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Domain Name System Operations J. Livingood
Internet-Draft Comcast
Intended status: Informational November 3, 2015
Expires: May 6, 2016


Responsibility for Authoritative DNSSEC Mistakes
draft-livingood-dnsop-auth-dnssec-mistakes-03

Abstract

DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) is now entering widespread
deployment. However, domain signing tools and processes are not yet
as mature and reliable as is the case for non-DNSSEC-related domain
administration tools and processes. Authoritative DNS operators
should focus on improving these processes and establishing a high
level of quality in their work.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on May 6, 2016.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of




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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Domain Validation Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Responsibility for Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Comparison to Other DNS Misconfigurations . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Other Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.2. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Appendix A. Document Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Appendix B. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

1. Introduction

The Domain Name System (DNS), DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC), and
related operational practices are defined extensively [RFC1034]
[RFC1035] [RFC4033] [RFC4034] [RFC4035] [RFC4398] [RFC4509] [RFC6781]
[RFC5155].

DNSSEC has now entered widespread deployment. However, domain
signing tools and processes are not yet as mature and reliable as is
the case for non-DNSSEC-related domain administration tools and
processes. As a result, operators of DNS recursive resolvers, such
as Internet Service Providers (ISPs), occasionally observe domains
incorrectly managing DNSSEC-related resource records. This
mismanagement triggers DNSSEC validation failures, and then causes
large numbers of end users to be unable to reach a domain. Many end
users tend interpret this as a failure of their DNS servers, and may
switch to a non-validating resolver (reducing their security) or
contact their ISP to complain, rather than seeing this as a failure
on the part of the domain they wanted to reach.

This document makes clear, however, that responsibility for these
failures rests squarely with authoritative domain name operators, as
noted in Section 3.







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2. Domain Validation Failures

A domain name can fail validation for two general reasons, a
legitimate security failure such as due to an attack or compromise of
some sort, or as a result of misconfiguration on the part of an
domain administrator. As domains transition to DNSSEC the most
likely reason for a validation failure will be due to
misconfiguration. Thus, domain administrators should be sure to read
[RFC6781] in full. They should also pay special attention to
Section 4.2, pertaining to key rollovers, which appears to be the
cause of many recent validation failures.

In one recent example [DNSSEC-Validation-Failure-Analysis], a
specific domain name failed to validate. An investigation revealed
that the domain's administrators performed a Key Signing Key (KSK)
rollover by (1) generating a new key and (2) signing the domain with
the new key. However, they did not use a double-signing procedure
for the KSK and a pre-publish procedure for the ZSK. Double-signing
refers to signing a zone with two KSKs and then updating the parent
zone with the new DS record so that both keys are valid at the same
time. This meant that the domain name was signed with the new KSK,
but it was not double-signed with the old KSK. So, the new key was
used for signing the zone but the old key was not. As a result, the
domain could not be trusted and returned an error when trying to
reach the domain. Thus, the domain was in a situation where the
DNSSEC chain of trust was broken because the Delegation Signer (DS)
record pointed to the old KSK, which was no longer used for signing
the zone. (A DS record provides a link in the chain of trust for
DNSSEC from the parent zone to the child zone - in this case between
TLD and domain name.)

3. Responsibility for Failures

A domain administrator is solely and completely responsible for
managing their domain name(s) and DNS resource records. This
includes complete responsibility for the correctness of those
resource records, the proper functioning of their authoritative DNS
servers, and the correctness of DNS records linking their domain to a
top-level domain (TLD) or other higher level domain. The domain
owner is also responsible for selection of the authoritative domain
administrator, operator, or service provider. Thus, even in cases
where some error may be introduced by a third party, whether that is
due to an authoritative server software vendor, software tools
vendor, domain name registrar, or other organization, these are all
parties that the domain administrator has selected and is responsible
for managing successfully.





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There are some cases where the domain administrator is different than
the domain owner. In those cases, a domain owner has delegated
operational responsibility to the domain administrator. So no matter
whether a domain owner is also the domain administrator or not, the
domain administrator is nevertheless operationally responsible for
the proper configuration operation of the domain.

So in the case of a domain name failing to successfully validate,
when this is due to a misconfiguration of the domain, that is the
sole responsibility of the domain administrator.

Any assistance or mitigation responses undertaken by other parties to
mitigate the misconfiguration of a domain name by a domain
administrator, especially operators of DNS recursive resolvers, are
optional and at the pleasure of those parties.

4. Comparison to Other DNS Misconfigurations

As noted in Section 3 domain administrators are ultimately
responsible for managing and ensuring their DNS records are
configured correctly. ISPs or other DNS recursive resolver operators
cannot and should not correct misconfigured A, CNAME, MX, or other
resource records of domains for which they are not authoritative.
Expecting non-authoritative entities to protect domain administrators
from any misconfiguration of resource records is therefore
unrealistic and unreasonable, and in the long-term is harmful to the
delegated design of the DNS and could lead to extensive operational
instability and/or variation.

5. Other Considerations

5.1. Security Considerations

Authoritative domain name operators and domain name owners, in the
case of DNSSEC-related mistakes that cause validation failures to
occur, should focus on correcting the issue and then improving their
processes and tools in the future. During the period of time that
their domain cannot be resolved due to a DNSSEC-related mistake, they
should not encourage end users to switch to non-validating resolvers,
as the use of a non-validating DNS recursive resolver has
comparatively less security capabilities than a validating resolver,
since one implements DNS Security Extensions and one does not. In
addition, if an end user changes to a non-validating resolver they
may subject themselves to increased security risks and threats
against which DNS Security Extensions may have provided protection.






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5.2. Privacy Considerations

There are no privacy considerations in this document.

5.3. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA considerations in this document.

6. Acknowledgements

- William Brown

7. References

7.1. Normative References

[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
.

[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, .

[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
.

[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
.

[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
.

[RFC4398] Josefsson, S., "Storing Certificates in the Domain Name
System (DNS)", RFC 4398, DOI 10.17487/RFC4398, March 2006,
.

[RFC4509] Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
(DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4509, May 2006,
.




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[RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008,
.

[RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
Format", RFC 5914, DOI 10.17487/RFC5914, June 2010,
.

[RFC6781] Kolkman, O., Mekking, W., and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC
Operational Practices, Version 2", RFC 6781,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6781, December 2012,
.

7.2. Informative References

[DNSSEC-Validation-Failure-Analysis]
Barnitz, J., Creighton, T., Ganster, C., Griffiths, C.,
and J. Livingood, "Analysis of DNSSEC Validation Failure -
NASA.GOV", Comcast , January 2012,
DNSSEC_Validation_Failure_NASAGOV_20120118_FINAL.pdf>.

Appendix A. Document Change Log

[RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication]

Individual-00: First version published as an individual draft.

Individual-01: Fixed nits identified by William Brown

Individual-02: Updated prior to IETF-91

WG-00: Renamed at request of DNSOP co-chairs

WG-01: Updated doc to keep it from expiring

WG-02: Removed RFC 2119 reference in XML

WG-03: I should really work on this draft soon

Appendix B. Open Issues

[RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication]

No open issues at this time





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Author's Address

Jason Livingood
Comcast
One Comcast Center
1701 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
Philadelphia, PA 19103
US

Email: jason_livingood@cable.comcast.com
URI: http://www.comcast.com








































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