NASA Johnson Space Center
Oral History Project
Edited Oral History Transcript
Philip
C. Shaffer
Interviewed by Carol Butler
Houston,
Texas –
25 January 2000
Butler:
Today is January 25, 2000. This oral history with Phil Shaffer is
being conducted for the Johnson Space Center Oral History Project,
in the offices of the Signal Corporation. Carol Butler is the interviewer
and is assisted by Kevin Rusnak and Sandra Harvey.
Thank you so much for joining us today.
Shaffer:
You're welcome.
Butler:
To begin with, if you could tell us a little bit about your early
life, early career, how you became involved, or what led up to you
becoming involved with NASA, maybe starting with your college days
and how you chose your area to focus in.
Shaffer:
Sure, but I'd rather start with going into the Air Force.
Butler:
Okay. Great.
Shaffer:
Because I didn't know what I wanted to be when I grew up, so I did
that, and as a part of that I got some training in electronics, which
I hadn't had any exposure to, and was stationed in Newfoundland for
a couple of years. One of the big events that happened there was that
a monster snowstorm that really isolated us to the workplace or the
barracks, wherever we happened to be at that time. And out of sheer
boredom, while they cleared the area, everybody read whatever was
available. One of the other fellows in the barracks was reading a
textbook on the principles of rocketry. And after I'd read everything
else in the barracks, I picked that up and looked at it, and that's
how I knew what it was I was going to do.
Butler:
That's interesting.
Shaffer:
So when the tour in the Air Force was over, I went to college at a
small cow college in Oklahoma, lots of math and physics and chemistry
and that sort of thing. I sent out my resumes to all the people that
had rockets and computers, which was the government. The Navy offered
me a job at the Naval Weapons Laboratory down in Virginia, and I went
there to do whatever it was they wanted me to do, with the title of
interdisciplinary mathematician physicist. I had no idea what that
meant and I still don't, but the function was more about ballistic
bodies and how they behave at hypersonic speeds, because I was working
on the Polaris program.
The basic job was to try to take the test firings that they did with
the Polaris missiles and reconstruct the miss. [You know,] what was
it that contributed to the miss? Because it always missed a little
bit whether it was a quarter mile, a half a mile, or a mile, or whatever
it was. I mean, they weren't perfect.
Lots of serendipity in that job, because it got me into real-time
operations and atmospheric and exoatmospheric trajectory management,
and the Polaris guidance steering laws and hardware were the same
that was used in Apollo to go to the Moon.
So after three years at the Naval Weapons Laboratory doing that, a
guy named Bob [Robert] Regelbrugge called me. He was one of the heavy
hitters in the rendezvous analysis area for getting ready for Gemini.
We had shared an office for a little while in Virginia, and he moved
here to go to work for NASA and he called me. And he says, "You
need to come here and interview with these people. They're hiring
flight dynamics officers."
I said, in the vernacular, "What the hell is a flight dynamics
officer?"
He says, "I don't know, but they're hiring them."
So I came, and he set me up with a guy named Glynn [S.] Lunney for
an interview. Glynn told me what a flight dynamics officer was, and
I said, "I can do that." And he said, "You're hired,"
and here I came. So 1961 to the Naval Weapons Laboratory, and 1964,
here, and we started getting ready to go to the Moon.
Butler:
So when you came in, you began working directly on Apollo then?
Shaffer:
I did. I did. The first project was, part of the qualification of
the launch escape system for the Apollo command module, which was
a series of launches out at White Sands [New Mexico], and then triggered
the launch escape system just to test it in all the environments and
test that hardware. So we supported four or five flights out there
with vehicles like Little Joe and that sort of thing, and started
writing requirements for the computing facilities on the ground for
Apollo and trying to understand translunar, which is more like interplanetary
spaceflight, and all that that entailed.
Butler:
Did anything that you were working on surprise you, or after you had
talked with them, was it all that you had expected it would be?
Shaffer:
I really didn't expect to go to White Sands. I really hadn't anticipated
that. I thought I would come and get ready to work in the control
center and I would work in the control center, and that would be it.
But White Sands was pretty primitive. They had limited trajectory
capability with things called XY plotters and a radar or two. And
they had these guys called visual observers, which was where we started.
I mean, we were stationed out in the desert with a headset and a line
laying on the ground, and we were like the backup to the radar system.
We reported what we saw, which was to help them confirm what they
were seeing on the plot boards in the little control center.
I'll never forget, probably BP-22, BP stands for boilerplate, because
it was not a real command module on the stack. It launched, and it
turns out that somebody had left a manhole cover loose as part of
the launch facility, and when the vehicle ignited, the pressure blew
that manhole cover up and it hit one of the control fins, one of the
stabilizers, and jammed it. So when the vehicle comes up off of its
pad, it yaws off to the right and straightens up and then it pitches
down, down range, and then straightens up and then it just loses it
and starts spinning.
The Algol rockets, which were the solid rockets inside, weren't supported
at the top, and the centrifugal force, they just peeled out and came
out through the sides of the launch vehicle and there's rockets going
everywhere. [Laughter] It was amazing, absolutely amazing. So that
was a surprise. [Laughter]
Butler:
I can imagine. Luckily, it came out okay.
Shaffer:
It did. It did. I was up on the tower on top of one of the assembly
buildings and could see one, it looked like it was headed my way,
but it went into the desert floor out in front of us.
Butler:
That's good. Quite a sight.
While you were working at the weapons lab, had you been following
the space program and the early flights?
Shaffer:
Oh, yes. Oh, yes, absolutely. I sat in a parking lot and listened
to John [H.] Glenn's [Jr.] flight in Washington, D.C. I had had to
go to town for something that day. And I sat in the parking lot, blew
off whatever it was I was in town for, and listened to his whole flight.
It was great.
Butler:
Did you think at that time about the possibility of being involved
with the space program?
Shaffer:
No. No, I was very much involved with what was going on there. It
hadn't become repetitious yet, so it never crossed my mind at that
point.
Butler:
Just until you got the call.
Shaffer:
Yes, right.
Butler:
After you had worked at White Sands, then you came back here to Houston?
Shaffer:
No, we were in Houston here the whole time and we traveled to White
Sands to do those launches. But they were in addition to what we were
doing here, which was primarily getting ready to do the lunar landing
mission. And the principal job was getting the computing requirements
defined for the control center here at Houston and getting ourselves
trained to work in the control center and participating in the functional
design of the guidance and control system of the Apollo spacecraft
and the lunar module about what they were going to have to do and
the ground would interface with those. That really was a training
kind of process for what turned out later to be the mission techniques,
which, when we started, didn't exist. There was no such thing as the
mission techniques process. It was a lot of people on their own initiative
trying to put all that together and get it documented.
Butler:
Do you recall what some of the stages were as you were training, as
you were looking at these systems and beginning to put these techniques
together? Did you get together and have classroom sessions or training
sessions or just strategy sessions?
Shaffer:
It truly was all of the above. It was all of the above. Since in flight
control people were doing Earth orbit mostly. The function, the control
function, came to Houston [from Cape Canaveral] for Gemini IV, and
all of the senior flight controllers were fully occupied with the
Gemini program, there weren't any experienced flight controllers to
help people with the definition of the computing requirements. So
I was the only one with anything resembling some real-time experience
that was available to some of these other folks, and all I'd done
was [analyze] launch[ed] Polarises, so I didn't know anything about
how NASA was going to do business.
So we had lots of sessions with the Gemini guys after work. We had
lots of sessions with the Mission Planning and Analysis Division [MPAD],
who were doing the mission design and the analysis for how we were
going to get to the Moon and back. We had lots of sessions with the
Guidance and Control Division, guys like John F. Hanaway and some
of those folks, who were in charge of the hardware and the control
systems.
So there was this circulating around in all of the different organizations
and which fairly quickly led to spending a lot of time in California
with Rockwell [North American Rockwell Corporation], who was building
the Apollo vehicles. I didn't spend much time with Grumman [Aerospace
Corporation], who built the lunar module, but we spent a lot of time
with the integrating contractor, who was Rockwell at that point.
In a while, the classroom environment switched, and as we became more
versed in what it was going to be like to go to the Moon, then we
started teaching the Gemini flight controllers about that aspect of
it. We kept hiring people to work on the Apollo, because we were nowhere
near well staffed enough for that, so all of those guys had to be
brought up to speed, too. So it was big-time busy, is what it really
was.
