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Chapte r 4

Narrativ e Criticism

Toulmin, S. E. (1970). Reason and causes. In R. Borger & F. Cioffi (Eds.), Explanation in it behavioral sciences (pp. 1-41). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Toulmin, S. E. (1972). Human understanding. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Toulmin, S. E. (1982). The return to cosmology: Postmodern science and the theology of Mm, Berkeley CA: The University of California Press. Toulmin, S. E., Rieck, R., & Janik, A. (1979). Introduction to reasoning. New York: Macmillan. Turner, V. (1980). Social dramas and stories about them. Critical Inquiry, 7, 141-168. Voegelin, E. (1952). The new science of politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Voegelin, E. (1975). From enlightenment to revolution. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Wallace, K. (1963). The substance of rhetoric: Good reasons. The Quarterly Journal of Speech,® 239-249 . Wenzel, J. W. (1977). Toward a rationale for value-centered argument. Journal of the America Forensics Association, 13, 150-158 . Wenzel, J. W. (1980). Perspectives on argument. In J. Rhodes & S. Newell (Eds.), Proceedings ofk summer conference on argumentation (pp. 112-133) . Falls Church, VA: Speech Communication Association. Wieseltier, L. (1983, January 10 and 17). The great nuclear debate. The New Republic, 7-38. Willard, C. A. (1978). A reformulation of the concept of argument: Theconstructivist/interactionist foundations of a sociology of argument. Journal of the American Forensics Association, 14 , 121-140 . Willard, C. A. (1982) Argument fields. In J. R. Cox & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Advances in argumentation theory and research (pp. 24-77 ) Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. White, H. (1978). Metahistory; tropics of history. Baltimore, MD : Johns Hopkins University. White, H. (1980). The value of narrativity in the representation of reality. Critical inquiry, 7,5- I 27 . Zarefsky, D. (1981). Reasonableness in public policy: Fields as institutions. In G. Ziegelmuellerx J. Rhodes (Eds.), Dimensions of argument: Proceedings of the second conference on argumentation (pp. 88-100) . Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association. Ziegelmueller, G., & Rhodes, J. Dimensions of argument: Proceedings of the second conference on argumentation. Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association. Ziman, J. (1968). Public knowledge. London: Cambridge University Press.

TELLING AMERICA'S STORY: NARRATIVE FORM AND THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY
WILLIA M E LEWI S By 1980 , Americ a ha d los t its sense of direction . Economi c troubles , a series of I foreign polic y failures , an d corruptio n in its governmen t ha d created a national malaise . The n Ronal d Reaga n cam e ont o th e scene wit h a visio n of America that reinvigorate d th e nation . Hi s grea t skills a s a communicato r an d his commitment to fundamenta l ideal s wer e jus t wha t th e natio n needed . We wer e once again prou d t o b e Americans . Thi s familiar an d well accepte d stor y follows th e patter n o f man y political success storie s in whic h th e her o rescues th e countr y from a tim e of great trouble. Thi s stor y is special , however , in tha t Reaga n is sai d to hav e accomplished the feat throug h th e powe r o f hi s speakin g and , eventually, t o hav e been brought dow n whe n tha t powe r failed him . After mor e tha n fiv e year s i n office, Reagan wa s still referre d t o a s "th e Wester n world' s mos t gifted communicator." 1 Objectio n t o Ronal d Reaga n di d no t originat e wit h th e discover y o f the Iran arm s deal , however . Despit e Reagan' s consisten t popularit y an d continuing prais e for hi s speaking, 2 ther e ha s been a substantia l segmen t of a critical public wh o no t onl y remaine d unpersuade d by th e President , bu t wer e offended by his


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persuasive manner. Wha t is seen by his supporter s as clear directio n ha s been attacked by opponent s as "ideolog y withou t ideas." 3 Whil e it ha s bee n note d ofte that Reagan ha s provide d a renewe d sense of confidence an d securit y in th e n country, expressions of fear abou t his ineptitud e or his willingness to ris k wa r hav been frequent. Despit e his continuin g hig h levels of approval , a whol e genr e e of literature agains t Reaga n ha s developed. 4 Wha t make s thes e book s a genr e is no just that the y shar e a commo n oppositio n to Reaga n an d hi s policies, bu t t als that they shar e a commo n approac h to thei r criticisms . Reaga n is accuse d o repeatedly of being unrealistic , simplistic , an d misinformed . Ronal d Dallek , for example, claims tha t Reagan' s anti-Communis t foreign policy is "a simplistic an ineffective wa y to mee t a comple x problem." 5 He explain s Reagan' s repeate d d polic mistakes as a manifestatio n of his psychologica l make-u p an d conclude s y that his ideology an d policy-makin g ar e "nonrational." 6 Th e sense of thes e criticism is epitomized in th e mockin g ton e of a New Republic editoria l that , in th e s course of bemoaning Reagan' s historica l ignorance , comment s that : "Ronal d Reaga has never let th e facts get in th e wa y of a goo d story." 7 n Similar themes recur frequently in th e scholarl y evaluatio n of Reagan' s rhet oric. His effectiveness is widel y recognized , bu t whil e Reaga n is praise d by som e fo his strategic prowes s an d for hi s ability to inspir e th e America n public, 8 other s r En his success problematic . How , it is asked , ca n he be so popula r whe n he d is uninformed, irrational , an d inconsistent? 9 Th e dominan t explanatio n ha s bee n that Reagan manipulate s his language , his strategy, or his style to mak e himself an his policies appea r to be attractive. 1 0 Whil e th e powe r of rhetori c to affect d appearances has been demonstrate d amply, thi s insight provide s onl y a partia l explanation for th e natur e of Reagan' s rhetori c an d th e respons e to it. It doe s no account satisfactorily for th e differences in perceptio n an d judgmen t amon g t Reagan's various audiences , for th e difference betwee n suppor t for Reaga n an d support for his policies, or for th e fact tha t journalisti c an d scholarl y analysi s debunking his competenc e an d sincerity wa s largely irrelevan t throug h mos t of his presidency. The purpose of this essay is to accoun t for th e distinctive reputation , style, an effect of Ronald Reagan' s discours e by providin g a consisten t an d sufficiently d comprehensive explanatio n for th e contradictor y perception s of hi s speakin g an for the related paradoxe s of thi s "Grea t Communicator's " presidency. To d construct this account in term s of his discours e require s an explicit awarenes s of the distinction between a "rational " an d a narrativ e perspective. 1 1 Narrativ e theory can provide a powerfu l accoun t of politica l discourse , an d it is essential fo explaining Ronald Reagan' s rhetoric , for it is th e predominanc e of th e narra r tive form in Reagan's rhetori c tha t ha s establishe d th e climat e of interpretatio n within which he is seen an d judged . The frequency of Reagan' s story-tellin g ha s bee n widel y noted 1 2 an d som e perceptive commentaries hav e demonstrate d his consistenc y wit h dominan t American myths,13 bu t wha t remain s to be emphasize d is tha t story-tellin g is fundamental to the relationshi p betwee n Reaga n an d his audience . Stories ar e no t just a rhetorical device tha t Reaga n uses to embellish his ideas ; Reagan' s message is a story. Reagan uses story-tellin g to direc t his policies, groun d hi s explanations , an inspire his audiences, an d th e dominanc e of narrativ e help s to accoun t for d the variety of reactions to his rhetoric . There is general agreement abou t th e cours e of th e Reaga n presidency--th e story of his ascendency ha s no w becom e th e stor y of his rise an d fall--but explanations differ. Thos e wh o hav e criticized Reaga n usin g th e standard s of


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Chapter 4 Narrative Criticism

technica l reasonin g an d policy-makin g ar e likely to conten d that his rhetoric is simplistic, untrue , or irrationa l an d to lamen t th e lack of public response to lis paten t deficiencies.14 The y ar e likely to explai n Reagan' s successes as being ti n resul t of rhetorica l manipulatio n an d to explai n th e Iran/'contra crisis as being th e inevitabl e resul t of his continuin g lack of realism. 1 5 Thos e wh o listen to Ronal d Reaga n as a story-teller ar e likely to emphasiz e Reagan' s character and to praist hi m for providin g vision, reassurance , an d inspiratio n to th e American public' The y ar e likely to see Reaga n as havin g struc k a responsiv e chord and to explai n th e Irania n crisis as a weakenin g of Reagan' s previousl y stron g grasp on publi c leadership. 1 7 Reaction s diverge because listeners perceive Reagan and his speeche s differently, an d because the y appl y different standard s of judgment to what tlie v perceive . Thi s essay will (1) explicat e th e varieties of narrativ e form active in Reagan's discours e to hel p explai n his presidenc y an d th e reaction s to it; and (2) discus som e of th e mora l an d epistemic consequence s of Reagan' s use of narrative, an d of th e narrativ e form itself.

