnamo, Kashmir, and above all, the Arab -Israeli conflict. Resolving these various issues would be important developments, not only in furthering counterradicalization efforts, but also in terms of increasing other countries' willingness to cooperate publicly

f rom C o U n t E r t E r ror ism p ol i C y. In recent years, U.S. public diplomacy rhetoric has made democracy promotion an explicit aspect of counterterrorism policy. It is even included as one of the Intelligence Community's missions in the U.S. National Intelligence Strateg y. This has the unintended implication of hurting the ability of both U.S. government and nongovernmental organizations to play an effective role on the ground in supporting democracy and reform efforts, as it raises suspicion that the real purpose of the efforts is regime change. It may be true, as arg ued here, that advancing freedom and opportunity around the world enhances U.S. national security, but it is 13

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Pr esiden ti a l Ta sk Force not merely a counterterrorism tactic. It should be delinked by this administration.
2. 1.2. m A k E E C on om i C r E f or m A H i G HE r pr i or i t y w H il E pr E s sin G f or p ol i t i C A l r E f o r m , i n C lU d i n G H U m A n r i G H t s .

The U.S. government needs to define countr yspecific strategies throughout the Middle East that lay out an integrated agenda for political, economic, administrative, and judicial reform. The U.S. government's diplomatic and development efforts in this area should emphasize economic reforms that weaken state control of economic life, expanding the sphere for private activity. In countries where this is already under way, the U.S. government should partner with the private sector to advocate increased trade and investment.
2 . 1 . 3 . l ink U. s . A s sis t A n CE t o E ndin G

them. In some cases, this will require helping governments to decentralize, relying on USAID, the World Bank, and other sources of expertise to do so. When the United States investigates charities asso ciated with these groups, it should develop robust mechanisms to provide "charitable backfill" so that legitimate humanitarian work is not disrupted by U.S. actions. Such mechanisms should include more robust support to nonsectarian, nongovernmental organizations that wish to compete with Hamas and Hizballah in providing such ser vices. While these actions may not help in "selling the United States" to these skeptical publics, they may at least prevent groups like Hamas and Hizballah from becoming more popular. More generally, the U.S. government in failed or weak states should look to compete with extremist groups by supporting flexible, targeted development programs designed to stimulate job creation.
2 . 1. 5 . b o o s t d E mo C r A C y A s sis tA n CE

Persistent corruption is the number-one frustration among Arab publics, a factor radical extremists exploit to challenge governmental legitimacy. By standing with these publics in challenging their governments to become more transparent, the United States builds bridges to a suspicious public and robs al-Qaeda of a rhetorical jab. Moreover, since many governments have signed on to international agreements like the United Nations Convention against Corruption, these legal commitments could provide the benchmarks for conditioning assistance, eliminating the arg ument that the United States is dictating the governments' form of government. In this regard, maintaining and even expanding support for the MCC makes excellent policy sense, since creating carrots to reward good policy is at least as important as developing possible sticks.
C or r U p t i on in t HE r E G i on . 2 . 1 . 4. C H A l l E n G E t HE s o C i A l - s E r v i CE ,

The Obama administration should double the level of resources available to both the National Endowment for Democracy and the Middle East Partnership Initiative to continue their support of human rights, democracy, and other activists in the Middle East. Support through both organizations and their sister institutes should be directed to institutions and organizations that have a demonstrated track record in standing up to and competing with both violent and nonviolent extremists.
t o l E v E l t HE pl Ayin G f i E l d . 2 . 1 . 6 . C on CE n t r At E on s t im U l At in G

Where terrorist groups provide social support and aid to their communities, such as Hamas, Hizballah, and the Muslim Brotherhood, the United States must work to empower alternatives to compete with
G r A s s r o o t s r E C r U i tm E n t tA C t i C . 14

t HE d E v E lop m E n t of f r E E m E di A . The sine qua non for more open, transparent societies is a free and independent press that can educate and inform as well as shine a spotlight on government malfeasance. To this end, the administration should encourage organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy to make media expansion a pillar of their programming and develop privatepublic partnerships to stimulate privately developed, independent media. Through credit g uaran-