Butler:
Certainly it was. It certainly was.
Shaffer:
The flight dynamics people were really kind of the pivotal point between
all of it, because all of the systems-oriented engineers had to support
the trajectory, which was to get to the Moon, and the radar tracking
systems and the ground computing maneuver computations and all that.
That was the pivotal business. They called us the "Trench,"
by the way, if you ever run across that, because we had the front
row of the consoles in the control center. So everybody was above
us. But, of course, we considered ourselves the pick of the crop,
you know. [Laughter] We thought we had the hardest job of all.
Butler:
Certainly a very important one.
Shaffer:
After I became a flight director, I realized that that was not true.
[Laughter] But it worked while we were there.
Butler:
Yes, we've run across a few references to the Trench, and it seems
like everybody had a pretty good feeling about themselves and the
camaraderie down there.
Shaffer:
Yes.
Butler:
Quite a few stories surrounding—
Shaffer:
Yes. I guess we were probably the largest sub-team in the control
center, because we had the retrofire officer and the guidance officer
and the flight dynamics officer. Yes, we were the largest sub-team
in the control center. Not the largest team—I'm sorry, in the
mission operations room, but in the control center, the systems guys
had the larger teams. The complexity of their job was tough, they
needed lots of books, which I learned as a part of my flight director
training.
Butler:
You mentioned that when you first came down, or when your friend first
called you, that you didn't even know what a flight dynamics officer
was, and here you came down and were one of the people most experienced
with this type of work. What, if you could define for us, what a flight
dynamics officer was meant to do for Apollo.
Shaffer:
No one has done that for you [before]?
Butler:
Well, we've had a couple, but we haven't talked to many, so—
Shaffer:
Well, the flight dynamics officer is predominantly responsible for
the management of the trajectory. That means he's got to determine
what the trajectory is, which is a position and velocity at a time—a
position, velocity, time relationship, and that allows you to tell
where you are and where you're going to be, a trajectory is predictable
and projectable. The flight dynamics officer also is the leader of
the Trench. The guidance officer manages the guidance system and monitors
it and loads it for the maneuvers, and the RETRO [retrofire] officer
is continually figuring out how you're going to get home from where
you are. Both of them are dependent upon the job the flight dynamics
officer's doing in terms of trajectory management, what it is now
and what it's going to be reflected by the maneuvers that are being
planned. Is that concise enough?
Butler:
That's a great definition.
Shaffer:
Okay.
Butler:
One thing that's interesting to look at is the fact that the computers
that you used to help you in these computations and the trajectory
and so forth don't measure up to a desktop computer nowadays.
Shaffer:
Oh, that's very true.
Butler:
Did a lot with slide rules and such?
Shaffer:
No.
Butler:
No?
Shaffer:
No. But we did have Olivettis that we did a lot of work with, which
was an early kind of a precursor to the PCs. It was a desktop computer
that you could program and had a little magnetic card that you wrote
the programs on, and if you built enough cards and did them right,
you could do a reentry trajectory with an Olivetti, which was pretty
fascinating.
But I remember very well when the PC thing started. We had guys walking
around talking about these things called microprocessors. I didn't
have time to figure out what those were, but I kept hearing them get
all excited about it, some of the nerdy kind of guys. [Laughter] But
later I understood what they were; that was the precursor to these
PCs. The guys that liked those liked it because they didn't have an
operating system. I mean, they interfaced with them with switches
and machine language kind of stuff. It was not a nice interface thing
like [Microsoft] Windows or the operating system for Apple.
Butler:
Very different at the time.
Shaffer:
Yes. The Naval Ordnance Research Calculator [NORC] was one of the
first major electronic calculating devices, and that was the computer
that existed at the Naval Weapons Laboratory and it was used for all
of the analysis we did there. That was a vacuum tube system [as opposed
to transistors], and each vacuum tube tray was about the size of a
PC now, or certainly at least a laptop. There was this room, which
all the walls were full of these trays of vacuum tubes, and the operators
sat at a console that looked a whole lot like out [of] Star Trek...
But the total interface with that was punch cards, [we] loaded program[s]
and loaded data with punch cards.
Butler:
Certainly very different than today.
Shaffer:
Yes, very different.
Butler:
But you were able to make it work and help do what you needed.
Shaffer:
It was nice to start at all of these almost first-of-a-kind things,
too, because it wasn't such a culture shock to walk in and try to
be competent with something that was extremely complex, one of the
problems with that being that there's an awful lot of assumptions
that people make about where you come from when they design these
very complex things. You can't just pick up a PC and use it.
Butler:
Yes, not that easy.
Shaffer:
No. You've got to find the path.
Butler:
That's right. As you continued to work on the program and you began
to find that path and you built up the skills and techniques and programs
necessary to make Apollo happen, along the way were there any major
stepping points or challenges that were hard to overcome, or did it
all flow pretty smoothly in that?
Shaffer:
I'm assuming when you say "hard to overcome," you mean technically?
Butler:
Yes.
Shaffer:
Because "hard to overcome" also has an emotional component.
So the answer to your question is, yes, in both cases. As we learned
and as we developed the processes and the requirements, the complexity
became obvious, that we really didn't comprehend the complexity of
what it was going to be. The interconnectivity in all of the [technical]
areas became more and more obvious, and it got really clear to a lot
of people pretty soon that the integration role that the flight controllers,
and in our case the flight dynamics people, that the integration role
for that was beyond us. I mean, we couldn't, we were inexperienced,
too inexperienced and too junior and too parochial, frankly, to do
that job.
The program office recognized that, and I don't remember the man's
name that really surfaced it, but he did the program a favor, and
they invented the Apollo Data Priority, which was the precursor name
for the mission techniques activity. They chartered Bill [Howard W.]
Tindall [Jr.] out of the program office. He didn't work in the program
office; he worked in the Mission Planning and Analysis Division. He
was a charging, assertive, integrating kind of guy, and they named
him to lead the Apollo Data Priority.
We in Flight Dynamics felt like we had been gutshot, because they
were taking our job away from us, and we thought we were capable of
doing that. But in retrospect, we clearly weren't, and Bill understood
that. So Bill's early data priority meetings were with the three of
us who were doing the Apollo [flight dynamics] work, and what he did
was document what we said we were going to do, and he didn't harangue
with us about it. His business was about understanding about how we
said we were going to do our part of the job. We were pretty resistant
to interacting with him, but he was kind of like resisting a glacier.
[Laughter] He'd ask you the question and you'd be resistant, and he'd
ask you the question and you'd resist it a different way, and he'd
ask you the same, you know.
But in a while he had that fairly well documented, and then he went
to management of the lunar module out of lunar orbit and down to the
surface. We all twigged really quickly to how deep our ignorance was
at that point and how unprepared we were for that, and how we truly
needed—now we needed a lot of help. So the tables between us
went away and we all got on the same side of the table. That was really
a turning point. The operational integration of the program really
pretty much happened out of that charter and everybody, the contractors,
the analysts, the hardware people, everybody got on the same team.
Butler:
I guess he knew what needed to be done and had the patience to—
Shaffer:
Well, plus the NASA management, the program office management, knew
that to charter it out of the program office would give it the clout
that it needed to operate with everybody. The program office relationship
is, they got the money, and so they're the money management, or the
business management, of the program. So if you wanted to get some
money to do something, you had to go through the program office. So
this kind of an integrating function was a natural to come out of
the program office.
Butler:
An example of some of the good leadership throughout.
Shaffer:
Exactly.
Butler:
That's good. Well, and it all did come together, and Gemini eventually
came to a successful conclusion.
Shaffer:
Although they didn't have the mission techniques or the data priority
for Gemini. The Apollo was the first one. To provide a segue for later,
Bill Tindall got his revenge for my resistance, too, because when
it was time for him to go on, he insisted that I was to replace him
as the chair of that, which I did do.
Butler:
Well, at least you had learned from him and been through it with him,
so you were able to build on that. That's good.
Talking about Bill Tindall, unfortunately we won't have a chance to
talk with him for this project, but can you tell us a little bit about
him and maybe some of the other people you were working with at the
time, too, that were influential, or that made an impact on you?
Shaffer:
Well, Bill was influential because not only the relationship in the
[data] priority, but we became reasonably close personal friends,
in part because he said we thought alike. We didn't have much tolerance
for "airbags" [statements that had form but no real content]
and that sort of thing, and we always wanted to solve the problem.