NARRATIV E FOR M I N REAGAN' S RHETORI C Reaga n tells tw o kind s of stories tha t differ in scale an d purpose , but that wor k togethe r to establish th e dominanc e of narrativ e form in th e creation and in th e interpretatio n of his rhetoric . Anecdotes define th e characte r of an issue at th e sam e tim e tha t the y illustrate , reinforce , an d mak e his policies and ideas mor e vivid. Myth structure s his message . Anecdote s ar e th e quick stories , jokes , or incident s tha t are the verbal counterpar t of th e visual image . Th e anecdot e is intende d to spark interest, an d its meanin g is establishe d in reference to som e large r frame of understanding that is eithe r specified withi n a discours e or assume d in an audience . In this way, the stor y of Alber t Einstein's difficulty in understandin g th e 104 0 form18 defines a relationshi p to th e ta x code--given a belief tha t complexit y is likely to be the reflection of excessive bureaucrac y an d tha t governmen t ough t to be accessible to all citizens withou t requirin g special expertise . Similarly, Reagan' s story of the Suprem e Cour t decision that , he says, prevente d Ne w York children from praying in thei r cafeteria19 defines a relationshi p to th e issue of schoo l prayer--given a belief tha t religious belief is a necessary par t of mora l orde r and that people ough t to be able to ac t in privat e withou t governmenta l restriction . In both these instances , a simple stor y carrie s a clear message to thos e whos e experience leads the m to accep t th e stor y as either tru e or as true-to-life an d whose values lead the m to accep t th e moral . As on e woul d expect , Reaga n uses anecdotes more often whe n speakin g to audience s tha t ar e expecte d to be uniformly Republican o r conservative . Myt h inform s all of Reagan' s rhetoric . In th e broa d sense in which it is used here , myt h refers to "an y anonymousl y compose d stor y telling of origins and destinies : th e explanation s a society offers its youn g of wh y th e world is and wh y we do as we do , its pedagogi c images of th e natur e an d destiny of man."2 Reagan' s myt h applies no t to th e origin of th e world , bu t to th e origin of America; no t to th e destin y of humanity , bu t to th e destin y of Americans . It is a simple an d familiar stor y tha t is widel y taugh t an d widely believed. It is no t exactly a tru e stor y in th e sense tha t academi c historian s woul d wan t thei r descriptions and explanation s to be true , bu t it is no t exactl y fiction either. As Jerom e Bruner wrote of myt h in general , "it s powe r is tha t it lives on th e feather line between fantasy


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an reality. It must be neithe r to o goo d no r to o ba d to be true , no r mus t it be d too true."21 Myth provide s a sense of importanc e an d directio n an d it provide s a communal focus for individua l identity . AMERIC A I N TH E STOR Y Reagan never tells th e whol e of hi s America n stor y at an y on e time , bu t th e myt h that emerges in his speeches is familiar an d easily stated : America is a chosen nation , grounde d in its families an d neighborhoods , and driven inevitably forwar d by its heroi c workin g peopl e towar d a worl d of freedom and economi c progres s unless blocke d by mora l or militar y weakness. Reagan portrays America n histor y as a continuin g struggle for progres s against great obstacles impose d by economi c adversity, barbari c enemies , or Big Government. It is a stor y wit h grea t heroes--Washington , Jefferson, Lincoln , Roosevelt--with great villains--the monarch s of pre-Revolutionar y Europe , th e Depression, the Communists , th e Democrats--an d wit h a grea t theme--th e rise of freedom and economic progress . It is a stor y tha t is sanctified by God 2 2 an d validated by the American experience. 2 3 All th e theme s of Reagan' s rhetori c are contained in the mythic history--America' s greatness , its commitmen t to freedom , the heroism of the America n people , th e mora l imperativ e of work , th e priorit y of economic advancement, th e domesti c evil of taxe s an d governmen t regula tion, and the necessity of maintainin g militar y strength . Th e stor y fulfills all th e requirements of myth--it is widel y believed, generall y unquestioned , an d clearly pedagogical. And Reaga n tells th e stor y extremel y well. Hi s message is alway s clear, his examples ar e chose n well , an d hi s consisten t ton e of buoyan t optimis m an unyielding faith in progres s complement s th e pictur e of continuin g success d that is proclaimed in the myth . Finally, it provide s a focus for identification by hi s audience. Reagan repeatedl y tells hi s audience s tha t if the y choos e to participat e in the story, they will becom e a par t of America' s greatness . Reagan's version of th e cours e an d directio n of America n histor y pervade s all of his rhetoric, but he tells hi s stor y mos t clearly on thos e occasion s whe n he intends to be most inspirational . Th e characte r of th e myt h an d th e mora l impli cations that he draws from it ca n be seen clearly in Reagan' s Second Inaugura l
Address.24 The key t o understandin g th e Secon d Inaugura l i s t o se e i t a s a stor y Lik e al l o f Reagan's rhetoric , th e logi c o f th e speec h i s a narrativ e logi c tha t emphasize s the connection betwee n characte r an d action , no t a rationa l logi c tha t emphasize s the connections betwee n problem s an d solutions . I n thi s speech , Reaga n estab lishes the identity o f Americ a an d th e America n people , tha t identit y establishe s the direction for America' s story , an d th e directio n implie s th e action s tha t shoul d be taken. By makin g intelligibl e th e public identit y of th e audienc e member s (a s American), the narrativ e make s thos e wh o accep t thi s identit y accountabl e t o a system o f values an d virtue s tha t ar e use d a s standard s agains t whic h t o judg e policies. The center o f th e speec h i s itsel f a story . Reaga n describe s "tw o o f ou r Foundin g Fathers, a Boston lawye r name d Adam s an d a Virgini a plante r name d Jefferson. " Though they ha d bee n "bitte r politica l rivals, " Reaga n tol d o f ho w "ag e ha d softened their anger " a s the y exchange d letter s an d finall y cam e togethe r t o th e extent that "in 1826 , th e 50t h anniversar y o f th e Declaratio n o f Independence ,


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the y bot h died . The v Ai*A

-"·sof each other s ..leu ui juiy. " Th e cosmi c harmon y ot this story is perfect]} keeping wit h th e mythi c frame of th e speech, an d th e "importan t lesson" that Reaga n draw s from th e stor y is perfectly in keepin g wit h th e dominant theme. Reaga n conclude s his stor y wit h a quotatio n from on e of Jefferson's letters to Adam s recallin g thei r mutua l struggle "for wha t is mos t valuabl e to man, his right of self government. " In this stor y America represent s a single message for all tim e an d for all people . Histor y ha s been transforme d int o a lesson tha t transcends the contingencie s of circumstance . Fo r Reagan , America' s meanin g is to be foun d as muc h in the future as it ha s been in th e past . Seeking to perfect th e ultimat e America n goal of individual freedom, he says, will guarante e peac e an d prosperity : "There are no limits to growt h an d huma n progress , whe n me n an d wome n are free to follow thei r dreams" ; "Ever y victor y for huma n freedom will be a victory for world peace. " Progres s towar d freedom is tied directly to economi c progress by linking unrestraine d individua l actio n to economi c productivity : "A t the heart of our efforts is on e idea vindicate d by 25 straigh t month s of economi c growth: freedom an d incentives unleas h th e drive an d entrepreneuria l geniu s tha t are the core of huma n progress. " Th e powerfull y future-oriented , forward-lookin g perspective is summe d up in his conclusion : America is "on e people , unde r God, dedicated to th e drea m of freedom he ha s place d in th e huma n heart , called upo n now to pass tha t drea m o n t o a waitin g an d a hopeful world. " Th e onl y impediment s to th e fulfillment of this drea m tha t Reagan identifies ar e thos e tha t Americ a impose s on itself.25 Fo r a time , said Reagan , "we failed the system. " We suffered throug h times of economi c an d social stress because "we yielded authorit y to th e nationa l governmen t tha t properl y belonged to the states or to local government s or to th e peopl e themselves. " These wer e temporary difficulties, however. By renewin g ou r faith in freedom "w e ar e creatin g a nation once agai n vibrant , robust , an d alive. " Th e othe r grea t risk tha t Reaga n identifies is militar y weakness . "Histor y ha s shown, " he states , "tha t peac e does not come, no r will ou r freedom b e preserved , b y goo d will alone. " Reagan' s Second Inaugura l is based upo n a stor y of America' s origins and its ques t for freedom. In it, Reaga n show s th e dir e consequence s of being distracted from th e ques t an d th e reward s an d potentia l glor y of regainin g faith and direction . He defines th e values tha t ar e neede d (unity, freedom, strength) and he outline story. s th e future an d calls upo n American s to dedicat e themselves to living this Th e Audienc e i n th e Stor y In th e sam e wa y in whic h Reagan' s stories give meanin g to America , they define wha t it mean s to be an American . Th e narrativ e form offers a special kind of identification to Reagan' s audienc e because each audito r is encourage d to see himself or herself as a centra l acto r in America's ques t for freedom. To accept Reagan's stor y is no t jus t to understan d th e cours e of an America n histor y tha t is enacted in othe r place s by othe r people , it is to kno w tha t th e directio n an d outcome of the stor y depen d upo n you . Prope r actio n make s th e audienc e membe r into a hero; inactio n or imprope r actio n make s th e listener responsibl e for America's decline. Th e narrativ e logic tha t defines th e natur e of herois m in Reagan' s rhetoric was th e centra l them e o f his Firs t Inaugura l Address. 2 6 America is defined as th e greates t countr y in th e world . It "guarantees individual libert y to a greate r degree tha n an y other, " it is th e "las t and greatest