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Confron t ing t he Ideolog y of R a dic a l E x t r e m ism tees, by providing matching seed capital, or through other means, the U.S. government could help new satellite-, terrestrial- and/or internet-based media get off the ground.
2 . 2 . r E or i E n t p U b l i C diplom A C y t o s U p p o r t o U r A l l i E s ' E f f o r t s. The core mission of public diplomacy must be to identif y, nurture, and support mainstream Muslims in the ideological and political contest against radical Islamism and to win backing for such efforts from nations and peoples in non-Muslim societies around the world. Ever ything that is new and special about America's public diplo macy effort should be targeted toward that goal, rec-

the local level. The State Department should instruct embassies to actively pursue this critical task overseas. Only after we know who and where these credible voices are can we find ways to empower and network them with U.S. NGOs in the business and nonprofit sectors that can take the lead to make it happen.
2 . 3 . 2 . Hi G H l i G H t di v E r s E v oi CE s , f rom s E C U l A r t o r E l i G i o U s. The new administration should make clear that it understands that religious piety is not synonymous with radicalization. Part of effectively countering radical extremist ideolog y is for the United States to stress that it is not at war with Islam, nor should the United States

" T h e n e w a d m i n i s t r at i o n s h o u l d m a k e c l e a r t h at i t u n d e r s ta n d s t h at r e l i g i o u s p i e t y i s n o t syn o ny m ous with rad i caliz a ti o n. "

ognizing that more traditional public diplomacy pro grams, such as educational exchanges, will continue. International broadcasting , in particular, should reflect this core mission.
2.3. G o b Eyo n d t H E A m E r i C A n b r A n d.

U.S. public diplomacy efforts must be mainly about empowering mainstream Muslims to compete with radical extremists and not about employing our best researchers, pollsters, and marketers to improve the American brand.
2 . 3 . 1 . i d E n t if y A nd n E t w or k opini on

be seen to endorse any particular form of Muslim religious obser vance. U.S. policy should be to recognize that religious diversity and education can be a bulwark against extremism. In its engagement with Muslims, here and abroad, the administration should reach out to a broad spectrum of groups and individuals, from the pious to the secular.
2 . 3 . 3 . p r i or i t iz E p ol i t i C A l E n G A G E -

The United States must more effectively identif y Muslim activists, entrepreneurs, writers, businesspeople, media personalities, students, and others who lead opinion within their domestic communities and abroad, particularly at
l E A d E r s A s A lli E s .

1 While interacting with a diverse rang e of Muslims and Arabs, the U.S. g overnment should prioritize its political eng ag ement with parties and groups that share our long -term objectives and have a demonstrated track record in standing up to and competing with both violent and nonviolent extremists. Such parties and groups deser ve first claim on the attention of our diplomats and polic ymakers.
m E n t.

1. We define Islamist groups as those that endorse the reestablishment of a caliphate, which would be governed by sharia (Islamic law), including those who support achieving this end state through the political process. We explicitly do not put all religious and practicing Muslims in this categor y, as most do not sign on to this broader vision and do not believe political systems and governments need to be run according to these principles.