It wasn't required to be our solution, it was required to be a solution,
that satisfied most of the constraints.
He was a bit older than I was and more experienced, particularly in
the management kinds of things, so he gave me a lot of help a lot
[along] that way, too. He became the director of Data Systems and
Analysis Directorate. He didn't stop at the lower level where we were
doing flight techniques; he kept right on going. He was a bit of a
wild man. I mean, he enjoyed high-energy kinds of things. He had a
Ford Pantera, which was a sports car with the engine in the middle
and all these kind of things, and he'd get it out on the highway and
drive it very fast. [Laughter] Basically he worked hard and he played
hard, and he was among the most ethical people that probably I've
ever known.
Butler:
That's great.
Shaffer:
Number one kind of guy. I remember once when we were doing simulations
for probably the first orbital Apollo mission, I was the flight dynamics
officer and we were training and we had gotten into a launch abort
sequence that—it got overly complex, is probably a good way
to say it, in that they put us in a trajectory that was going astray
and then failed the control center.
Butler:
Oh, my. That's complex.
Shaffer:
So we didn't have any more data, any more real-time data. Of course,
it was appropriate to be prepared for that, so the call that I made
was the one that I thought was conservative, which was to go on to
orbit instead of terminating the launch space. Almost nobody agreed
with me. Of course, when they brought the system back up to see what
the results of what the call was about, we were in a safe orbit and
etc., but everybody said I should have tried to terminate it. Well,
my problem with trying to terminate it was I didn't know how to keep
them out of a hard landing in Africa without the computers, and I
had no idea whether or not we'd still have the engine on as we intersected
the atmosphere, which landing in Africa meant you didn't have to worry
about that. But I had a fairly good idea of how to get the orbit from
where we were.
So anyway, there was this big harangue with all these people doing
Monday quarterback kind of things. Well, there's this guy called Chris
[Christopher C.] Kraft [Jr.] that's sitting back up at the flight
director console, just observing all this. After it came to no resolution
and decided that I wasn't going to give, because I truly thought it
was more dangerous, and after it was all over, Chris comes down. Chris
is nowhere near as tall as I am, so he's standing on the next step
up, and he's just a little bit above the eyes, and this is the first
words he ever says to me. He looks at me with his flat expressionless
stare and he says, "You are an arrogant son of a bitch,"
and turned around and walked away. [Laughter]
I thought my career was over. I thought the end of the world had come—but
what it really was, was that he was acknowledging that I had taken
a position that he didn't find untenable and had held it, and that
he approved of that. Boy, I didn't think so at the time. [Laughter]
I really didn't.
Butler:
[Laughter] A very unique way of telling you that.
Shaffer:
Yes. I had another one like that. Bob [Robert R.] Gilruth was in that
genre of people that were very much worth emulating. I suspect because
of the difference in seniority, he was the center director when I
came here, but one of the things we got into was interminable flight
plan updates while we were in lunar orbit, because we could never
get to the Moon on time. We could get into the right orbit, but we
always got there sooner or later than we were supposed to, and so
the times in the flight plan would all be off by however much the
time of arrival was. A guy named Tommy [W.] Holloway—that's
a name you have to know—he called and said, "We've got
to do something about this time stuff." He said, "We're
just taking entirely too much time with this air to ground updating
the times of the flight plan."
I says, "Tommy, it's not a big problem. We'll just change the
clocks."
He says, "You can do that?"
I says, "Tommy, we do that during launch phase. When we find
out what time they release the inertial measurement unit, we put that
in the computer during launch phase. I mean, changing the clocks again,
you know, and during coast, that's a nonevent."
He says, "Well, that would be wonderful."
So we have to go to the Change Control Boards, because this is a new
procedure and it makes a lot of people nervous. This was a precursor
to Y2K, [is] the way people thought about it. "You're going to
change the clock?" [Laughter]
So that piece finally got to the center-level Change Control Board.
Bob Gilruth was there that day, and I made my pitch for changing the
clocks and all the stuff we'd do to be sure we'd done it right. Does
it sound like Y2K to you? He listens to all of that, and we finally
get to the point, and Gilruth looks at me and he says, "You're
out of your mind," and he got up and left.
Butler:
Well, I guess that's one answer for you. [Laughter]
Shaffer:
I, particularly, sat there kind of stunned. So I said, "Well,
that's great. We can get on with implementing it now."
They said, "What?"
I said, "Yes, he didn't say not to do it, he just said we were
out of our minds."
"Oh." They said, "No, that isn't what he meant."
I said, "Well, you'll have to ask him. I'm not going to. I'm
going to go implement it."
And they didn't and we did, and that was the end of the flight plan
time problem. We went through it and was very, very careful and did
it in a time when it was really benign and it worked wonderfully.
A guy named Jim [James A.] McDivitt was the CCB chairman at that point,
and when we generated the first load to the computer to change the
times, I burned a hard copy and took it up to him and made him autograph
it, and I still have that somewhere in my memorabilia, this old hard
copy with his signature on it with the clock load.
Butler:
That's pretty unique. That's pretty good. You've had some interesting
times.
Shaffer:
Well, there's some interesting people. All these guys, they were the
giants.
Butler:
They certainly were. When did you begin running simulations for the
missions for Apollo, and was it during this time when you were building
up all these techniques?
Shaffer:
We began running simulations before it was possible to run simulations.
There were simulations where we ran against a computer model of a
crew, and then there were simulations that we ran with crews, and
we could hardly wait to get to where we could run simulations with
real crews. But we didn't have simulators here, and we didn't have
a control center here, but we wanted to do it anyway. It turns out
there was a facility called the ME-101, which was a spacecraft simulator
in Downey, California, at the Rockwell plant there. It was hooked
up to computers out there. So we developed a communication system
between that facility and a computer here.
We set it up so that the trajectory data out of the ME-101 in California
would print out vectors, you know, position, velocity and time, on
a computer here and we would manually load those into another computer
and compute rendezvous maneuvers and then read them back to the crew
on a telephone and then they would do them. So we were running integrated
sims really early to do that, long before we had sims that resembled
anything like we would run after we had a control center. So, still
building the control center, getting ready to do Gemini stuff here,
and we were running [Apollo] simulations with real crews and that
simulator in California.
Butler:
Figured out a way to make it all work.
Shaffer:
We were really anxious to get on with it. We knew that was going to
be fun. [Laughter]
Butler:
Always good to do the fun stuff.
Shaffer:
Yes.
Butler:
Always. While they were building the control system and putting the
whole space center together, where were you based out of, do you recall?
Scattered throughout Houston?
Shaffer:
You mean what building?
Butler:
Yes.
Shaffer:
Sure. We spent the first probably four months in the second story
of the Stahl & Myers warehouse building, where Oshman's is now,
on the freeway. No windows, not very good air-conditioning. The control
center was one of the early buildings that they built here, and when
that was ready, we came out before it was done and moved in. So our
offices were basically next door. They were in the same building as
the control center in the Building 30.
For long time we moved around a lot. We ended up over in the second
tallest building, it's Building 47, which is a six- or seven-story
building over there. We moved out of the control center and over there
when we finally got too large for the room we had.
I don't know where those guys sit anymore. I haven't known for a long
time. But it was really kind of interesting, because we'd get up from
our desk and then in a few steps be in the control center.
Butler:
That's convenient.
Shaffer:
Plus we kept a lot of data in our office area, because it was going
to be convenient. We had to carry it all over there. That was very
much worthwhile, too.
Butler:
Certainly. As part of all this building up for Apollo, were you involved
with any of the details of the construction of the control center,
or just more with the computers?
Shaffer:
No. Our job was—you know, they had these big projection TVs
and those kinds of things at the front. Our business was deciding
and recommending what was going to be on those. The little TVs that
had all the data, we were deciding, recommending, what was going to
be on those, the configuration of the communications panels and who
we would need voice loops to and from. In the case of the flight dynamics
officer and the booster systems engineer who was on the end or far
left, we had always had abort command switches on the console.
So getting those configured and the same for everybody, it was that
level of stuff in the control center itself, but the basic design
of the control center, it was probably under way before we had people
at my level to think about that. Lyn [Lynwood C.] Dunseith and Jim
[James C.] Stokes [Jr.] were probably the big pushes for that, which
are also guys that I respected and admired very much. They did just
an outstanding job.