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bastion of freedom," and , consequently , it ha s "th e world' s stronges t economy. " To be heroes, the audienc e member s mus t act in way s tha t will contribut e to America's goals. Th e narrativ e defines thei r virtues--determination , courage , strength, faith, hope , work , compassion--an d Reaga n identifies thei r character . In his most explicit an d extensive consideratio n of heroism , Reaga n make s it clear that America's rea l heroe s ar e its ordinar y people--th e factory worker s an d the farmers, those wh o marke t good s an d thos e wh o consum e them , thos e wh o roduce ("entrepreneurs" ar e given special mentio n her e as elsewhere) , an d thos e wh give to others.27 o The idea of the America n her o is epitomize d in th e stor y of Marti n Treptow , "ayoung man . . . wh o left hi s jo b in a small tow n barbersho p in 1917 " to serve inWI . "We're told, " said Reagan , "tha t o n his bod y wa s foun d a diary " i n vbich he had written : "Americ a mus t wi n thi s war . Therefor e I will work , I will save, 1 will sacrifice, I will endure , I will fight cheerfully an d do my utmost , as if the issue of th e whol e struggle depende d on me alone. " Th e characte r of the individual and th e values tha t he hold s ar e defined by thei r contributio n to America's struggle. If th e audienc e accepts Reagan' s descriptio n of th e natur e of that continuing struggle, the n the y will be encourage d to accept th e sam e kin d of values, actions, an d commitment s tha t Trepto w accepte d in his struggle . In this case, Reagan's use of anecdot e defines th e characte r tha t bes t fits hi s story of America. World Wa r I is take n to exemplify America' s struggle for freedom against hostile forces; Trepto w exemplifies th e commo n man ; th e dedicatio n of the soldier exemplifies th e dedicatio n to countr y an d th e fighting spirit tha t ar e necessary to prevail in th e struggle ; an d th e diar y entr y exemplifies th e commit ment to act upon these principle s (work , save, sacrifice, endure ) an d th e attitud e that is appropriate to th e fight ("cheerfully") . Significantly, th e stor y is presente d as true, but the primar y sense of its accurac y is tha t it represent s a larger truth . "We're told" is a wea k clai m to factuality, bu t th e applicatio n of th e stor y in a Presidential Inaugural is a stron g claim to mora l legitimacy. Reagan's definition of America n herois m is primarily , bu t no t exclusively, economic. The key to herois m is effective actio n in th e ongoin g struggle to achieve freedom and prosperity . Reaga n encourage s identification on th e groun d of a general commitment to th e America of his stor y an d discourage s distinc tions based on differences in politics or interests. 2 8 Th e stories he tells as Presiden t feature the audience member s as American s rathe r tha n as member s of different political parties, and Time magazin e support s th e sharin g of thi s perceptio n whe n itches as typical the commen t by "a retire d brewer y worke r from San Antonio " that. "He really isn't like a Republican . He' s mor e like an American , whic h is what we really need."29 Reaga n i n th e Stor y Som of Reagan's critics hav e attempte d to portra y hi m as a dangerou s man , e seeing him either as a demagogue 3 0 or a warmonger. 3 1 Othe r critics hav e marvele d at his ability to retain his rol e as a critic of governmen t even after he becam e its symbolic head an d hav e worrie d abou t hi s detachmen t from th e policies of his own administration32 or abou t hi s lac k of accountability. 3 3 Such criticisms , however, fail to take accoun t of th e natur e of th e publi c perceptio n tha t is encouraged by the narrative form . To understand th e respons e to Reaga n it is necessary to see an d understan d Reagan-in-the-story, no t Reagan-the-policy-make r or even Reagan-the-speaker . Since the story is th e dominan t mod e throug h whic h th e politica l situatio n is


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interpreted , Reaga n will no t be perceive d or judge d as a politicia n or a policymake r or an ideologu e unless tha t is th e rol e tha t is defined for Reagan as part of th e story. In th e stor y tha t emerges throug h hi s speeches , however, Reagan play s tw o role s tha t hav e succeeded in encompassin g th e perspectiv e of his critics, As a characte r in th e story , Reaga n is a mythi c hero . He embodie s the role of th e compassionate , committe d politica l outsider ; he is th e activ e force that has arrive d to hel p righ t th e prevailin g wrong s an d to ge t thing s movin g again. As th e narrato r of th e story, Reaga n is portraye d as simpl y presentin g th e nature of th e situation . Ther e i s n o artifice an d n o threa t i n thi s style o f realisti c narration; Reagan-as-narrato r jus t present s thing s a s the y are . Reagan' s characte r ha s been a dominan t focus amon g thos e wh o attempt to explai n th e impac t of hi s rhetoric . On e explanatio n for Reagan' s success is that h e ha s "character"--tha t is , h e project s a n imag e o f "manl y effectiveness.'* Reaga n is said to be "th e politica l embodimen t of th e heroi c westerner,"3i both i n hi s appearanc e ("tall , lank , rugged" 36 ) an d i n hi s characte r trait s ("honesty an d sincerity, innocence , optimism , an d certainty" 37 ) . He is compare d with other Presidentia l heroe s such as Thoma s Jefferson, Theodor e Roosevelt , and Franklin Roosevelt , whos e virtue s wer e thos e of th e visionar y an d th e ma n of action,31 I n thi s respect , h e i s said t o contras t wit h th e "softer " Democrati c candidates wh o hav e oppose d him . Reaga n ha s been abl e to establish th e perception of hi s competenc e throug h "toug h talk , vigorou s promises , an d hi s emphasis on immediat e solutions." 3 9 Reagan' s opponent s ar e said to hav e been pushed by the contras t int o appearin g "impractical , ineffectual, an d effete."40 Such descriptions revea l Reagan' s success in establishin g himself as a variatio n on a dominant type of America n mythi c hero--strong , aggressive, distant , in control , an d in Reagan's case , abl e t o see th e situatio n clearl y an d t o explai n i t t o a confused public.41 Th e mos t familia r for m o f attac k o n Reagan' s characte r attempt s t o reveal a tru e Reaga n behin d a constructe d mask . "Character " become s a criticism of Reaga n whe n he is accuse d of playin g a rol e as he di d durin g hi s movi e career. The criticism appear s in a numbe r of relate d forms--h e is said to be a "performer," a "host, " an "image, " to be playin g a "gam e of cultura l make-believe," or to b e "using " hi s rol e t o manipulat e th e publi c an d t o mor e effectively pursue his politica l or ideologica l or persona l goals. 4 2 Thi s use of "character " as artifice will succeed as a criticism onl y if Reaga n is perceived as constructin g a fictional persona . It canno t succeed if hi s person a is seen as matchin g or expressing his "real " character . Th e criticism of Reaga n as an artificial creation , however, neglects hi s rol e as narrato r of th e story. Reagan' s story , an d hi s rol e in the story, ar e presente d as a realisti c an d sensible portraya l of th e norma l an d ordinary cours e of events . Th e combinatio n of Reagan' s cal m demeanor, 4 3 his frequent reference to familia r situation s to explai n comple x or threatenin g events,44 and hi s relianc e o n America n commonplaces 4 5 combin e t o creat e a n ai r o f reassuring certaint y tha t ha s suggested to som e commentator s tha t Reaga n woul d be more aptl y compare d wit h Hardin g o r Eisenhowe r tha n wit h Theodor e o r Franklin Roosevelt. 4 6 If criticisms of Reagan' s characte r ar e no t adjuste d to fit th e story, they are likely eithe r t o b e dismissed o r t o b e reinterpreted--sometime s wit h unexpected results . Th e charg e tha t t o elect Reaga n wa s t o ris k war, for example , was unsuccessful fo r Carte r in th e 198 0 presidentia l electio n an d for Geral d Ford in the 197 6 Californi a primar y becaus e thes e attempt s a t criticis m wer e perfectly consisten t wit h th e stron g characte r tha t Reaga n ha d establishe d i n hi s stor y and with th e story' s assumptio n tha t strengt h is a necessar y preconditio n of peace. From

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the point of view of th e story, Reagan' s emphasi s on increases in weapons , hi s assertion o f the nee d t o stan d u p t o th e Soviets, an d hi s willingness t o ris k wa r in pursuit of the highe r goal s of freedo m an d democrac y reinforce d hi s repeate d declaration tha t "peac e i s th e highes t aspiratio n o f th e America n people, " an d that he, personally, wante d nothin g so muc h as a peaceful world. 4 7 Th e resul t wa s that, in both of these elections , th e charge s mad e agains t Reaga n di d mor e har m to the accuser tha n to Reagan . In 1976 , Ford' s ad s wer e even used by th e Reaga n campaign.48 Similarly, Reaga n ca n continu e to use "government " as a characte r in his stories an d to oppos e himself an d hi s audienc e to th e Federa l governmen t after being President for mor e tha n on e full ter m becaus e Reagan' s rol e in th e narrative situation i s t o give meanin g t o th e countr y an d it s government ; h e an d his vision may inspire an d shap e policy, bu t he is no t hel d responsibl e becaus e designing the particular s of polic y will no t be seen as hi s rol e from withi n thi s perspective. The dominance of th e stor y is als o revealed by thos e occasion s in whic h Reagan's character ha s been called int o question . In th e first debat e wit h Walte r Mondale during th e 198 4 presidentia l campaign , hi s advisor s attempte d to prepare him with sufficient informatio n an d detail , bu t thi s tacti c wa s unsuc cessful because it did no t accor d wit h th e characte r of Reaga n in hi s ow n story. In the second debate , hi s advisor s resolved to "le t Reaga n be Reagan." 4 9 Th e failure of this attemp t to alte r Reagan' s "character " to mee t th e demand s of his critics and the success of hi s retur n to hi s "normal " style in th e secon d debat e confirms the acceptance of Reagan' s stor y an d of his rol e in it . In th e Iran/contra affair, Reagan's apparen t willingness to dea l wit h an archetypa l enem y an d to compromise his previousl y firm stanc e agains t terroris m seemed completel y inconsistent with th e characte r h e ha d established . Ther e seemed t o b e onl y tw o "rational" explanations (from th e poin t of vie w of th e story) : eithe r tha t Reaga n was not responsible for th e action s or tha t hi s characte r ha d changed . Hence , on e response to the crisis ha s been to questio n Reagan' s contro l ove r hi s subordinate s and another has been to inquir e int o hi s menta l an d physica l health . Neithe r of these explanations, however, is consisten t wit h th e story' s imag e of presidentia l leadership. The stor y ca n encompas s Reagan' s critics , bu t it is vulnerabl e to hi s own inconsistencies. Reagan's story encourage s hi s audienc e to see Americ a as a chose n natio n leading the world to freedom an d economi c progress , to see Reaga n as a friendly well-motivated leader an d as a narrato r of th e America n story, an d to see them selves as heroes in th e unfoldin g dram a of America n greatness . In Reagan' s rhetoric, the natur e of th e world , hi s policies , hi s values , hi s character , an d th e character of his audienc e ar e defined togethe r by th e stor y tha t he tells. Th e conse quences of this reliance on narrativ e for m nee d to be considere d carefully. CONSEQUENCE S O F REAGAN' S US E O F NARRATIV E FOR M In a 1984 review essay on "Narrativ e Theor y an d Communicatio n Research, " Robert L. Scott observed tha t despit e th e suggestive correspondence s betwee n narrative forms an d rhetorica l functions , "n o rhetorica l criti c . . . ha s presse d along the lines suggested thu s far by narrativ e theorists." 5 0 At th e sam e time , Walter Fisher propose d a theor y of huma n communicatio n base d on narrative . Fisher argued tha t traditiona l investigatio n of communicatio n wa s regulate d by the "rational world paradigm, " whic h presume d tha t rationa l communicator s managed a world tha t "i s a set of logica l puzzle s whic h ca n be resolve d throug h