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Pr esiden ti a l Ta sk Force U.S. engagement will naturally var y with different strands of Islamist groups. We endorse such engagem e nt w h e n i t s o b j e c ti v e s a r e c o n c r e t e a n d c l e a r l y articulated to advance U.S. interests. Whereas local actors and the nong overnmental sector may have a different approach, in the Middle East it is widely understood that official engagement ( i.e., politicallevel dialog ue) is a political act that has important and wide-rang ing implications. While taking steps t o e n s ur e t h a t i t h a s l i n e s o f c o mm un i c a t i o n a n d inte l l i g en c e thro ug h o ut l o ca l s o c i e ti e s , th e U. S . g o v e r nm e n t n e e d s t o a v o i d a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h its pursuit of "dialog ue" with certain Islamists has the unintended consequence of dispiriting or even ries of the mothers, sons, and daughters who have lost their husbands, fathers, and mothers due to alQaeda's carnage.
2 . 3 . 5 . i d E n t if y C r E dib l E v oi CE s t o E x -

The United States should continue to exploit and amplif y existing ideological fissures and further drive wedges between radical extremists and their followers and prospective followers. The United States should amplif y the voices critical of al-Qaeda, particularly former jihadists and extremists like Dr. Fadl, even though we may still take issue with many of their views. As demonstrated by Ayman al-Zawahiri's defensiveness in his
ploi t f is s U r E s .

" The U nite d St a tes s h ou ld a mplif y the vo i ces c r i t i c a l of a l - Q a ed a ... e v en t h o u g h w e m ay s t i l l t ake issu e with m any o f the ir views. "

undermining other groups and parties with whom we share closer interests. At the same time, the U.S. g overnment should step back to allow local actors a n d t h e n o n g o v e r nm e n t a l s e c t o r t o o p e r a t e m o r e freely of official policy.
2 . 3. 4 . p o rt r Ay t H E A l- QA E dA t H r E At r E A li st i C A l ly A nd E m p H A siz E t HE G ro U p ' s b A nk r U p t id E olo G y. Al- Qaeda is tr ying to portray itself not as a terrorist organization but as a global movement that can successfully defeat the West. Rather than portraying al-Qaeda as a strong , coherent force, U.S. rhetoric should instead make better use of satire and humor to ridicule and humiliate the al-Qaeda leadership or, when appropriate, even ignore it. Official rhetoric should also highlight how little al-Qaeda's ideolog y offers, with no viable vision for the future or redress for ever yday problems, and emphasize that victims and targets of al-Qaeda's terrorist attacks are primarily Muslims and mosques, respectively. It should humanize the victims of al-Qaeda, by showing the personal sto 16

leng thy question-and-answer session over the internet in the summer of 2008, these voices appear to be the ones al-Qaeda itself fears most.
2 . 4. E m plo y n U A n CE d , n on C om b At i v E

Focusing on the specific terrorist threats in each countr y, and moving away from the "war on terror" rhetoric, would short-circuit the extremist narrative that the "Muslim world" is involved in a global conflict with the West and reduce other countries' ability to take inappropriate action toward their own citizens under the g uise of counterterrorism. Indeed, even referencing a sing ular "Muslim world" inadvertently echoes al-Qaeda's narratives while downplaying the rich diversity that exists within the Muslim community globally and among various countries. Recent policy frameworks that envision the United States as involved in a "g lobal counterinsurgenc y" are particularly unhelpful. Such sweeping generalizations encourage the viewing of any existing government as a target of insurgency, no matter how unpopular that government. The United States has pushed many countries
r HE t or i C .

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Confron t ing t he Ideolog y of R a dic a l E x t r e m ism to take ag g ressive counterterrorism actions, at times allowing them to take action against dissidents under the rubric of fighting terrorism. This policy has often left the United States as the "bad guy" supporting oppressive governments and standing by as they abuse their people.
2 . 5 . C H A l l E n G E E xt r E m is t s in C yb E r spA CE .

The United States should devote far more resources to countering radical extremist messages on the internet, where the self-radicalization process is spreading and accelerating. Recently, the State Department has developed a variety of creative initiatives in this area, including the team of bloggers in the Counterterrorism Communication Team, but this effort must be expanded dramatically to other agencies and include nongovernmental actors.
2. 5 . 1 .

The United States should focus its efforts on the extremist chat rooms, since these types of two way interactions are far more dangerous as recruiting tools than websites, where propaganda can merely be downloaded.