Butler:
Certainly able to put together a good center and make it all work.
Shaffer:
Yes, they did. You know, their private contractor for that job was
Philco, Philco Ford, and guys like John [W.] Hatcher, who also is
not with us anymore, was integral. John's a guy, slight, not very
tall, dynamo, absolute dynamo. One of his favorite activities was
hunting white-winged doves down by the Mexican border. If he disappeared
and was out of town, that's probably where he was, was chasing the
wily white wing.
Butler:
I guess you always knew where to find him if you needed him then.
Shaffer:
Right.
Butler:
That's good. Well, as you came along, you were building up to Apollo.
What was the first mission then that you were going to be working
on, assigned to work on?
Shaffer:
Oh, the very first Apollo, which was Apollo 201, which was not a real
spacecraft. It was a launch vehicle test and had a spacecraft with
some capabilities. We all worked all of those things in some capacity.
In the early days, we didn't have crews working with us yet, so some
of us would do capcom functions, and do the things in terms of sequencing
the computer, like the launch abort mode would change when it was
time to jettison the launch escape system, that tower with the rocket.
So you had to tell the computer when that had happened, and that nominally
was done on a voice report from the crew, so we had those kinds of
inputs to make to the computer. When staging happened and you switched
first stage to second stage, the astronaut, the capcom, would tell
us. So we had those kind of functions early.
I was not the flight dynamics officer on any of those until probably
the first real [manned] Apollo. We had other folks in training that
were running all of those jobs. I was very much involved in this integration
function that I had done almost from the time I came here, so they
were doing that, but when it came time to put people in it, then I
was the lead flight dynamics officer. We went and did that.
Butler:
Unfortunately, the first one that was supposed to be—
Shaffer:
Well, not the one we actually flew.
Butler:
Oh, the Apollo 7?
Shaffer:
Yes. I had the same role on Grissom's flight where they got killed,
yes.
Butler:
That, unfortunately, did cause some changes that were necessitated
and such, but yet a lot of people have said that without such an incident
they wouldn't have been able to make it to the Moon probably eventually.
Shaffer:
I hear that. I don't disagree with it, nor do I understand it. I don't
know whether they mean that there was design deficiencies or whether
the quality wasn't good enough to go. I've never truly been able to
make that distinction, but they do say that, and so we ended up with
a very different vehicle in terms of its capability. So I'm certainly
willing to accept it. I [don't] have reservations about that. But
sometimes it takes something like that to really clear the air, too,
and to get everybody really serious about what we were doing. Maybe
that's what they mean when they say we needed that kind of incident.
I don't know, but it was tough. I mean, we were in the control center
when the guys died. That was not one of my favorite memories.
Butler:
I certainly can understand why. Apollo 7 kind of brought the whole
Apollo program together, bringing it all, making it work, and then
this was the first mission in that you worked from the control room
as flight dynamics officer then?
Shaffer:
Yes, it was.
Butler:
That must have been very rewarding to see it all come together and
work.
Shaffer:
Well, it was. It not only was the first launch that I had done and
the first launch of a manned Apollo, but it was also the first rendezvous
that I had done, and we did it without a "transponder."
Because we re-rendezvoused with the third stage, or actually the second
stage of the launch vehicle, and it didn't have this wonderful transponder
that gave you both range and range rate to tell you how fast you were
closing on it, so you had to derive that from the range data. We got
through that all right. It was also the first long-duration mission
I'd done. We were there for ten days.
It was the first sick crew I'd gotten to deal with. We got involved
in that. I have to tell you that the job Glynn Lunney did, Glynn was
the flight director then, and dealing with the sick crew was just
nothing short of magnificent. I couldn't believe the Irishman could
be that cool while he was being rained on from orbit. [Laughter] He
did good.
We had lots of memories about that one, too, you know. Launch phase
was, I think it was this one, I think we got to orbit, we got the
coast segment, we gave them a go-for-orbit, and the control center
went dark, for real.
Butler:
Oh, no.
Shaffer:
I'm almost sure that's what it was. A guy with a ditcher had gone
through the power cables outside the control center. [Laughter]
Butler:
Oops. Oh, dear. What did you do at that point?
Shaffer:
Well, we looked at the emergency lights. [Laughter] It was real quiet.
Part of Apollo, part of early Apollo, was a very limited tracking
network, so we had built…the Apollo instrumentation ships and
had them placed around in strategic locations, and one of which was
down range in the Atlantic, so that if we lost the control center,
they would be able to monitor the latter part of boost and give them
a go-for-orbit. A youngster named Jay Greene, who turned out to be
the flight director on Challenger when it blew up, he was on the instrumentation
ship.
So it wasn't a panic, because we knew they were there and that they
were up, so we got back and got it all pulled back together and pressed
on with ten days of boring holes in the sky. It was not boring, but
it was boring. [Laughter]
Butler:
I guess it's good that all the training and simulation that you had
done beforehand was able to—and people had the experience they
needed to make it all happen.
Shaffer:
Well, I had been integral in the requirements for those ships, too,
so I knew what they were capable of, and I had hired Jay from Rockwell,
so I knew what he was capable of.
Butler:
That's good.
Shaffer:
Another little piece of history there that I hadn't thought of in
a long time.
Butler:
I'm sure somebody changed some procedures about digging ditches. [Laughter]
Shaffer:
Got to impound all the ditchers during the launch phase. [Laughter]
Butler:
Definitely not something you'd want to have happen when you were about
to land on the Moon or anything. I suppose if it had to happen on
a mission, that was maybe the best one that—
Shaffer:
It was a great way to get started. It taught us a lot about what we
needed to do with the flight crews before we flew, too, because, in
all honesty, Wally [Walter M. Schirra, Jr.] and the guys were not
fully briefed on all the tests that were going to be done, and some
of them they heard for the first time while they were there [on orbit].
Then because we were there and because it was new, we actually invented
a couple of new things to do while we were there, and at least one
of those went really wrong and crashed the on-board computer. I mean,
it was training for all of us. It was not just checkout of the spacecraft.
Butler:
Had you, previous to that time, had a lot of interaction with the
flight crew, or also did your interaction levels then with the flight
crew change after that?
Shaffer:
No. No, we had lots of interaction with them. The flight dynamics
team spent a lot of time with the flight crew, because the trajectory
management was the dynamic part of the phase, doing all the maneuvers
and calculating the thing, getting them there, getting them home,
and so we did. But all of us were neophytes. I mean, Wally wasn't,
because he had flown in Mercury and Gemini, but we were, so we didn't
know all the things that we really needed to talk to them about.
Plus we had a lot of fun with them, too. One of the things that Wally
and I did continually was make quarter bets on trajectory-related
events while he was in the simulator. I nearly broke him with that.
[Laughter] He was easy. But Wally and I had a good time. He was, for
the most part, a pretty nice guy. But he was confident. But [Apollo]
7 was problematic for him because he was sick.
Butler:
Certainly couldn't have been a comfortable situation, and then like
you said, there were so many new things.
Shaffer:
Yes.
Butler:
It was a good learning mission for everyone.
Shaffer:
It was, which is what it was supposed to be. You cannot imagine how
surprised we were when, although we were really bound up in Apollo
7, when—and I don't remember exactly when it was, but it could
have been like the week before launch—they said, "We're
going to go to the Moon on the next one." [Laughter]
Butler:
That must have been shocking, from your standpoint.
Shaffer:
It was. We couldn't go work on it, because we were getting ready to
fly. Jay and I were clearly going to be leads on this first flight
to the Moon, so we splashed down from Apollo 7 and sixty days later
we went to the Moon. That was exciting. [Laughter]
Butler:
That's one way of putting it. [Laughter]
Shaffer:
It was.
Butler:
Did you stop at that point ever and think about, "Wow, look at
what we're really doing here"?
Shaffer:
No, we were 60-day intervals then, and I mean, it was end one and
start on the next one.
Butler:
How did you bring it all together for Apollo 8 to work, or did it
just kind of—
Shaffer:
No, we had started it, and we brought all the stuff that we were doing
for what would have been the first one out, which would have probably
been Apollo 10 anyway. I mean, we had all of that work done and the
waves were started. We had some guys coming from Gemini now who were
capable. I mean, Ed [Edward L.] Pavelka pretty much picked up the
load while Jay and I finished with Apollo 7 and got on with that.