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Chapter 4 Narrative Criticism

appropriat e analysi s an d applicatio n of reaso n conceive d as an argumentative construct." 5 1 Fisher foun d thi s approac h to be mor e incomplet e than wrong. Specifically, he objected to its inabilit y to gras p th e manne r in which symbolizatio n is a universal thoug h non-rationa l characteristi c of huma n nature, and to its impositio n of ideologica l restriction s upo n th e proces s of mora l choice. In contrast , Fisher offered th e "narrativ e paradigm, " whic h presume s that humans ar e essentially story-tellers wh o ac t on th e basis of goo d reason s derived fro m thei r experienc e in a worl d tha t is "a set of stories whic h mus t be chosen among to live th e goo d life in a proces s of continua l recreation." 5 2 Th e distinctio n betwee n narrativ e an d "rational " form s of consciousness is well grounde d in th e literatur e of narrativ e theory . Drawin g from the texts of history , literature , an d anthropology , thes e theorist s hav e show n tha t narrative is a distinctiv e an d distinctively importan t mean s of giving meanin g to events. The importan t questio n for politica l discours e parallel s Hayde n White's inquiry into historica l narrative : "Wit h what kind of meaning doe s storyin g endow" political events?53 Th e answer s provide d by narrativ e theorist s suggest tha t narrative is a fundamenta l for m of huma n understandin g tha t direct s perception , judgment, and knowledge . Narrativ e for m shape s ontolog y by makin g meaningfulness a product of consisten t relationship s betwee n situations , subjects, an d events and by making trut h a propert y tha t refers primaril y to narrative s an d onl y secondarily to propositions ; narrativ e for m shape s moralit y by placin g character s an d events within a contex t wher e mora l judgmen t is a necessary par t of makin g sense of the action; an d narrativ e for m shape s epistemolog y by suggesting tha t all important events ar e ope n t o commo n sense understanding . Thes e characteristic s of narrativ e suggest an explanatio n for the apparent incongruit y of a Presiden t wit h hig h levels of persona l suppor t despite opposition to his policies , an d it explain s th e particula r wa y in whic h suppor t and oppositio n to Reaga n ha s been expressed--Reagan's exclusive and explicit reliance on a single story has dominated the realm of political judgment. The story is the primar y basis for defining th e situation , moralit y is th e primar y basis for justifying publi c policy, an d commo n sense is th e primar y basis for analyzing political issues. Narrativ e Trut h Reagan' s stories ar e sometime s presente d as fictional, sometime s as fact. In either case , thei r appropriatenes s to politica l discours e depend s upo n their consistency wit h th e historica l worl d of th e audience . If th e stor y is no t true , it must be trueto-life; if it did no t actuall y happen , it mus t be eviden t tha t it could have happened or that , given th e wa y thing s are , it shoul d hav e happened . Whe n narrative dominates , epistemologica l standard s mov e awa y from empiricism . History is more likely to be seen as a literar y artifact , fiction is mor e likely to be seen as a mimetic representatio n of reality, an d th e tw o forms "cross " in th e historicit y of the narrative form. 5 4 Understandin g thi s shift in perspectiv e is essential to understanding Reagan' s rhetori c an d th e reaction s t o it . As Bennet t an d Feldma n foun d in thei r examinatio n of story-telling in jury trials , "judgment s based on stor y constructio n are , in man y importan t respects, unverifiable in term s of th e reality of th e situatio n tha t th e story represents."5i Th e stor y become s increasingl y dominan t as th e empirically defined context for th e stor y become s increasingl y distan t fro m confirmatio n by either experience or consensus . Bennet t an d Feldma n identify tw o situation s in which "structura l characteristic s of stories becom e mor e centra l to judgment" : (1) if "facts


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or documentary evidence ar e absent, " or (2) if "a collectio n of facts or evidence is subject to competing interpretations." 5 6 Bot h of thes e condition s ar e typicall y present in major political disputes . Even the most obviousl y fantasti c storie s mak e a clai m to trut h for th e orde r fiat they impose on a chaoti c world . To suppor t th e clai m tha t fairy tale s give meaning to a child's life, fo r example , Brun o Bettelheim quote s th e Germa n poe t Schiller as saying that , "deepe r meanin g resides in th e fair y tales tol d to me in my childhood tha n in th e trut h tha t is taugh t by life." 5 7 Event s becom e mean ingful in stories and meanin g depend s upo n th e significance of th e events withi n the context of the story. As a consequence , th e perceptio n of trut h depend s upo n th story as a whole rathe r tha n upo n th e accurac y of it s individua l statements . e Loui 0. Mink argues tha t a historica l narrativ e "claim s trut h no t merel y for eac h s of its individual statement s take n distributively, bu t for th e comple x for m of th e narrative itself."58 Th e "comple x form " of a narrativ e make s isolate d event s an d individual statements meaningful . Min k conclude s tha t "th e significance of pas t occurrences is understandabl e onl y as the y ar e locatabl e in th e ensemble of interrelationships that can be graspe d onl y in th e constructio n of narrativ e form . " 5 9 The variety of technical term s develope d her e all lea d to a single basi c conclu sion: somehow we mus t recogniz e tha t stories admi t to a dua l evaluation . Alasdai r Maclntyre studies mora l discours e in term s of verisimilitude an d dramatic probaMiry.60 Fisher uses narrative fidelity an d narrative probability to expres s a parallel distinction.61 In other words , eac h theoris t sees narrativ e credibilit y (an d narrativ e power) as having bot h substantiv e an d forma l properties . An examination of th e reactio n to Reagan' s dominan t narrativ e suggests tha t tie two properties ar e interdependent , an d recognizin g th e reflexive qualit y of hi s narrative suggests an explanatio n for th e difference in claim s abou t th e trut h of his rhetoric: the kind of "narrativ e probability " establishe d in Reagan' s explicitly narrative and mythi c rhetori c ha s affected judgment s of "narrativ e fidelity." Because his story is so dominant , so explicit , an d so consistent , politica l claim s are likely to be measure d agains t th e standar d of Reagan' s mythi c America n history rather than agains t othe r possibl e standard s such as technica l compe I lence or ideological dogma . In thi s way, th e story' s dominanc e ha s diminishe d the significance of claims abou t Reagan' s factua l inaccuracies . Fo r example , in the 1984 campaign Reaga n claime d tha t th e ta x proposa l bein g advance d by th e Democrats would be equivalen t to addin g $180 0 to th e ta x bill of every America n household/2 The figure wa s questione d widely, bu t th e charg e of inaccurac y neve r affected Reagan's credibility or popularity . Th e meanin g of th e genera l stor y wa s mor important tha n th e particula r figure. If Reagan' s estimat e erre d by 10 % or e hy 100% that would no t affect th e meanin g of hi s story--tha t th e Democrat s we, once again, offering a "massiv e ta x an d spendin g scheme " tha t threatene d American economic progress--s o th e erro r coul d be dismissed as trivial . In addition, relying on th e interna l relationship s establishe d in stories to determin the truth discourages direc t denia l or refutatio n an d encourage s th e audienc e e to discover their own plac e in th e story. On e reaso n fo r th e lac k of success of man of Reagan's critics ha s been thei r tendenc y to attemp t to refute Reagan' s y assertions.''3 Those mos t successful in confrontin g Reagan , such as Mari o Cuomo , hav been those few politician s wh o offer alternativ e stories . Th e argumen t mus t e he adjusted to the narrativ e paradigm--fo r example , by makin g th e "cit y on a hill" a "tale of tw o cities "--o r it is likely to be seen as trivia l or irrelevant . The stories that have cause d th e mos t troubl e fo r Reaga n ar e thos e whic h ar e least in accord with th e generall y accepte d understanding . In a speech to th e VF W