2.6 . C o or din At E C o U n t E r r A di C A l iz At i on pro G r A ms . The United States should pay close attention to the counterradicalization programs springing up in Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, as radicalization in these distant locations can often have a direct impact on U.S. national security. 2 . 6 . 1 . Cr E At E A C o U n t E r r A di C A l iz At i on

The United States should establish a "Counterradicalization Forum," where the policymakers and practitioners from the countries engaged in these efforts can compare notes and " best practices." This organization could also perform independent assessments of each countr y's success and press for needed improvements. The organization could further encourage the development of these types of programs in at-risk countries that don't currently have them (Belgium is an obvious candidate). The organization should have a pool of funding available to dole out for designing , implementing , and improving countries' programs.
f o rU m .

The United States should recognize that not all countries view the counterradicalization problem the same way. For example, the British are willing t o w o r k w i th s o m e g r o u p s a n d i n d i v i d ua l s w h o s e views the United States might find distasteful, in an effort to tr y to prevent an attack in the immediate f uture. Given the g rave and imminent threat that exists in Britain, this approach may make sense, as long as the British recognize that it may have nega ti v e l o n g - t e rm c o n s e q u e n c e s a n d tha t i t s h o u l d b e adjusted once conditions improve. A s p e c i a l f o c u s o f t h i s f o r um s h o u l d b e S a u d i Arabia . While the Saudis should be applauded for t h e i r d o m e s t i c c o un t e r r a d i c a l i z a t i o n e f f o r t s , t h e y continue to provide the ke y supports of extremist ideolog y, exporting educational material, mosques, and imams. Under the umbrella of this forum, the Unite d States should press Saudi Arabia to cea se th i s a c ti v i t y that en d a n g er s u s a l l , i n c l u d i n g th e kingdom itself. B e t t e r un d e r s ta n d i n g th e r a d i c a l i z a ti o n a n d d er a d i c a l i z ati o n p ro c e ss i s cri ti c a l t o d e ve l o p i n g effe ctive p ol icies in th is area . The Un ite d States should press the Counterradicalization Forum to conduct comprehensive assessments on all aspects o f t h e r a d i c a l i z a t i o n c y c l e , i n c l u d i n g w hy p e o p l e join terrorist org anizations and why some choose to leave ; how the radicalization and deradicalization process differs in the United States versus overseas; how radicalization is chang ing as the terrorist threat e volves ; and what the realistic limits are in the deradicalization process.
2 . 7. i m pro v E d om E s t i C C o U n t E r r A di C A l iz At i on E f f or t s . The United States benefits from a broadly positive integration experience among its Muslim-American communities. There are steps the government can take to ensure that this trend continues. 2 . 7. 1 . U t il iz E A b r oA d. bEst pr A C t i CE s f rom

The United States should closely study other countries' counterradicalization programs to see whether there are any lessons to apply at home.
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Pr esiden ti a l Ta sk Force Several of the European countries' innovations appear to have particular domestic applicability, for example : The United States should take a pag e from the B r i t i s h a n d e n s ur e t h a t a l l r e l e v a nt g o v e r nm e n t agencies are engaged on these issues and fully understand the U.S. strateg y. At the ver y least, it should focus on ensuring that agencies avoid mistakes that will poison community relations and possibly contribute to radicalization. In the U.S. system, the only place for a local citizen to turn to with concerns about potential radicalization would be the FBI. In local communities, this option increases the perception that the U.S. g overnment views Muslim and Arab Americans as a t hr e a t . T h i s p e r c e p t i o n m a y i n c r e a s e n o w w i t h the newly relea se d Attorne y G enera l Guidelines, which gives the FBI more latitude and authority to conduct broad-ranging assessments of the domestic threat. This authority will allow the bureau to move beyond solely investigating specific cases with sufficient legal predicate to, more broadly, "chasing the threat." In lig ht of this chang e, the g overnment should work with communities to develop alternative non­ law enforcement mechanisms at the local level, both g overnmental and nong overnmental, to deal with r a d i c a l i z a t i o n i n t h e s e c o mm un i t i e s . T h e c i t y o f Amsterdam's "Information House" is a good model.
2 . 7. 2 . b ro A d E n m U sl im o U t r E A CH .

vention, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
2 . 7. 3 . d i v E r si t y is E s s E n t i A l .