Butler:
What shift were you assigned to in Apollo 8 for the mission actually
going to the Moon?
Shaffer:
Jay launched it. I no longer remember who did reentry, but I did the
lunar orbit parts, the getting in and out of lunar orbit. The orbit
determination problem was going to be a real zoo there, because we
hadn't done that before with a vehicle. JPL [Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
Pasadena, California] had done it, we hadn't done it yet.
Butler:
When they went behind the Moon for the first time and you were waiting
to see whether they had gotten lunar orbit, what was that like?
Shaffer:
It was not nice. They're up there with a single engine, no backup.
If they have problems with the engine, they can end up in anything
from doing a whifferdill around the Moon and going away, to being
stuck in lunar orbit. I mean, we had the same problem when they did
trans-Earth injection. All of the things that you worried about during
lunar orbit insertion are now possible again in trans-Earth injection,
because they're all basically associated with changing the energy
of the orbit that you're in. One of the ways the orbit gets squirrelly,
instead of being an orbit that has enough energy to go around the
Moon and come all the way back to Earth, it has enough energy to go
around the Moon and then get to the point where the Earth and the
Moon have equal gravitational pull on it. Then who knows where it
goes from there, or does it become another little moonlet? It's scary.
Butler:
It must have been a very intense time.
Shaffer:
It really was scary. So doing it again when we back on Apollo 10 and
had a lunar module with us for a backup engine, you know, it was just
like being in a Cadillac after we'd just gotten done with a manure
spreader. [Laughter]
Butler:
Well, it must have been very rewarding or satisfying or a relief when
it did all work.
Shaffer:
It was, and we were all like sponges again. I mean, we were learning
so much about translunar navigation problems and lunar orbit navigation.
We were seeing things that we didn't expect, which were little perturbations
to the trajectory, and were just absolutely stunned at how sensitive
it all was. By the same token, we learned about how easy it was to
fix, because if it was a small perturbation to disturb the trajectory,
then it was a small maneuver to fix it, too.
Butler:
It was a good learning mission, then.
Shaffer:
Yes, but we all ended with a great deal of confidence in the vehicle,
too. The vehicle was really, really a piece of work.
Butler:
The vehicle and the crews, crews supporting it, both the flight crew
and the ground crews, that you all knew what you were doing.
Shaffer:
You're correct.
Butler:
If we could go ahead and take a break here and we'll change out our
tapes.
We've just finished talking about Apollo 8 and the challenge with
that mission and some of the things you discovered going around. Some
of the next missions were then building up still toward the lunar
landing, Apollo 9 with the lunar module and command module, both testing
out in Earth orbit and then [Apollo] 10 going back to the Moon and
testing them both in lunar orbit. Were there any particular incidents
around either of those missions that stuck in your mind, or any particular
things you learned?
Shaffer:
Yes, I launched Apollo 10, and also I got to run the first rendezvous
around the Moon. If I remember the numbers, the command module and
the lunar module got about 700 miles apart, something like that, and
then we had to bring them back together. So that was another great
reassurance builder, about our ability to navigate and to pull it
off. It was an easier problem than getting the crew up off the lunar
surface, which turned out was going to be next. I don't think it was
supposed to be, but the way the schedules worked out, it was. So that
piece, from a learning and a performance standpoint, was really important.
I don't remember anything particular about launch phase or lunar orbit
other than that. I mean, it was pretty much we'd done it once and
now we did it again, except when the crew came out from behind the
Moon after trans-Earth injection, the crew advised the ground that
I was going to get a bottle of champagne for [having done] all that.
[Laughter]
Butler:
That's pretty special.
Shaffer:
So I thought that was neat.
Butler:
That's nice to have them recognize your work in that manner. Do you
keep a recording of that part of the—
Shaffer:
No. No, I didn't. I should have. I never got the champagne. [Laughter]
But that didn't really matter; it was the acknowledgement.
And sixty days later, whatever it was, we went back and I'm now ending
my career as a flight dynamics officer. I pulled one shift on Apollo
11 and that was the launch rendezvous off the lunar surface, and that
was the last time that I served as a flight dynamics officer.
Butler:
That's certainly a very special mission to have your last one.
Shaffer:
At that point, Bill Tindall got his revenge, and I became the chairman
of the data priority, and off we went with all the rest of the lunar
missions, planning those, the J missions, the ones that a rover and
the full-blown scientific instrument complement in the service module.
That was very, very much more complex in getting all of that done.
I got involved a lot in landing site selection at that point, too,
but it was as the data priority guy, mission techniques guy, rather
than any other role. I remember the selection for Apollo 17, the geologists
wanted to go to Taurus-Littrow, the crew was interested in going to
Taurus-Littrow, and the trajectory guys say, "You can't get there.
It's too narrow."
Taurus-Littrow has got a 200-foot scarp cliff at the end of it and
it's got these 6,000-foot mountains on each side, but this scarf is
200 feet of lunar crust, it's exposed. One of the mountains has had
a huge slide and you can see the debris material that's down on the
floor. There's impact craters there. There's volcanoes there. I mean,
everybody wants to go, but the trajectory guys are saying, "You
can't get there from here."
The argument escalated, and finally we ended up in the presence of
Chris [Kraft] about landing site selection for Apollo 17. Chris listens
to the scientists make their plea and the trajectory guys doing their
doom-saying, and then he looked at me and he said, "Well, what
do you think?"
I said, "Chris, you ought to go. Let's go. We can do that."
So Bill [William R.] Muehlberger, who was the geologist guy, he made
up a plaque for me for that one, with a little rhyme about, you know,
basically acknowledging the role that I'd gotten to play in picking
that landing site.
Butler:
That's pretty nice.
Shaffer:
Basically that's the last—I think that's the last clear memory
I have of anything to do with Apollo, and I was off to do Skylab then.
Somewhere in there we had started the mission techniques work for
Skylab, and it was so different from the Moon. The Moon began very
quickly to be like a really good dream with all its intensity that
you could reconstruct anytime you wanted to, but it was kind of surrealistic
in a way, too. You all may have had that experience, to go out and
look at Moon now and think that thirty years ago we were walking around
on that. Say what? [Laughter]
Butler:
It really is something to think about.
Shaffer:
It's very different.
Butler:
Having two of the critical missions in the Apollo program, we've touched
on Apollo 8 and Apollo 11—
Shaffer:
You know, I've left out a huge piece here. I have left out a huge—I
didn't realize I was leaving it out. In the middle of all of this,
I was made a Flight Director.
Butler:
Yes. [Laughter] We will definitely talk about that.
Shaffer:
You know, it's a bit of overwhelm. We had data priority for Apollo,
data priority for Skylab, assistant chief of the Flight Dynamics Branch,
and now I'm going to be a flight director [Purple Flight]. Some of
the younger guys, and I remember Bill [William M.] Stovall and Chuck
[Charles F.] Dieterich, who were a couple of guys from the trench,
they would come to talk to me about a problem and they would ask me
which hat I was wearing. [Laughter] Because I was in a position where
I was working for myself, and it was very confusing to them as to
what role I was speaking, as their administrative leader or as the
data priority, or was I being a flight director, because the perspective
is different from all of those things.
Yes, Apollo 16.
Butler:
When did you get the opportunity to be a flight director? Do you recall
how that happened, how that came about?
Shaffer:
No. [Laughter]
Butler:
Okay, that's fine.
Shaffer:
No, I don't. I really don't remember the specifics. Don [Donald R.]
Puddy and Chuck [Charles R.] Lewis and Neil [B.] Hutchison and I,
it was serendipity, all four of our home states start with O. [Laughter]
We weren't really made flight directors; we were made deputy flight
directors. And I didn't understand why, since the previous classes
had not been deputy flight directors, until I understood that Gene
[Eugene F.] Kranz, when he had been named, was named the deputy flight
director. He was the Director of Flight Operations now, so he's the
namer of the flight directors, so he was not going to start us out
at a rank above the one he'd started at. [Laughter]
Butler:
Certainly not.
Shaffer:
We knew that we were going to be flight directors for Skylab, that
that was our principal role, and what we did on Apollo as flight directors
was OJT [on-the-job training]. It was training in being a flight director.