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Chapte r 4

Narrativ e Criticism

durin g th e 198 0 campaign , fo r example , Reaga n referred to the Vietnam Ii as "a nobl e cause. " Despit e th e approva l of th e immediat e audience, thest« complicate d hi s nationa l campaig n becaus e of it s inconsistency with the understandin g of Vietna m as an unjus t wa r in whic h America played an ignotit I role/ 4 Similarly, Reagan' s difficulties wit h th e Bitbur g ceremony stemmed fnhi s accoun t contradictin g th e received understandin g of America waging wv I to destro y th e evils of Naz i conquest . Neithe r of thes e cases resulted inlastB! damag e to Reagan' s popularit y or credibility, however , because he was ableio i sho w tha t hi s action s wer e consisten t wit h hi s stor y of America/ 5 The distinctivenes s of th e Iran/'contra affair is tha t Reagan' s action s hav e been interpreted as I bein g inconsisten t wit h Reagan' s ow n story. Tradin g arm s for hostages was no I t seen as consisten t wit h standin g up to terrorism ; providin g arms to Iran wa I s no t seen as consisten t wit h stron g oppositio n to America' s enemies. Because it I wa s perceived as bein g inconsisten t wit h th e establishe d stor y of the Reagan pres-1 idency, th e effects of th e Irania n arm s dea l hav e been genera l and severe.66 Eve a n stor y tha t is powerfull y resistan t to outsid e criticism canno t survive inconsistency' wit h itself. Reagan' s storie s ar e no t completel y self-contained--if the y could not be interprete d as representin g rea l events in th e rea l worl d the y woul d be vulnerable to charge s tha t the y ar e merel y fantasie s conjure d up by th e conservative imagination 67 --bu t thi s is a special kin d of reality. Th e basis fo r accepting the referential valu e of Reagan' s storie s is no t empirica l justification , bu t consistency with the mora l standard s an d commo n sense o f hi s audience . Mora l Argumen t Narrativ e for m shape s interpretatio n by emphasizin g th e mora l dimension of understanding . As Hayde n Whit e says of historica l narrative , "stor y forms not onl y permi t us to judg e th e mora l significance of huma n projects , they also provid e th e mean s by whic h to judg e them , even whil e we preten d to be merely describin g them." 6 8 Whit e take s th e "mora l impulse " to be a defining characteristi c of narrativity, 6 9 Fishe r uses moral argumen t to distinguis h tha t form of publi c argumen t mos t suite d to narrative, 7 0 an d Alasdai r Maclntyr e makes the connectio n betwee n narrative , persona l identity , intelligibility, an d accountability fundamenta l to hi s attemp t to rescu e ethical judgmen t fro m wha t he sees as the sterile standard s of enlightenmen t thinkers. 7 1 Th e natur e of th e narrativ e form is said to be mora l becaus e storie s mak e events intelligible by imposin g a temporal orde r tha t lead s t o som e en d tha t defines th e mora l fram e o f th e stor y and because th e natur e o f th e character s an d event s i n th e stor y will b e defined wit h reference t o tha t purpose . Ronal d Beiner explain s an d exemplifies th e mora l impuls e of narrative in politica l discourse . "I n attemptin g to define a conceptio n of th e huma n good," he writes , "we tell a story. "71 No t all storie s wor k equall y well, bu t ric h an d penetratin g storie s ar e wha t w e loo k fo r i n th e wor k o f politica l theorist s an d i n the statement s o f politicians . Th e qualit y o f th e stor y will mak e i t mor e o r less effective i n disclosin g som e trut h abou t th e huma n condition . An d different stories will sugges t different truths , no t all of whic h will be consisten t wit h each other. "Fo r instance, " Beiner continues , "if w e wis h t o expoun d th e necessar y place o f politica l freedo m i n a meaningfull y huma n life, w e ma y wis h t o tell a story abou t ho w th e unio n organizer s o f Solidarit y i n Poland , agains t all odds , forced a remot e part y machin e t o listen t o th e voice o f th e Polish people." 7 3 O r w e may


Lewis recall the heroic acts an d nobl e sentiment s of th e America n Revolutio n as conservative spokesmen like Reaga n often do . Or we ma y reverse th e focus an d tell of [he horrors of repressio n an d segregatio n in Sout h Africa. Th e significant poin t here is that whatever stor y is tol d will provid e a mora l directio n an d tha t thi s is especially true for narrative s tha t ar e presente d as historica l fact. The heavily mora l orientatio n of Reagan' s rhetori c help s to accoun t bot h for the character of hi s rhetori c an d for th e characte r of th e respons e to it . Reaga n characteristically justifies hi s policies by citin g thei r goals , whil e critics of hi s poli cies characteristically cite problem s of conceptio n or implementation . Reagan' s moral focus ha s worke d well becaus e th e shift of emphasi s to end s rathe r tha n means pre-empts argument s abou t practicalit y an d because it provide s Reaga n with a ready response by transformin g oppositio n to polic y int o oppositio n to principle. The difficulties of reachin g th e goa l ar e no t ignored , bu t in thi s ideal istic framework the y tak e on th e statu s of technicalities--potentiall y bothersome , but not really fundamenta l to judgin g policies or people . The focus on goal s ha s als o led to tw o sort s of criticisms . Reaga n is accuse d of overlooking th e impac t tha t mean s ca n hav e on ends, 7 4 an d of assumin g tha t stating the goal is equivalen t to its achievement. 7 5 Thes e tendencie s ca n be seen clearly in the justification an d defense tha t Reaga n provide s fo r hi s policies . Reagan's justification fo r th e Strategi c Defense Initiativ e in th e 198 5 Stat e of the Union Address provide s a goo d exampl e of th e way s in whic h a mora l emphasis can influence publi c argument . Ther e is , said Reagan , "a bette r wa y of eliminating the threa t of nuclea r war " tha n deterrence : It is a Strategic Defense Initiativ e aime d at finding a non-nuclea r defense against ballistic missiles. It is th e mos t hopefu l possibilit y of th e nuclea r age . But it is not well understood . Some say it will brin g wa r to th e heavens--bu t its purpos e is to dete r war, in the heavens an d on earth . Some say th e researc h woul d be expen sive. Perhaps, bu t it coul d save million s of lives, indee d humanit y itself. Some say if we build such a system , th e Soviets will buil d a defense system of their own. The y alread y hav e strategi c defenses tha t surpas s ours ; a civil defense system, wher e we hav e almos t none ; an d a researc h progra m covering roughly th e sam e area s of technolog y we'r e exploring . An d finally, some say the research will tak e a lon g time . Th e answe r to tha t is : "Let' s ge t started."76 The pattern of respons e is revealing . Whil e th e objection s cited by Reaga n ate primarily pragmati c (expense , Soviet response , time) , Reagan' s justifications ate made in terms of th e goal s of th e program . Reaga n doe s no t den y tha t thi s program might "brin g wa r to th e heavens, " he cites th e goa l of th e progra m as sufficient justification; he doe s no t den y it s expense , he invoke s th e goa l of savin g lives. The relationship betwee n mean s an d end s is skewe d to an exclusive focus on goals as a means of judgment . If th e mov e fro m practicalit y to principl e is accepted, it makes th e polic y immun e fro m mos t objections . Fro m thi s poin t of view the only reasonabl e explanatio n for oppositio n is th e on e tha t Reaga n cites , , the policy must no t be "wel l understood." 7 7 The same combinatio n of an exclusive focus upo n end s defined withi n a partic ular historical narrativ e ha s resulte d in charge s tha t Reaga n "ha s been pushin g his civil-rights policies wit h a campaig n of 'astonishin g misrepresentation.'" 7 8 Reagan's response to such criticisms is tha t the y ar e th e resul t of "mispercep tions" and "misunderstandings." 7 9 Whil e hi s critics cite hi s factua l error s an d


Chapter 4 Narrative Criticism

wha t the y see as inconsistencie s betwee n his statement s an d the actions of his administration , Reaga n relies on th e stor y of his life an d his story of America to counte r th e accusations . Whe n questione d abou t his negative image among black leaders , for example , Reaga n responde d wit h a reference to his character (that is to th e characte r of Reagan-in-the-story) : "it' s very disturbin g to me, because anyon e wh o know s my life stor y know s tha t lon g before ther e was a thing called th e civil-rights movement , I wa s busy on tha t side." 8 0 In his Second Inaugural,he agai n used reference to th e pas t to mak e racia l equalit y a par t of America's story: "A s an olde r American , I remembe r a tim e whe n peopl e of different race, creed, or ethni c origi n in ou r lan d foun d hatre d an d prejudic e installed in social custom and , yes, in law. Ther e is no stor y mor e heartenin g in ou r histor y than the progress tha t we'v e mad e towar d th e 'brotherhoo d of man ' tha t Go d intended for us." Fro m th e narrativ e poin t of view, it is sufficient to hav e th e appropriat e character, an d to believe in th e appropriat e goals . Th e prope r result s ar e the consequence of th e story's progression . Commo n Sens e Narrativ e trut h assume s a typ e of knowledg e tha t differs from the knowledge produce d withi n an d sanctione d by rationa l argument . Both Min k and White claim tha t narrativ e is th e basic mediu m of commo n sense.81 Maclntyr e and Fisher identify narrativ e wit h th e received wisdo m of th e communit y and contrast that to th e "elitist " an d "technical " knowledg e of th e academi c an d political establishment. 8 2 Since narrativ e make s sense of experience , th e sense tha t is made will be grounde d in th e presupposition s of thos e wh o accep t th e narrative , and those presupposition s ar e commo n sense. Persuasive narratives , then , bot h express and assum e a knowledg e tha t is share d by th e community . Th e emphasi s on commo n sense is significant for, as Clifford Geertz in anthropolog y an d Alasdai r Maclntyr e in philosoph y hav e shown , "commo n sense" is a culturall y defined set of rules an d expectations. 8 3 Jus t as relianc e on a common moralit y de-emphasize s practica l an d technica l concerns , reliance on a commo n understandin g de-emphasize s objection s based on claims to special knowledg e or expertise . Commo n sense is so obviou s to thos e wh o accept it tha t disagreemen t wit h its implication s will often seem irrelevant , impractical, or unintelligible . Hayde n Whit e note s approvingl y tha t "on e of its virtues is the convictio n tha t inform s it; agreemen t wit h its dicta is th e very mar k of goodwill."84 In thi s way, commo n sense insulate s its claims from alternativ e conceptions; it consist s of an unreflective, self-evidently "true " set of beliefs tha t are used to mak e sense ou t of situation s an d events . Commo n sense establishes a transparent realism-- a commo n sense statemen t is wha t everyon e knows ; a commo n sense judgmen t i s wha t an y sensible perso n woul d do . Reagan' s relianc e upo n commo n sense as a standar d for understandin g and judgmen t ha s been note d bot h by commentator s an d by Reaga n himself,85 and th e consequence s of th e emphasi s on commo n sense on his expressio n and his analysis ar e evident in th e style, th e logic, an d th e attitud e of his rhetoric . In brief, th e commo n sense groundin g tha t i s a n elemen t o f Reagan' s dominan t narrative suggests a patter n of understandin g tha t parallel s Geertz's informa l categorization of th e "stylistic features , mark s of attitude " of commo n sense.86 Reagan' s rhetori c employ s a simple , familiar, an d persona l style; a logic grounde d in practical analogy ; an d an attitud e tha t offers a singula r perspective , unquestione d assumptions , an d definitive portrayals .