The United States should ensure that its outreach is as broad as possible and not allow one group or organization to monopolize representation of these tremendously diverse communities.

2 . 7. 4. Hi G H l i G H t U. s . A C t i on s d om E s ti C A ll y. The government should better publicize its extensive, but little-known, efforts to protect the civil liberties of its Arab -origin and Muslim citizens. These actions will help to reassure domestic Muslim-American communities, alert them to outlets for resolving their grievances, encourage greater cooperation with law enforcement and other government agencies, and reduce the resonance of the radical extremist global narrative.

3 . S t ruc t u r a l R e c om m e ndat ions
3 . 1 . f i x t HE E x is t in G b U r E A UC r A C y. While there are worthwhile debates about whether new agencies are needed to meet the substantial challenges outlined here, the administration should begin by fixing the existing bureaucracy. This effort will require the right leadership and some important adjustments to the machiner y of public diplomacy, democracy pro motion, and counterradicalization. 3 . 2 . dE si G n At E A sin G l E A ddr E s s f or t HE C o o r d i n At i o n o f U. s . p U b l i C d i p l o m A C y, s t r At E G i C C om m U ni C At i on , A nd C o U n t E r r A d i C A li z Ati o n s tr At EG y. Despite the undesirability of a drastic reorg anization, it is critical that strateg ic coordination in combating extremist ideolog y be provided by a senior administration official at the White House. Only by having someone close to the president in charg e of the overall effort can there be any hope of maintaining strateg ic focus over the long er term. The ideal solution would be for the deputy national security advisor (DNSA) for combating terrorism to focus on the militar y,

The United States should work closely with its Arab origin and Muslim communities to ensure open channels of communication. The U.S. law enforcement agencies, including the U.S. Attorneys' offices, the FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security, have had extensive engagement with the domestic Muslim and Arab communities. While this contact is important, Muslim communities must see the government as consisting of more than its law enforcement arms. It is therefore critical that engagement is broadened to include ser vice-providing entities, such as the Health and Human Ser vices Department, the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-

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Confron t ing t he Ideolog y of R a dic a l E x t r e m ism law enforcement, and intellig ence aspects of pressuring and defeating violent extremists, with a second DNSA , perhaps the DNSA for strateg ic communication, a position that already exists, available to devote his or her full time and attention to the ideolog ical parts of this strug g le. Sp l i t t i n g t h e s e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a l o n g t h e s e l i n e s , instead of creating a new DNSA position, also makes sense g iven current fiscal realities and difficult adjustments still under way from other recent g overnment restructuring . However, ensuring a specific address for work in both combat areas, where one expects the militar y to lead, and in non­combat zones. Part of the problem is a dangerously imbalanced allocation of resources between militar y and civilian agencies and an underfunding for State Department public diplomacy and strategic communications efforts. Redirecting this imbalance needs to be a top priority for the administration.
3 . 3 . 2 . E x p A nd t HE U nd E r s E C r E t A r y ' s rol E .