Don and I worked Apollo 16, and Neil and Chuck worked Apollo 17. The
other pair worked in what was called the SPAN [Spacecraft Analysis]
room, which was an advisory room to support the ones that were on
the console.
Butler:
What did your training entail for the job?
Shaffer:
Well, it was a whole lot of time in the simulators now, learning about
systems, which was the allusion I made earlier about all of a sudden
I found out that all those systems guys had a lot harder job than
I thought they did, because you had, particularly the electrical and
environmental systems, which was something we had nothing to do with
as trajectory guys, we did the propulsion system, I mean, guidance
and control, but not with the environmental things. My stars, those
things were complex, plus they were little alien in the way—you
know, didn't have any basis. So hours and hours and hours in the simulators
and with those guys, learning about those things, and plus now getting
involved in integration of that into our planning process and in our
limiting process, because you have to take into account everything
that's going on with every system when you make a decision as a flight
director. It's not just what's the next maneuver look like. It's a
little different. Plus we hadn't had a lot to do with communication
systems, which was another thing. I have to truly say, I never really
mastered the communication system in terms of comfort. It was beyond
me. It was too complex.
Butler:
I guess you had good people, though, that could support you on it.
Shaffer:
Yes, I did. Captain Video, Ed [Edward I.] Fendell, and those guys,
yes. Great teams, though, first-rate people still there doing their
thing. Not too much prima donna business, except those guys in the
trench were a real pain. [Laughter] They really were. They were the
worst of the worst when it came to the prima donnas. They thought
they were something special. [Laughter]
Butler:
Go figure.
Shaffer:
Apollo 16 was interesting. Gene Kranz was my mentor, not only because
he was the FOD [Flight Operations Director], but we had a connection.
So he was the one that was counseling and advising and critiquing
and all that. On the first translunar shift I pulled, he came in for
an hour or two or something like that, and he got up and left. That
was okay, I didn't have any problem with that. And he had no more
than got out the door than the IMU [Inertial Measurement Unit], the
reference unit, tumbled and went away, and the crews without a GNC
[Guidance, Navigation, and Control] without a reference, which I wasn't
particularly concerned about, because it happens, except the guidance
officer was also new. It was his first solo shift and he stood right
straight up and said, "Oh!" [Laughter] And I knew I was
in trouble. [Laughter] Jerry [W.] Mill. Jerry Mill was his name.
So we told the crew that we didn't see any fault, we'd just locked
up the gimbals. It was not a four-gimbal platform, and we'd locked
it up and dumped it and they said, "Okay, we're going to bed.
You all fix it." So we went on with that.
Butler:
And were able to get it back in order.
Shaffer:
Yes. Lunar orbit was sort of a zoo. I was the flight director for
trans-Earth injection. I think Don [Puddy] had done lunar orbit insertion.
I don't remember exactly. But I know I was on the trans-Earth injection.
We had a mass spectrometer experiment, which was a sensor out on the
end of a big wand that was sticking out from the side of the spacecraft,
and one of the test objectives was to de-orbit the lunar module close
enough to some of the seismographs that were on the Moon to make a
little earthquake so they could see—it was all things that we
were supposed to do.
The crews had had a fairly exhaustive time on the surface. John [W.
Young] had gotten sick of the orange juice because it spilled inside
his spacesuit and he had orange juice all over him. Those kinds of
things.
Got them up and got them rendezvoused. I did that, too. Goodness.
Yes, we got them up and got them rendezvoused and we were configuring
the lunar, to close out the lunar module, getting ready, and all of
a sudden the crews realized they had misconfigured the lunar module
so that the ground control, the orbit sequence was not going to work
very well. But the [control center] guys were convinced they could
get it down and we might be able to get the detail. The crew was so
tired that I made a flight-director-level decision that we were not
going to reenter the lunar module and reconfigure it, because that
meant we would have to spend another orbit, at least one more orbit
in lunar orbit, and the crew was going south, anyways, and nobody
argued with me.
So that was the plan, and the trajectory guys and the lunar module
guys got started with the plan to do the best job they could. We needed
to get it out of orbit so we didn't have a debris problem. They were
doing that piece of it. We got ready to retract. The command and service
module's now by itself getting ready to do trans-Earth ejection. We're
retracting the mass spectrometer boom, because it turns out you don't
retract it and light off the engine on the command module, that thing
swings and that sensor [would] punch a hole in the nozzle of the rocket,
on the command and service module.
Butler:
Not a good thing.
Shaffer:
Yes. And it won't retract. It's stuck. It's jammed. We fooled with
it, fooled with it, and we're approaching loss of signal prior to
trans-Earth injection. And I remember we've got all these heavy-hitters
up behind me on the console and they're going to have a philosophy,
they're going to have a plan. I told them how many minutes they had
till loss of signal, and I can hear them up there debating about what's
the right thing to do. We ran out of time, and I told the capcom [to
tell the crew] to jettison the mass spectrometer boom with that pyrotechnic
device on it, and it banged it and had already gotten the vehicle
in attitude so that we would punch that boom out into an orbit that
we wouldn't intersect it again, you know, from trans-Earth. They did,
and it went away and gave them a go for trans-Earth injection, and
they went behind the Moon. In a couple three or four minutes, this
gang behind me says, "We have a recommendation for you."
I said, "Nope, I have a recommendation for you. Take a break,
and in about forty minutes we'll have AOS and the crew should be on
their way home."
And they said, "Oh, okay." [Laughter]
Butler:
You did the job they had put you in a position to do.
Shaffer:
There was Apollo 16. It's amazing that I forgot there for a moment
I'd done that.
Butler:
Well, you did a lot of things. Talking more about Apollo 16, before
they had gone down to the lunar surface, they had some problems with
the command module engine and some oscillations with that. Were you
at all involved in—
Shaffer:
Jay [Greene] was on for that. Yes.
Butler:
Did you work any of the lunar surface activities?
Shaffer:
Everybody pulled a shift, but I think we deputy flight directors were
doing sleep shift planning things. I don't think we were doing active
activities. I don't recall doing those, so it would make sense that
we were doing the planning kinds of things.
Butler:
You certainly had enough interesting things that happened during your
times on console.
Shaffer:
Well, actually, Skylab was a lot more interesting from that standpoint
than Apollo was, believe it or not.
Butler:
Well, we will certainly talk on that. Before we go on to Skylab, there's
a couple other things I'd like to talk at least briefly about on Apollo.
Shaffer:
Sure.
Butler:
One being your thoughts on Apollo 8 and Apollo 11, both unique missions
from many standpoints. Is there one of those that you think was the
prime mission or the one that accomplished the goal most in your mind,
or that was the biggest challenge for you, or meant the most?
Shaffer:
No, I don't think so. When I think about that sort of thing, I think
about the Apollo program, okay. And from this vantage, which is thirty
years later, I think the thing that's most important to me about the
Apollo program is the technology spinoff and what it did to our culture,
rather than a high point of Apollo 8 going to the Moon for the first
time or Apollo 11 standing on the Moon for the first time. Those are
fairly esoteric things which were done predominantly for political
purposes. I mean, their basic justification was politics, international
politics.
But we stepped computer technology a full generation having done that.
We stepped medical monitoring some untold number of generations by
doing that. The whole business of space flight changed. No matter
whether you do it unmanned with scientific satellites or whether you
put people up there, those were the world changes. I mean, walking
on the Moon was a thing that happened on the way to changing the world.
It wasn't an end game in itself. It was kind of the beginning of the
end in some ways for Russia, because they lost the technology race,
and then I think when [President Ronald W.] Reagan started pushing
the Star Wars [SDI – Strategic Defense Initiative] thing, they
gave up. They can't keep up with the capitalist bastards. [Laughter]
Excuse me. They were big deals, but they weren't the big deal at all.
Butler:
It's true. Good perspective. Very good. Looking at that, too, and
talking about some of the international impact and the world, at this
time there was so much going on and you all were so focused on Apollo
and getting to the Moon and making this all happen, were you aware
a lot of the other events going on in the world?
Shaffer:
No. No, we were cocooned. Most of us were working 3,000, 3,500 hours
a year on a standard issue 2,000-hour work year. We were all doing
close to double time, and that's really all there was. No. Did anything
happen then? [Laughter]
Butler:
A few things. [Laughter]
Shaffer:
Well, you know, we really, in a sense, missed the hippie phenomenon.