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Reagan's style encourage s th e perceptio n tha t politica l problem s ar e accessible to solution by th e commo n actio n of ordinar y people . Since commo n sense is "thin," political understandin g require s no mysteriou s or arcan e perceptiveness ; things are as they appear. 8 7 Th e simplicity of apparentl y comple x issues ha s been a continuing theme in Reagan' s rhetoric . In th e so-called Reaganomic s speech , he declined to presen t "a jumbl e of charts , figures, an d economi c jargon" ; hi s Strategic Defense Initiativ e wa s "no t abou t spendin g arithmetic" ; hi s proposa l for Tax Reform was "a simple , straightforwar d message" ; on Nicaragua , "th e ques tion the Congress of th e Unite d States will no w answe r is a simple one" ; an d on arms control, "the answer, my friends , is simple." 8 8 One consequence of Reagan' s simple style of commo n sense rhetori c is tha t he has been subject to charge s of bein g simplistic throughou t hi s politica l career. In a revealing respons e to tha t clai m in hi s Inaugura l Addres s as governo r of California, Reagan said : "Fo r man y years , yo u an d I hav e been shushe d like children and told ther e ar e n o simpl e answer s t o comple x problem s tha t ar e beyond our comprehension . Well, th e trut h is ther e are simpl e answers--jus t no t easy ones."89 Muc h of Reagan' s relationshi p to hi s audienc e is containe d in thi s "common sense" observation . Th e reference t o "yo u an d I " place s Reaga n an d the audience together agains t th e unspecified forces tha t oppos e th e participatio n of the people in political decision-makin g an d th e reference to "simpl e answers " opens up the political process . Characte r an d style combin e to reinforc e th e presumption that will an d courage , no t intelligence o r expertise , ar e require d t o solve difficult political problems . Aristotle noted tha t compariso n wit h th e familia r allow s us to understan d the unfamiliar90 an d th e assumption s of commo n sense mov e tha t observatio n farther: unfamiliar events an d comple x situation s ar e seen to be "really " lik e th e simple and familiar understanding s an d beliefs of th e group. 9 1 Reaga n often uses a "common sense" logic of practica l analogie s to explai n an d justify hi s polic y choices. In his Acceptance Addres s at th e 198 0 Republica n Convention , for example, Reagan said : "I believe it is clea r ou r federal governmen t is overgrow n and overweight. Indeed , it is tim e fo r ou r governmen t to go on a diet." 9 2 An d in his first speech on "Reaganomics, " he me t hi s oppositio n wit h commo n sense : "There were always thos e wh o tol d us tha t taxe s couldn' t be cu t unti l spendin g was reduced. Well, you know , we ca n lectur e ou r childre n agains t extravaganc e until we run out of voice an d breath . Or we ca n cur e thei r extravaganc e by simply reducing thei r allowance." 9 3 In Reagan' s 198 6 addres s on Nicaragua , th e Mcaraguan government is referred to as "a secon d Cuba , a secon d Libya, " whil e thecontras are said to be "freedo m fighters " wh o ar e "lik e th e Frenc h Resistanc e that fought the Nazis . " 9 4 By usin g th e dail y dilemma s of diet s an d allowance s an d the widely accepted evils of th e Nazi s an d Cub a as parallel s to curren t America n policy-making, Reagan suggests tha t wha t migh t hav e been seen as comple x an d distant problems ar e amenabl e to simple an d familia r (if no t alway s pleasant ) solutions. As he concluded late r in th e "Reaganomics " speech , "All it take s is a little common sense an d recognitio n of ou r ow n ability." 9 5 Since common sense is assume d to be "natural, " th e correctnes s an d universality of the perceptions an d judgment s tha t Reaga n propound s is als o assumed. 9 6 His is not a carefully weighe d reflection involvin g doubt s an d reservations ; Reagan presents th e pictur e clearl y an d incontestabl y an d th e action s follo w natu rally from his descriptions. In hi s Addres s to th e Natio n on Defense an d Nationa l Security (the so-called "Sta r Wars " speech) , fo r example , Reaga n bega n by statin g


Chapter 4 Narrative Criticism

tha t furthe r defense cut s "canno t be made " an d tha t ther e is "n o logical way" to reduc e th e defense budge t withou t reducin g security. In hi s description of Soviet powe r he state d tha t "th e . . . militarizatio n of Grenad a . . . ca n only be seen as a powe r projectio n int o tha t region " an d tha t "th e Soviet Unio n is acquiring what ca n onl y be considere d an offensive militar y force. " Th e appropriate actions ar e jus t a s clear : "i t wa s obviou s tha t w e ha d t o begin a majo r modernization program, " "w e mus t continu e to restor e ou r militar y strength" ; and with regard to his proposal : "Ar e we no t capabl e of demonstratin g ou r peaceful intentions by applyin g all ou r abilities an d ou r ingenuit y to achieving a trul y lasting stability? I thin k w e are . Indee d w e must." 9 7 Thi s sense of unquestione d trut h explain s wh y th e observation s of theorists abou t commo n sense in genera l appl y so smoothl y to Reagan' s rhetoric--a "maddenin g ai r of simple wisdom " exercises Reagan' s critics an d "comfortable certainties " reassur e hi s supporters. 9 8 Since commo n sense justification relies on doin g wha t an y sensible perso n woul d do based on wha t everyone knows to be true , a narrativ e frame ma y encourag e thos e withi n it to see intelligence in practical term s an d to emphasiz e sensibility over intellectua l analysis. The differing perspective s hel p to explai n wh y hi s supporter s ca n recognize that Reagan is "n o rocke t scientist " an d still respec t hi s intelligence,99 at th e same time that his opponent s lamen t wha t seems t o the m t o b e hi s obviou s intellectual weakness. Technical accomplishmen t ha s its plac e in a commo n sense perspective--expertise is useful, even essential , in makin g application s an d in completin g the details of policy--bu t on e need no t be a nuclea r engineer or a ta x accountan t to know that nuclea r strengt h ensures peac e o r tha t simplicity brings fairness."100 Consequence s fo r Policy : Incommensurabl e Frame s Fisher's descriptio n of th e rationa l an d narrativ e paradigm s neatly summarizes majo r difference in perspective . Fro m th e poin t of vie w of th e rational world paradigm , a stor y shoul d be substantivel y tru e so tha t it ca n be used as evidence by exampl e or analogy , or it shoul d be vivid enoug h to illustrat e the problem or its possibl e solution . In eithe r case , stories ar e no t considere d likely to be able to carr y th e knowledg e on e need s to analyz e an d solve a problem . From the point of view of th e narrativ e paradigm , a stor y shoul d be a goo d stor y judged by internal aestheti c criteri a an d by externa l criteri a of "fit " wit h th e audience's experience an d morality . In an y case , it is likely to best expres s wha t one really needs to kno w to ge t by in th e world . Th e tw o perspective s clash over standards for evidence an d th e appropriat e basis for judgment . Th e rhetorica l critic shoul d conside r tha t an y discours e can be described differently accordin g to these competin g thoug h no t contradictor y accounts. Furthermore , th e critic shoul d conside r tha t different auditor s ma y respond differently to th e sam e message becaus e the y ar e applyin g these different standards of apprehension . Th e incommensurabilit y of thes e tw o frames of reference is illustrated neatly in Walte r Mondale' s attac k on Reagan' s fiscal polic y in th e 1984 presidential campaign . In hi s acceptanc e addres s at th e Democrati c Convention, Mondale called for "a ne w realism. " He challenged Reaga n to "pu t his plan on the table nex t to mine " an d the n to "debat e it on nationa l television before the American people, " an d he contraste d Reagan' s approac h wit h "th e truth " five times includin g hi s memorabl e promis e to raise taxes : "Let' s tell the truth Mr. Reaga n will rais e taxes , an d so will I. He won' t tell you . I jus t did."101 Calls for


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realism, debate, an d trut h ar e fundamenta l t o rationa l analysis , bu t the y tak e o n a different meaning fro m withi n th e narrativ e paradigm . In the Second Inaugura l an d in th e relate d speeches tha t followed,102 Reaga n offered two directions for reducin g budge t deficits. First , "a dynami c economy , with more citizens workin g an d payin g taxes, " an d second , a n amendmen t tha t would "make it unconstitutiona l fo r th e federal governmen t to spen d mor e tha n the federal governmen t take s in. " Bot h thes e strategie s ar e grounde d in th e telos of Reagan's narrative. Workin g individual s ten d naturall y towar d economi c success unless blocked by barrier s constructe d by government . Th e federa l government , on the other hand , will ten d naturall y towar d expansio n an d will increas e taxe s and spending unless blocke d by a permanen t contro l tha t is beyon d it s powe r to change.103 Fro m th e poin t of view of th e rationa l paradigm , ta x increase s ar e the logical solution becaus e addin g revenu e woul d correc t th e imbalanc e betwee n income and expenditure . Fro m th e poin t of view of Reagan' s story, ta x increase s are illogical because the y woul d frustrat e th e individua l initiativ e tha t is th e basis for economic growt h an d the y ar e immora l becaus e the y woul d violat e th e natura l order by restraining individual s to benefit government . Fro m th e rationa l poin t of view, a Balanced Budget Amendmen t is irrelevan t becaus e it addresse s a principl e without dealing wit h th e underlyin g problem . Fro m th e poin t of vie w of Reagan' s narrative, the amendmen t is logica l becaus e th e federa l governmen t will neve r ac t contrary t o its natura l characte r withou t som e outsid e restrain t an d i t i s mora l because it is directed towar d th e ques t fo r individua l freedom . The dispute over ta x polic y reveals different structure s of perceptio n tha t lea d to different policy conclusions . Th e distinctiv e characte r of thes e differences is that they are defined by Reagan' s relianc e on narrativ e form . It is no t jus t th e nature of the particula r story , bu t th e relianc e on story-tellin g tha t defines th e rela tionship of those wh o accep t Reagan' s rhetori c to a comple x of significant issues . A narrative perspective uses consistenc y wit h th e stor y as th e primar y measur e of truth, emphasizes mora l standard s for judgment , an d feature s commo n sense as the basis for makin g politica l decisions . CONCLUSIONS When Reagan is seen as a story-telle r an d hi s messag e is seen as a story , it become s evident why he wa s so successful in "re-invigorating " th e country--hi s stor y gav e a clear, powerful, reassuring , an d self-justifying meanin g to America' s publi c life. And it is evident wh y Reagan' s persona l popularit y consistentl y exceeds suppor t for his policies--to accep t th e stor y is to see Reaga n bot h as a her o exemplifying the virtues of manl y efficacy an d as a realisti c narrato r telling thing s as the y are ; it makes sense to rel y on Reagan-in-the-story . Th e reaso n tha t charge s agains t Reagan's lack of compassio n or hi s militaris m hav e been ineffectual is tha t th e nature of social justice an d peace , an d th e appropriat e mean s fo r thei r achievement, are defined from withi n hi s story. Th e reaso n tha t repeate d charge s of ignorance and factual erro r hav e no t affected eithe r Reagan' s popularit y o r hi s credibility is tha t trut h is judge d in th e contex t of th e stor y an d th e stor y is judge d for its fit with popula r moralit y an d commo n sense . In short , Reaga n demon strates the enormous appea l of a narrativ e for m handle d wit h artistr y by a majo r public figure. Reagan also demonstrate s ho w limitin g relianc e on a single, unquestione d narrative structure ca n b e whe n applie d t o th e rang e o f nationa l an d internationa l concerns that comprise America n politica l discourse . Th e effectiveness of Reagan' s