The undersecretar y for public diplomac y

" The gove rnme nt s h ou ld b ette r pu b li cize its e x te ns ive, b u t l i t t l e - k n o w n , eff ort s t o p r o t e c t t h e c i v i l lib e r ties o f its Arab-o ri gin and M us lim citize ns. "
the polic y coordination effort is crucial, whatever the specific structural nature of the assignment. The official in this position should coordinate the public diplomacy and counterradicalization functions. An important aspect of the DNSA's portfolio should be the construction of a formalized interagency group, including the State and Defense departments, the CIA, a n d t h e N C T C . T h i s g r o u p s h o u l d tr a c k a n d a s s e s s progress and challenges in the implementation of both the overt and covert components of the overall strateg y to confront radical ideolog y. This contact will help foster jointedness among the key ag encies and awareness of each other's activities, which was not always the case in the previous administration.
3 . 3 . s tr E n G t H E n t H E r o l E A n d C A p A C -

should spearhead the ideolog ical contest ag ainst radical extremism and should have the powers and resources to carr y out this task . This position should be viewed as critical to national security, not as a public relations job. The undersecretar y should be g iven far greater control over his own ag enc y's public diplomac y personnel and planning around the world. The U.S. embassies' missions should include an emphasis on implementing efforts to counter radical ideolog y specifically.
3 . 3 . 3 . Cr E At E A n A s sis t A n t s E C r E t A r y p o si t i on . To assist in executing these expanded responsibilities, the administration should work with Congress to create a new assistant secretar y within the Office of the Undersecretar y for Public Diplomacy. The official in this role would : 3. 3. 3. 1 . Oversee and direct all International Information Programs (IIP) conducted by the bureau. 3. 3. 3. 2 . Work with embassies and regional bureaus to develop strategies to empower and 19

At the same time the White House position is created, the administration should seek to bolster the capacity of the State Department to operationalize strategic communications and public diplomacy.
i t y o f t H E s t At E d E p A r tm E n t. 3 . 3 . 1 . bA l A n CE C i v il A nd m il i t A r y r E s o U r CE s . The militar y is increasingly stepping in to do public diplomacy and counterradicalization

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Pr esiden ti a l Ta sk Force amplif y mainstream Muslim voices around the world and be resourced to implement them.
3 . 3 . 4. Cr E At E n E w d E p U t y A s sis t A n t s E C r E tA r y b U r E A U s. p o si t i on s in r E G i on A l

tant secretar y responsible for these efforts would have input into these ratings.
3 . 4 . r E o r i E n t t H E b b G f o r s tr At EG i C C om m U ni C At i on . International broadcasting is an essential element of U.S. efforts, already consuming more than half of the public diplomacy budget. It is essential that BBG members commit their media outlets to this goal. Therefore, policy considerations, emphasizing a commitment to and appreciation of counterradicalization, should drive the decision making in filling vacancies in the BBG. With so many vacancies, there is an opportunity to create a BBG of outstanding Americans committed to the spread of enlightened values. At the height of the Cold War, for example, Ronald Reagan infused international broadcasting with a sense of national purpose and strategic mission. Today, President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton should seek to endow the board with a comparable stature. The result will be U.S. international broadcasting to Arab and Muslim societies that reaches over governments to give voice to the peoples of this region and to build--through satellites and radio waves--a network of human connections between them and their American partners in the effort against radical extremism. With proper leadership, mission, oversight, resources, and personnel, America's broadcasting outlets to Arab and Muslim societies can be a powerful tool in this undertaking.

Currently within the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs, a senior advisor to the assistant secretar y of European affairs works bilaterally with embassies in Europe as well as many groups and individuals across the continent as part of the U.S. public diplomacy, strategic communication, and counterradicalization strateg y. This role should be institutionalized as a deputy assistant secretar y (DAS) for each regional bureau. Each regional DAS would maintain a dotted-line relationship with the new assistant secretar y to create an effective counterradicalization forum within the State Department.
3 . 3 . 5 . r At E A m b A s s A d o r s o n C o U n t E r r A di C A l iz At i on . To ensure that U.S. embassies in key posts are appropriately focused on countering extremist ideolog y, this responsibility should be explicitly included in the White House's letter of commission for all ambassadors. Ambassadors should also be rated on their efforts in this area, an approach the British have used effectively in specific countries of concern. Both the DNSA and the assis-