I'm serious. We didn't know anything about that. We'd see a picture
of a young woman putting a flower in the end of the rifle and say,
"What the hell are they doing that for?" Then we'd go back
to whatever it was we were doing.
Butler:
Well, you certainly had quite a goal to accomplish and work on.
Shaffer:
Yes. But I can't tell you how much fun it was. It really was.
Butler:
Quite an experience.
Shaffer:
Yes.
Butler:
Well, looking at a couple of the other missions, you said that after
Apollo 11 you moved into the data priority area, and for Apollo 12,
at least from a trajectory standpoint, it was quite a challenge to
get—you wanted to go for the pinpoint landings and shooting
for the Surveyor. Were you much involved with discussions on that?
Shaffer:
Apollo 12 was so much like Apollo 11 that there wasn't a lot of new
development for anything that they were planning on doing. Bill [Tindall]
had already done that level of thing. In fact, the J missions started
with Apollo 15, was where most of the effort, the development effort,
was, because the data priority piece had to be done before the crew
training could really start for those differences and before the simulations
could start and people start getting ready. Sixty days was nowhere
near long enough. I mean, people were starting to get ready months
before, so you had to be that far ahead of the curve.
The big thing that happened for us on Apollo [11] was this horrible
miss distance that we had when they came around the Moon, where they
were at least three miles long, if not further, and Neil [Armstrong],
when they pitched up, all he can see is a boulder field out in front
of him, and he knows from the training that he is a long ways down
range from where he's supposed to be. And we had to understand what
had caused that and what to do about it. For me, it was the same kind
of problem that I'd been doing for the Navy, about why did the Polaris
reentry body miss. There's a whole bunch of little things.
It turned out there were some uncoupled attitude control thrusting
going on while they were doing that, and every one of those little
puffs of those things was perturbating the orbit. It turned out there
was some valves, probably some valves left open, and there was some
outgassing of atmosphere, the oxygen, and that was perturbating the
orbit. When they separate them [the CSM and LM], it's a push-away,
and that perturbated it. All that stuff added up.
So we had to go through and isolate and neutralize all of those kinds
of things, and basically it was a whole new [vehicle] attitude history,
so that when you did those little perturbations, that you did them
out of the plane of the orbit, so that they had no effect. Those things
are insensitive out of the plane of the orbit and very sensitive in
the plane of the orbit. So we had that piece of work to do, but other
than that, 12, 13 and 14 were pretty much done pre-flight. Thirteen
was not done in flight. Got very involved in 13.
Butler:
With 13, when did you learn about what had happened and then what
did you do?
Shaffer:
It's a psychic experience. I sat bolt upright in bed and knew that
something awful had happened, and jumped in my clothes and my car
and went to the control center.
Butler:
Oh, my goodness.
Shaffer:
Yes, it was a peculiar kind of thing.
Butler:
Wow. That's kind of chilling.
Shaffer:
So I got right in the middle of it just immediately. I had now been
flight techniques just long enough that everybody was looking to me
instead of Bill. Although Bill was still there and still involved,
the piece of the development that I could do, or that mission techniques
could do, was my part. Ken Mattingly and John Aaron did the thing
that was the limiting resource, which was [they] finally found a way
to have enough electricity to get home.
Butler:
So you worked with them in trying to establish—
Shaffer:
Well, we did everything we could, and then they just had to take it
and finish it.
Butler:
Quite a time.
Shaffer:
Yes, very much so. I yelled something at my neighbor as I went to
the car, because his lights were still on, he was still up, and what
he says is, he said he went to the bathroom and then turned the TV
on, and when he turned it on, I was walking into the control center,
the camera was there, and the problem was, I lived fourteen miles
from the—so it was a trip. [Laughter]
Butler:
You didn't waste much time.
Shaffer:
I don't even remember that part of it. I was trying to understand
it, trying to get a sense, if I could, of what had happened, and all
I had was it was bad. "Go to the control center now."
Butler:
We'll go ahead and take a quick break again and change out our tape.
We should talk now about Apollo in some pretty good detail, and you
said toward the end of Apollo that, of course, you had worked as flight
director for Apollo 16 and then you worked in the SPAN [Spacecraft
Analysis] room for Apollo 17, is that correct?
Shaffer:
Right.
Butler:
While you were in there, what were your duties and responsibilities
for supporting that?
Shaffer:
Well, the SPAN room was a function that basically coordinated analysis.
They were very much a support role, but they were a senior support
role. For instance, something would be going wrong with a spacecraft
system, then the interface with the contractor, the builder who had
built that system, was generally handled through the SPAN. So it was
more an admin advisory process than it was anything else. So that's
what we did, and basically we were "gofers" for whoever
the flight director was out there. If he needed us to go do something
in a deputy flight director role, he'd trigger us and we'd go do it.
It was a terrible demotion to go off the flight director console into
SPAN. [Laughter]
Butler:
I can imagine. Quite a change.
Shaffer:
Yes.
Butler:
But, of course, you were at the same time getting ready to be flight
director for Skylab and had also been working Skylab data priority?
Shaffer:
Yes.
Butler:
Can you tell us about some of what was involved in all of that?
Shaffer:
Skylab, its principal difference from earlier Earth orbit missions
was going to be the duration, because the longest Earth orbit we'd
had was two weeks—Gemini VII. So we weren't terribly concerned
about the first Skylab, because it was only going to be four weeks,
but then it was going to be eight weeks and then it was going to be
twelve weeks. That had some potential. We didn't think enough about
the fact that the Skylab was going to be there for a year and you
weren't going to be able to send a technician up to work on it. We
were going to do rendezvous, but we had done rendezvous at the Moon
now, so rendezvous in Earth orbit really were becoming old hat. Very
quickly we had the Apollo launch vehicle. We hadn't flown very many
of the 200 Series for a long time, but we flew a bunch of them early
in the Apollo program, so there wasn't a lot new about that.
The other piece was the large number of experimental endeavors that
were going to go on up there, and the thrust was going to be of maximizing
things [scientific activities] that basically interfered with each
other, which, by the way, is the same problem [you]'ve got on the
[International] Space Station. They're doing that, and it's one of
the big problems that the current Space Station really doesn't address,
is the conflict that's there. It's why Max [Maxime A.] Faget's idea
of a whole bunch of little stations, single-discipline oriented, would
have been a better way to do the science, not necessarily a better
way economically or operationally, but to do the science. Anyhow,
that was the problem. Milton [L.] Windler. Have you all talked to
Milton Windler? Will you talk to Milton Windler?
Butler:
Not yet, but we hope to, yes.
Shaffer:
Milton did the development of the planning process for Skylab and
set up that sequence. I don't really know how it happened that he
got tagged with that, because he was a flight director, too, on Apollo.
But anyway, he did, and he did an absolutely, in my opinion, sterling
job of pulling that off. So basically he had a planning shift, you
gave it a shift of shelf life, then you'd do the detail planning shift,
which was all of the crew procedures and things, and then you executed
it. But that basic sequence, if it hadn't been done that way, it would
have been an absolute zoo. That was the master stroke.
I was the launch, Don Puddy launched the Skylab, and I doubled with
him on that job. The Skylab started shedding parts fifty seconds after
liftoff. When we finally got to orbit, it was pretty wounded. Don,
everything he tried didn't work, because the thing was so trashed,
but he basically set up attitude profiles and a bunch of that kind
of stuff that were required to make it last.
My job was the launch, rendezvous, and the de-orbit entry of all three
missions and an on-orbit shift as one of the four. So I had two different
flight control teams for Skylab. I had the trajectory oriented guys
with an active command and service module, and then I had a different
set of guys who were experiment heavies and Skylab systems oriented.
So I was with Don to understand what I was going to, because we were
supposed to launch the next morning, with Pete [Conrad] and the guys.
But [now] we got this crippled thing up there that's flying like this
instead of like this [Shaffer gestures]. The meteoroid shield's gone,
it's getting really hot in there. We didn't get all the solar arrays,
I mean, one of them is gone and one of them won't deploy. We're real
short on power and flying like this puts us out of the sun, and I
mean, you know, it's a real mess.
So we basically held it together for ten days and redesigned Skylab,
the program, built a parasol and took up a bunch of tools like bone
saws and some of those things to try to get things loose. Then we
went and launched. When we got there, I don't know whether it was
worse than we expected, but it certainly wasn't better. I do remember
that the launch team was there, was on console for twenty-two hours
that day before we got to break. There was no place to hand over with
all of this stuff that we ran into, including some problems with the
docking probe. So it was a real zoo. I got to go home, take a bath
and change clothes, and come back and pick up my on-orbit shift. I
don't remember much about that shift.