Chapter 4 Narrative Criticism

transcenden t narrativ e depend s upo n establishin g th e stor y as th e primary context for understandin g peopl e an d events . Such a self-contained communication for m is effective becaus e it is clear, complete , an d (therefore) reassuring . In addition to its eviden t effectiveness, however , such a narrativ e is also fragile and dangerous. A dominan t narrativ e structur e is fragile becaus e th e requiremen t of internal consistenc y is permanent , whil e th e abilit y of peopl e respondin g to events to maintai n tha t consistenc y is inevitabl y partia l an d temporary . The fragility of Reagan' s stor y becam e evident in th e publi c respons e to th e Iran/contra affair, Since Reagan' s characte r an d hi s action s wer e perceived as a par t of his story an d wer e judge d on th e basis of thei r consistenc y wit h tha t story, his credibility I wa s intac t as lon g as he remaine d consistent . Perceived inconsistency with the I standard s tha t he ha d established , however , wa s devastatin g an d the effects were immediat e an d (apparently ) lasting. 10 4 Reagan' s dominan t narrativ e is dangerou s because its assertion of permanenc e assume s bot h insularit y from materia l condition s an d isolation from social commentary . Hi s mythi c rhetori c appeal s to a traditio n of belief and action that lend s credenc e to th e virtue s an d action s tha t ar e justified by his historical sense, bu t th e justification is limited by Reagan' s limited notio n of history. An essential par t of Alasdai r Maclntyre' s consideratio n of th e ethica l rol e of narrative thinking is tha t "a living traditio n .. . is an historicall y extended , socially embodied argument , an d a n argumen t precisely i n par t abou t th e good s whic h constitute that tradition." 10 5 Whe n Reaga n treat s America n histor y as a clearly defined set of action s wit h a clear an d constan t set of lessons to be applie d to present action an d futur e polic y direction , he isolate s his vision from historica l reinterpretation an d from curren t controversy . Reagan' s consistenc y provide s his audiences with a clear, simple , an d familiar framewor k withi n whic h to encompas s complex or unfamilia r problems . Yielding to thi s enticin g vision ca n be dangerous, however, because th e assumptio n of th e story' s trut h hide s it s contingen t nature and its implici t ideology. Adherenc e to a single stor y wit h a single poin t of view can mak e goo d judgmen t mor e difficult by reinforcin g th e legitimacy of a single set of social stereotype s an d by promotin g an exclusively America n poin t of view on internationa l problems. 10 6 A relate d dange r concern s th e rol e of th e publi c in Reagan' s version of America's story. Relying on th e (presumably ) establishe d mora l cod e an d th e (presumably) accepte d commo n sense of th e America n peopl e to establis h th e legitimacy of th e stor y implicitly denies th e legitimacy of eithe r chang e or challenge with the resul t tha t th e story' s participant s ar e drive n to a postur e of passive acceptance.107 Ironically, Reagan' s stor y of an actively heroi c America n publi c forces those who accep t it int o th e positio n of being listeners rathe r tha n creators . At most, the individua l become s a participan t in a pre-establishe d historica l frame. Th e applicatio n of narrativ e theor y to Reagan' s rhetori c also raises some broade r question s regardin g narrativ e an d politica l judgment . Fisher's assertion of th e mora l superiorit y of th e narrativ e paradigm 10 8 is no t confirmed. Reagan's story-tellin g doe s emphasiz e mora l argumen t an d it doe s ac t as an explicit counter to technica l elitism, but , as jus t noted , it ma y als o damag e publi c morality. This examinatio n of Reagan' s rhetori c suggests tha t Fisher's relianc e on th e Aristotelian dictu m tha t "th e 'people ' hav e a natura l tendenc y to prefer th e true and the just" 10 9 ma y be a mystification tha t require s a mor e careful examination of the way s in whic h storie s ar e accepte d or rejected. Reaga n ha s show n tha t powerful appeal s ca n b e mad e t o popula r belief an d popula r moralit y throug h the narrative form , bu t th e acceptanc e of hi s stor y an d th e durabilit y of his popularity also I


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seem to show tha t ther e is a preferenc e for clarit y ove r complexity , for consis tency over aberration , for positiv e directio n ove r acceptanc e of limitations , an d for self-justification by th e derogatio n of one' s enemies . Good s interna l to th e story need to be consisten t wit h th e mora l judgmen t of th e audience , an d truth s that are accepted withi n th e stor y nee d to be consisten t wit h th e commo n sense of the audience, but it is no t clea r from examinin g thi s case in whic h narrativ e for m is dominant tha t narrativ e is likely to provid e a moralit y or trut h tha t is superio r to other forms of discours e or to combination s of othe r forms . There are other disturbin g problem s as well . Despit e identifying tw o "para digms," Fisher assumes tha t rationa l an d narrativ e mode s of thinkin g ar e fundamentally compatible. 11 0 He argue s tha t consideration s of narrativ e fidelity can subsume th e skills an d requirement s of logic . But thi s examinatio n of Reagan's rhetoric an d th e response s to it suggests tha t th e narrativ e an d th e rational perspectives ca n be distinctive an d incommensurable . On e nee d no t claim that narrative is irrationa l to distinguis h its characteristi c for m of ratio nality from tha t of th e "rationa l world " paradigm . Havin g mad e th e distinctio n between these tw o mode s of though t clear, it become s difficult to accep t Fisher's conclusion that narrativ e offers a superio r an d fully encompassin g alternative. 11 1 Americans have listened to Ronal d Reaga n as Presiden t for almos t a decade , usually with admiration , bu t often withou t agreement . Some hav e hear d poo r arguments and marveled at hi s abilit y to delud e audiences ; other s hav e hear d good stories and dismissed hi s error s as trivial . An d whil e th e Iran/contra crisis has diminished the credibilit y of Reagan' s presidency, it ha s no t altere d th e form s of understanding throug h whic h he is heard . Until th e differences in judgmen t are identified as differences in perspective , ther e will be littl e groun d for commo n discussion and little motivatio n for self-analysis. NOTES
'Mary McGrory, ". . . and growls from the training camp, " Des Moines Register, 6 September 1985,12A. Paul Erickson begins his book on Reagan with the judgment that , "Ronald Reagan is by far the most persuasive speaker of our time." Reagan Speaks (New York: Ne w York University Press, 1985), 1. ! "More Popular Than Ever," Time, 12 August 1985, 17. 'Sidney Blumenthal, "The Reagan Millennium," New Republic, 19 November 1984, 12. 'The books cover a range of policies and perspectives, some are explicitly political and were designed to influence election campaigns: Edmund G. Brown, Reagan and Reality (New York: Praeger, 1970); Brown and Bill Brown, Reagan: the Political Chameleon (New York: Praeger, 1976); Mark Green and Gail MacColl, There He Goes Again: Ronald Reagan's Reign of Error (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983). Others respond to specific issues: Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush, and Nuclear War (New York: Random House, 1982); Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms (New York: Knopf, 1984); Fred Ackerman, Reaganomics: Rhetoric vs. Reality (Boston: South End Press, 1982); Joan Claybrook, Retreat From Safety: Reagan's Attack on America's Health (New York: Pantheon, 1984). Others attempt more thorough or scholarly appraisals of Reagan's statements and policies: Ronald Dallek, Reagan: The Politics of Symbolism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984); Ronnie Dugger, On Reagan: The Man and his Presidency (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983). 'Dallek, 178. 'Dallek, viii. '"Innocence Abroad," The New Republic, 3 June 1985, 7. 'Martin Medhurst, "Postponing the Social Agenda: Reagan's Strategy and Tactics," Western journal of Speech Communication 48 (1984): 262-76 ; Henry Z. Scheele, "Ronald Reagan's 1980 Acceptance Address: A Focus on American Values," Western Journal of Speech Communication 48 (1984): 51-61 ; Bert E. Bradley, "Jefferson and Reagan: The Rhetoric of Two Inaugurals," Southern Speech Communication journal 48 (1983): 119-36 ; Walter Fisher, "Romantic Democracy, Ronald Reagan, and Presidential Heroes," Western Journal of Speech Communication 46 (1982): 299-310 .