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Signator ies

m A r y C At HE r in E ( m . C . ) A ndr E ws , senior consultant, ViaNovo ; former special assistant to the president and director, White House Office of Global Communications f r A nk j . Cil l U f f o , associate vice president for homeland security and director, Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington University ; former special assistant to the president for homeland security

j o s H U A m U r Av CH ik , visiting scholar, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University ; adjunct scholar, The Washing ton Institute sU E m y r i C k , member of Congress (R-NC); member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence j o s E p H s . n y E , j r ., University Disting uished Service professor, Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations, Har vard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government; former chairman, National Intelligence Council

president, International Republican Institute ; former assistant secretar y of state for democracy, human rights, and labor
l or n E w. Cr A n E r ,

senior vice president, APCO Worldwide ; former U.S. ambassador to Morocco and special U.S. coordinator for Mediterranean trade, investment, and security affairs
m A r C G in sb E r G ,

president, Center for National Policy ; former member of Congress (D-IN) and member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence ; member 9-11 Commission
t imo t H y j . r o E m E r ,

associate professor, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey
moHAmmEd m. HAfEz, j A n E H A r m A n , member of Congress (D- CA); chair, Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing , and Terrorism Risk Assessment b r UCE H of f m A n , professor, Edmund A . Walsh School of Foreign Ser vice, Georgetown University ; former corporate chair in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, RAND Corporation

executive director, The Washing ton Institute ; creator and host, "Dakhil Washington" weekly talk show, al-Hurra satellite television
r ob E r t s At lof f ,

member of Congress (D-WA); chair, House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities.
A d A m s m i t H, s . E n d E r s w i m b U s H , senior vice president, international programs and policy, and senior fellow, Hudson Institute ; consultant, Office of the Secretar y of Defense Office of Net Assessment

president, Fahmy Hudome International ; former associate deputy secretar y of energ y
r A n d A fA H m y H U d o m E , Ell E n l A i p s o n , president and CEO, The Henr y L. Stimson Center; former vice chair, National Intelligence Council w il l m A r s H A l l ,

executive director, Freedom House ; former deputy assistant administrator and director of the Center for Democracy and Governance, USAID
j E nnif E r w ind s or , k E nn E t H w ol l A C k ,

president, National Demo -

cratic Institute

president and founder, Progres-

sive Policy Institute
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Pr esiden ti a l Ta sk Force Con v e nor s:
j . s C o t t C A r p E n t E r , Keston Family fellow and director of Project Fikra, The Washing ton Institute ; former deputy assistant secretar y of state, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and coordinator, Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiatives, State Department m i CH A E l j A C ob s on , senior fellow, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, The Washing ton Institute ; former senior advisor, Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Treasur y Department m Att HE w l E v i tt , senior fellow and director, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, The Washing ton Institute ; former deputy assistant secretar y for intelligence and analysis, Treasur y Department

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"there is growing consensus that countering the ideology that drives extremism is a critical element in the overall effor t to prevent and defeat the violence that emerges from it. despite this greater reali zation , a precise strategy to counter extremism and empower mainstream alternatives... remains a daunting and urgent task for the obama administration."

E ndo r s e d b y M. c . andrews J. scott carpenter Frank J. cilluffo lorne W. craner Marc Ginsberg Mohammed M. Hafez Jane Harman Bruce Hoffman randa Fahmy Hudome Michael Jacobson ellen laipson Matthew levitt Will Marshall Joshua Muravchik sue Myrick Joseph s. nye, Jr. timothy J. roemer robert satloff adam smith s. enders Wimbush Jennifer Windsor kenneth Wollack

a j oi n t p r oj e c t of p r oj e c t f i k r a a n d the stein pr ogra m on cou nte rte rr oris m and inte lli ge n ce

18 2 8 L S t r e e t N W, S ui t e 10 5 0 Wa s hin g t o n, D C 2 0 0 3 6 w w w.w a s hin g t o nin s t i t u t e.o r g