Butler:
I can understand why.
Shaffer:
Yes. But I'll always believe without equivocation that Pete and P.J.
[Weitz] and Joe [Joseph P. Kerwin] saved the program. I think they
took some risks that were above and beyond the call of duty. I think
they were not adequately recognized for what they did, but then it's
not my business. But things like they got in the suits, I mean, the
big solar array that was held down was a major power supply. We needed
that power and there was a piece of angle iron that had stripped off
and was wrapped around it. So P.J. stood up in a window with something,
I've forgotten what, and Pete drove up beside it and he reached out
and hooked that and then Pete backed the spacecraft away, trying to
pull the thing loose. He almost pulled P.J. out of the spacecraft.
[Laughter] So that was a bad plan and we didn't fool around with that
very much, and actually gave up on it for a while.
They went out later [in the mission] with a bone saw and were able
to cut that piece of scrap loose. But by that time, the shock absorber
on the solar array was frozen, so it wouldn't deploy. Pete and Joe
are out [EVA], they got under the solar array, because the analysis
indicated that if they lifted, both of them lifted together, could
break the shock absorber and let that thing deploy. So they get under
it and with their legs lifting, shoulder on the thing, they put it
out and they broke it. Solar array goes out and they go "boing"
and they're at the end of their tethers. [Laughter]
Butler:
Well, it's a good thing they had those tethers. [Laughter]
Shaffer:
Yes, you wouldn't have dared done it without the tethers. It makes
you think about that elevator that fell in New York last night. Did
you hear about that? Forty stories. Cable broke on it and it fell
forty stories. Braking system finally caught them four stories from
the ground. While you're going "boing" out here, you wonder
if the tether's going to hold. It's that kind of stuff.
But once all that was done, got them to bed and got some sleep…
With that out, you could reorient and let it start cooling, etc.
Butler:
And it was ready to get under way.
Shaffer:
They did. Basically from that point on, Skylab II was as nominal as
Skylab was ever going to be. We were always power limited because
we'd lost one big solar array, and we always attitude limited because
we had a parasol up, but we didn't have a real heat shield, etc. But
the parts that worked, really worked well. Then things got worse.
Butler:
How did they get worse?
Shaffer:
I thought you would never ask. [Laughter] On Alan's [Alan L. Bean]
flight, on the second manned Skylab, we lost a [CSM] thruster quad
during the rendezvous, which is no big deal. I mean, they have four
quads around it and you had full control… Other than changing
the propulsion model a little bit, we rendezvoused and we docked and
they proceeded to get on, but during the activation process we lost
the same quad on the other side. There were two here and two here,
but we lost the one on the other side.
What that means is we lost the ability to yaw. We didn't have any
control, spacecraft control, in this axis. So now, in addition to
planning some kind of end of mission for this vehicle, we're running
sims with the crew, with Jerry's [Gerald P. Carr] crew, for the next
mission, we've got a plan for a recovery mission in case we can't
figure out how to get Alan down in his own vehicle, and we get to
do science in our spare time.
Butler:
Well, you didn't have to worry about getting bored.
Shaffer:
I don't remember anything about that except the trajectory-related
stuff. Vance [D.] Brand and I did a tremendous amount of work trying
to figure out how to control that vehicle with those thrusters gone,
and we finally solved it adequately with an offset CG [center of gravity],
so that if you translated in that direction with the offset CG, it
would yaw you. Once you got the big engine started, it wasn't a problem
anymore. I mean, you had yaw control while that was going on, and
once you separated the command module, it had its own attitude control
system. So we got that done.
I think Jerry and his crew did not get adequately supported in terms
of [pre-flight] interface because of the distraction of the recovery
problem. And they were up there the longest and they were all rookies,
so the last one was more awkward than the other ones were, for an
awful lot of reasons.
Butler:
Were you involved in some of that and trying to find ways to make
that work and pull everyone together between the control team and
the flight crew?
Shaffer:
The answer is yes, but I was unaware of the problem. I was unaware
of the problem until we got on orbit and discovered that we were—well,
we didn't discover, the crew finally told us that we were overloading
them. It turned out that we started out treating them like we had
treated Alan's crew at the end of their flight, and they'd had sixty
days of training and integration and all that. For us, we'd been up
there so long now, it was almost like we didn't realize we'd changed
out crews. So we [had] a lot of those kinds of things to work through.
Butler:
You had another learning experience. Luckily were you were able to
make it all come together and work it out.
Shaffer:
Well, we did, but I also feel like we got lucky in some ways. A ninety-day
crew in the air and a year-old crew on the ground with all of that
stuff is, in my opinion, not at the top of their form.
Butler:
Hopefully that's something they'll keep in mind for the International
Space Station now.
Shaffer:
Well, it's not so much a problem with the International Space Station,
because the Shuttle pilots are never going to get that worn down.
It makes a difference, but it makes a tremendous difference for something
like going to Mars. Big. Plus, they don't have the ground support.
When you go to Mars, you're on your own when you get there. You got
a many-minute time delay, so you really can't help those guys [in
real-time].
Butler:
It'll be interesting to see what happens with that when we get there.
Shaffer:
Yes, it will. Skylab, in lots of ways, is like the year that never
happened, because I continued this too many jobs. With the trauma
we had, I was even more focused on what was going on there than I
had been on the Apollo stuff. Being a flight director was different
than being a flight dynamics officer, because your perspective was
so much broader, the number of things you had to deal with and integrate.
Butler:
Certainly a very complex time with a lot going on.
Shaffer:
Yes.
Butler:
Are there any other aspects of Skylab that you recall that were important
at the time?
Shaffer:
Yes, I always wished we'd have done them in reverse order, that we'd
done Skylab first and then gone to the Moon, but the politics of the
problem did not support that.
Butler:
I think a lot of people had initially had that as an idea.
Shaffer:
Well, yes, I think it was, but Skylab was never appreciated, because
it [was], "Why are we boring holes in the sky after we've been
to the Moon? Let's go to Andromeda [Galaxy] or somewhere really interesting."
Butler:
Yes, Skylab often does get—it's kind of an afterthought a lot
of times.
Shaffer:
But it produced a tremendous amount of very valuable information about
the Earth and about the sun and about space flight and about the human
physiology, metals and materials, etc, etc.
Butler:
A lot of valuable science.
Shaffer:
Yes, absolutely. A worthwhile program.
Butler:
Very. Very much so. Well, following Skylab came Apollo-Soyuz [Test
Project, ASTP]. Were you at all involved in that?
Shaffer:
Yes, for about a half a day. Yes, [M. P.] Pete Frank said he wanted
me to be the lead flight director for Apollo-Soyuz, and Kenny [Kenneth
S.] Kleinknecht, who was the director of flight operations at that
point, said he wanted me to become the crew/ground liaison with Rockwell
for the crew interface. And since Pete worked for Kenny, Kenny won
and I became a part-time Rockwell person. I spent a lot of time out
there doing that job, which was directly in line with the mission
techniques part now, because really mission techniques is about the
crew-ground interface and who's going to do what and who's responsible
for what and where does the information come from and what computations
go on on board and what go on on the ground, you know, all that sort
of thing.
Butler:
Was there anything that was done differently for this mission or was
it pretty similar to the other Apollo and Skylab?
Shaffer:
Well, it was very different from the impact of the international crew
and the international cooperation required to do that. The vehicles
are incompatible in terms of they're different electrically and they
have different docking mechanisms. The Russians have got this three—thing
with the three petals on it and the Americans have got the probe and
drogue, which is an inverted umbrella with a retraction. So they built
this adapter to go between them, and the Americans built that. I've
always suspected it's because the Russians couldn't get off the dime
with their bureaucracy. They couldn't get anything approved. I had
the clear impression, listening to those guys, that when they finally
started getting serious about procedural planning and mission design
and that sort of thing that they were so—"lethargic"
is the wrong word—labyrinthic in their process, that they were
virtually nonresponsive. So they ended up finding themselves and proposing
and the Russians saying, "Yes, that looks like a good plan."
But other than the periphery of hearing people talk about it, I didn't
k