Chapte r 4

Narrativ e Criticism

'Richard L. Johannesen, "An Ethical Assessment of the Reagan Rhetoric, 1981-82," Political Communication Yearbook 1984, eds[.] Keith R. Sanders, Lynda Lee Kaid, and Dan Nimm o (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), 226-41 ; C. Thomas Preston, Jr., "Reagan's 'New Beginning': Is it the 'New Deal' of the Eighties?" Southern Speech Communication Journal 49 (1984): 198-211 ; Gregg Phifer, "Two Inaugurals: A Second Loot," Southern Speech Communication Journal 48 (1983): 378-85 . '"David Zarefsky, Carol Miller-Tutzauer, and Frank E. Tutzauer, "Reagan's Safety Net for [lie Truly Needy: The Rhetorical Uses of Definition," Central States Speech Journal 35 (1984): 113-19 ; Richard E. Crable and Steven L. Vibbert, "Argumentative Stance and Political Faith Healing: 'The Dream Will Come True,['] " Quarterly Journal of Speech 69 (1983): 290-301. In his explanation of Reagan's approach to Soviet-American relations Robert L. Ivie found that "a flawed policy is being perceived as successful because of ho w it is symbolized." "Speaking 'Common Sense' About the Soviet Threat: Reagan's Rhetorical Stance," Western Journal of Speech Communication 48 (1984): 40 . Sarah Russell Hankins concluded that "the presidential choice in 1980 was an attempt to align the human with the illusion of the heroic." "Archetypal Alloy: Reagan's Rhetorical Image," Central States Speech Journal 34 (1983): 34. Similarly, Marth a Anna Marti n wrote tha t "the cumulative language, if not the reality, suggested that Carter was an 'unfit' leader." "Ideologues, Ideographs, and 'The Best Men': From Carter to Reagan," Southern Speech Communication Journal 49 (1983): 19. Gary C. Woodward mates a parallel claim abou t Reagan's populist appeal: "Populism has taken on a cosmetic and ironic purpose . . . pretending to serve the 'public interest', but serving what may be very private interests indeed." "Reagan as Roosevelt: The Elasticity of Pseudo-Populist Appeals," Central State Speech Journal 34 (1983): 57-8 . "Walter R. Fisher, "Narration as a Huma n Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument," Communication Monographs 51 (1984): 1-22. 12See Erickson, esp. chapter 3, "Analogies, Allegories, and Homilies," 32-50 ; David Stockman , The Triumph of Politics (New York: Harpe r & Row, 1986), 90 . "Marti n Medhurst demonstrates the way in which Reagan employs the theme of America as a nation that was set apart, by God. As he notes, "the theme of a people set apart is.. . a standard topos of civil-religious discourse in America." Medhurst, 270 . Both Erickson and Johannesen suggest tha t Reagan's rhetoric uses the form of the jeremiad and the substance of American civil religion. Reagan Speaks, 86-93; Richard Johannesen, "Ronald Reagan's Economic Jeremiad," Central States Speech Journal, forthcoming. Janice Hocker Rushing argues that "the mythic milieu of the ['Star Wars'] speech is the transformation of the Old West into the New Frontier," "Ronald Reagan's 'Star Wars' Address: Mythic Containment of Technical Reasoning," Quarterly Journal of Speech 72 (1986): 417 . Perhaps the most notable development of this idea is Gary Wills, Reagan's America (New York: Doubleday, 1987). "Fo r example, in commenting on Reagan's arms negotiations in Iceland, Anthony Lewis wrote: "Ronald Reagan has never been more breathtaking as a politician than in the weeks since Reykjavik. He has pictured failure as success, black as white, incompetence as standing up to the Russians. And according to the polls, Americans love the performance." Quoted in Thomas Griffith, "Being Too Easy on Reagan," Time, 17 November 1986, 88 . "Thi s has been evident particularly in the response of the press. A Time magazine editorial, for example, offered the following explanation: "A frustrated Washington press corps had felt itself ignored by a public tha t did no t want to hear criticism of a popular President. But the sudden and steep decline in Reagan's popularity suggests tha t all along the public had recognized, in a man it admired, ho w casually he minded the store, and ho w willfully he could deny facts or distort them." Thomas Griffith, "Watergate: A Poor Parallel," Time, 29 December 1986, 57 . uAs even th e Washington Post conceded, "this president ha s given tens of millions of people in this country a feeling tha t safe, stable times are returned and that fundamental values they hold dear are back in vogue and unashamedly so " (January 22 , 1985). 17Since th e narrativ e logic of Reagan's story makes his actions in th e arm s deal difficult to explain, the dominant response has been to remove Reagan from the story either by suggesting that he had no control over the actions of his subordinates or by suggesting tha t Reagan himself had changed and questioning his mental or physical health. ,8In his campaign speeches, Reagan told the story as a humorou s example. In Milwaukee, for example, he said, "Ou r pledge is for ta x simplification, to make the system more fair, to make it easier to understand. Do you kno w tha t Einstein has admitted he cannot understand the Form 1040? [laughter]." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (hereafter, WCPD), 8 October 1985 , 1381 . In his speech to the nation he told the story in slightly different form: "We call it America's ta x plan because it will reduce ta x burdens on the working people of this country, close loopholes tha t benefit a privileged few, simplify a code so complex even Albert


Chapte r 4

Narrativ e Criticism

'Richard L. Johannesen, "An Ethical Assessment of the Reagan Rhetoric, 1981-82," Politial Communication Yearbook 1984, edsf.J Keith R. Sanders, Lynda Lee Kaid, and Dan Nimm o (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), 226-41 ; C. Thomas Preston, Jr., "Reagan's 'New Beginning': Is it the 'New Deal ' of the Eighties?" Southern Speed Communication Journal 49 (1984): 198-211 ; Gregg Phifer, "Two Inaugurals: A Second Loot," Southern Speech Communication Journal 48 (1983): 378-85 . "Davi d Zarefsky, Carol Miller-Tutzauer, and Frank E. Tutzauer, "Reagan's Safety Net for die Truly Needy: The Rhetorical Uses of Definition," Central States Speech Journal 35 (1984): 113-19 ; Richard E. Crable and Steven L. Vibbert, "Argumentative Stance and Political Faith Healing: 'The Dream Will Come True,['] " Quarterly Journal of Speech 69 (1983): 290-301. In his explanation of Reagan's approach to Soviet-American relations Robert L. Ivie found that "a flawed policy is being perceived as successful because of ho w it is symbolized." "Speaking 'Common Sense' About the Soviet Threat: Reagan's Rhetorical Stance," Western Journal of Speech Communication 48 (1984): 40 . Sarah Russell Hankins concluded that "the presidential choice in 1980 was an attempt to align the human with the illusion of the heroic." "Archetypal Alloy: Reagan's Rhetorical Image," Central States Speech Journal 34 (1983): 34. Similarly, Marth a Anna Marti n wrote tha t "the cumulative language, if no t the reality, suggested that Carter was an 'unfit' leader." "Ideologues, Ideographs, and 'The Best Men': From Carter to Reagan," Southern Speech Communication Journal 49 (1983): 19. Gary C. Woodward make s a parallel claim abou t Reagan's populist appeal: "Populism has taken on a cosmetic and ironic purpose . . . pretending to serve the 'public interest', but serving what may be very private interests indeed." "Reagan as Roosevelt: The Elasticity of Pseudo-Populist Appeals," Central Stales Speech Journal 34 (1983): 57-8 . "Walter R. Fisher, "Narration as a Huma n Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument," Communication Monographs 51 (1984): 1-22. I2See Erickson, esp. chapter 3, "Analogies, Allegories, and Homilies," 32-50 ; David Stockman , The Triumph of Politics (New York: Harpe r & Row, 1986), 90 . "Marti n Medhurst demonstrates the way in which Reagan employs the theme of America as a nation that was set apart, by God. As he notes, "the theme of a people set apart is.. . a standard topos of civil-religious discourse in America." Medhurst, 270 . Both Erickson and Johannesen suggest tha t Reagan's rhetoric uses the form of the jeremiad and the substance of American civil religion. Reagan Speaks, 86-93 ; Richard Johannesen, "Ronald Reagan's Economic Jeremiad," Central States Speech Journal, forthcoming. Janice Hocker Rushing argues that "the mythic milieu of the ['Star Wars'] speech is the transformation of the Old West into the New Frontier.'' "Ronald Reagan's 'Star Wars' Address: Mythic Containment of Technical Reasoning," Quarterly Journal of Speech 72 (1986): 417 . Perhaps the most notable development of this idea is Gary Wills, Reagan's America (New York: Doubleday, 1987). "Fo r example, in commenting on Reagan's arms negotiations in Iceland, Anthony Lewis wrote: "Ronald Reagan has never been more breathtaking as a politician than in the weeks since Reykjavik. He has pictured failure as success, black as white, incompetence as standing up to the Russians. And according to the polls, Americans love the performance." Quoted in Thomas Griffith, "Being Too Easy on Reagan," Time, 17 November 1986, 88 . 15This ha s been evident particularly in the response of the press. A Time magazine editorial, for example, offered the following explanation: "A frustrated Washington press corps had felt itself ignored by a public tha t did no t want to hear criticism of a popular President. But the sudden and steep decline in Reagan's popularity suggests tha t all along the public had recognized, in a man it admired, ho w casually he minded the store, and ho w willfully he could deny facts or distort them." Thomas Griffith, "Watergate: A Poor Parallel," Time, 29 December 1986, 57 . 16As even th e Washington Post conceded, "this president ha s given tens of millions of people in this country a feeling tha t safe, stable times are returned and that fundamental values they hold dear are back in vogue and unashamedly so " (January 22 , 1985). I7Since th e narrativ e logic of Reagan's story makes his actions in th e arm s deal difficult to explain, the dominant response has been to remove Reagan from the story either by suggesting that he ha d no control over the actions of his subordinates or by suggesting tha t Reagan himself had changed and questioning his mental or physical health. ,8In his campaign speeches, Reagan told the story as a humorou s example. In Milwaukee, for example, he said, "Ou r pledge is for ta x simplification, to make the system more fair, to make it easier to understand. Do you kno w tha t Einstein has admitted he cannot understand the Form 1040? [laughter]." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (hereafter, WCFD), 8 October 1985 , 1381 . In his speech to the nation he told the story in slightly different form: "We call it America's ta x plan because it will reduce ta x burdens on the working people of this country, close loopholes tha t benefit a privileged few, simplify a code so complex even Albert