NASA STS Recordation
Oral History Project
Edited Oral History Transcript
J. R. Thompson
Interviewed by Jennifer Ross-Nazzal
Huntsville, Alabama – 13 May 2011
Ross-Nazzal:
Today is May 13, 2011. This interview is being conducted with J.R.
Thompson in Huntsville, Alabama, as part of the NASA STS Recordation
Oral History Project. The interviewer is Jennifer Ross-Nazzal, assisted
by Rebecca Wright.
Thanks again for taking time to meet with us today.
Thompson:
You’re welcome.
Ross-Nazzal:
We know you’re certainly busy, and we appreciate you giving
some time here in Huntsville. I’d like for you to set the ground
for us. When you became manager of the Space Shuttle Main Engine Project
in 1974, at what stage was the main engine at that point?
Thompson:
I believe it was around May of ’74 when I came aboard, and the
Shuttle engine at that time was about—they were several years
into the development, “they” being Rocketdyne. Then, of
course, Marshall [Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama] in the
laboratories out there were heavily involved as well.
We were on the cusp of starting to embark on the subsystem or component
testing, a lot of it planned at Santa Susana in California, right
outside of Los Angeles. It started out somewhat slow, primarily because
the work was behind schedule on the facilities up at Santa Susana.
They were called COCA [test] stands. COCA-1 was combustion devices,
and COCA-2 was turbo machinery. We struggled through the summer and
into the fall on trying to get the facility in shape. They were very
massive systems, very complicated. They had controls on them to simulate
the component being subjected to the requirements of the Shuttle main
engine. To make a long story short, it was very unsatisfactory. We
probably didn’t get more than a couple of dozen tests off. We
had several major problems, some fires with the facilities. For example,
in the lock system we had some metallic particles or pins that came
loose, and of course that created a fire.
This drug out. We were getting further behind schedule, and it was
costing a good bit of money so we looked very hard at leapfrogging
all of the subsystem tests and going straight to the engine system.
We called it the Integrated [Sub]system Test Bed, ISTB. I believe
by the spring of the next year we had assembled our first ISTB test
and embarked on that at [NASA] Stennis [Space Center, Mississippi].
It turned out to be a very successful undertaking; it allows us to
keep going. Any problems we encountered were real problems because
they were conducted on the engine itself, and we had to deal with
those.
Several of the more significant ones [involved] what was called a
whirl in the high-pressure fuel pump. It was a subsynchronistic orbiting
of the turbo pump shaft within the bearings, and it was caused by
inadequate cooling of the bearings. They became soft and allowed the
rotor to orbit subsynchronously within the bearing cage itself. It
slowed us down for about nine months, as I recall, didn’t allow
us to get much beyond a couple of seconds into the engine test. We
ended up solving that problem by putting a little paddle—it
wasn’t any bigger than your thumbnail. A vortex was being created
without that paddle where the coolant flow dumped into the bearings,
and the introduction of the paddle disrupted the vortex and allowed
the cooling to get there.
That solved that problem and from then on the engine problems that
we encountered were somewhat typical of the development of a rocket
engine. We had some problems with turbine blades, several lines broke.
We had some injector elements burn through, and we had problems with
those. You sum all these up, and over the next four or so years prior
to the first flight we probably lost about 11 engines through explosions,
fires, and working through that development.
But the overall approach of abandoning all of the subsystem testing,
going directly to the engine, running head-on with the problems that
had to be solved—in retrospect I think was very satisfactory.
It was very fruitful, productive, and although the program was very
expensive and costly, it turned out to be an excellent product. The
Space Shuttle main engine has now flown successfully to orbit probably
almost 400 times, and I think this upcoming launch [STS-134] will
be over 400 times considering you’ve got three in every Shuttle.
It’s been very safe; it’s very high-performance. Looking
back on it, it was a real marvel.
Ross-Nazzal:
That’s a great summary. Would you tell us what the requirements
were for the main engines when you became project manager, in terms
of performance?
Thompson:
The performance on specific impulse was about 450 seconds. That really
wasn’t a problem, and that’s about the way it ended up.
I think it started out to be reusable on 55 missions and at a certain
thrust level of about 470,000 pounds of thrust or thereabouts. We
saw that early on we needed a little bit more payload or performance
out of the engine, so we backed off some on the number of flights.
I think it was 55 missions and 27,000 seconds, and we reduced that
to several dozen flights, but we increased the performance to 109
percent of the 470,000 pounds of the rated thrust, and that met the
performance requirements of that time on the Shuttle. It provided
the added performance for the shortfall in payload-carrying capability
the Orbiter had. It did reduce the number of times the engine could
be used, but I think looking back on it, we found that with all the
normal inspections and the refurbishment after several flights that
the engines were very robust and could be used a number of times.
Ross-Nazzal:
Would you tell us how you thought about solutions or suggestions for
things like cost overruns, problems with the facilities which you
pointed out, budget shortfalls—all of the issues that you would
have to deal with as a project manager?
Thompson:
My counterpart at Rocketdyne was a fellow by the name of Dom Sanchini.
He was a very good program manager. Both he and I were focused on
the technical challenge, the solutions that we had to come up with,
and our job was to motivate and stimulate the team, both at Marshall
and at Rocketdyne. Cost was a problem, but schedule and having a technically
responsive product was higher at that time. There was a huge amount
of money being spent on the total program, so if the Shuttle main
engine was late, then that complicated everybody’s cost overruns.
So although the Shuttle main engine clearly overran its cost objectives
that were seen at the outfront, the real challenges during the development
program leading up to the first flight in April of 1981 was to be
able to produce as good a schedule as we could and had a product that
really worked. Particularly the latter was a highlight of the program;
it worked very well.
Ross-Nazzal:
Would you tell us how much time you spent out at Santa Susana trying
to come up with solutions to the challenges that you were facing out
there at that facility?
Thompson:
I probably spent at least every other week. Sometimes I was gone for
several weeks at a time, but I think over half my time was spent out
at the Rocketdyne facility—not necessarily at Santa Susana,
that was the test area—but in Canoga Park [California] at the
Rocketdyne plant, and then a good bit of time at Stennis. I attended
a large number of engine-development tests that were conducted down
there.
Ross-Nazzal:
Tell us about the budget issues that you faced as the project manager
at this point, because the budget was much more limited than it was
for the Apollo Program where you sort of had a blank check. You had
a very small amount of money in comparison.
Thompson:
Yes, the budget was tight, but the sense I got from the leadership
in the program—who, by the way, probably the most focused was
John [F.] Yardley—I think the signal that he conveyed to myself
and to Sanchini was, “If you guys will solve the technical problems
and bring us in as close as you can on schedule, I’ll take care
of the money.” I think he probably moved some money around between
projects, probably helped the Shuttle main engine and cut some of
the external tank and the solid rocket boosters. That was the sense
I had at the time. Everybody spent a lot of time trying to forecast
funding requirements and the timing of that, but Yardley probably
took it on as a job in [NASA] Headquarters [Washington, DC], if Thompson
and Sanchini could stay focused on schedule and the technical product.
Ross-Nazzal:
You’ve talked a little bit about testing. Would you tell us
how you laid out the testing program for the main engines? How did
you come to the idea of the ISTB, and how did you lay out the component
testing? Can you give us some idea about that?
Thompson:
I don’t really recall exactly who came up with the idea. I think
it ended up being an only option that Sanchini and I focused on and
discussed quite a bit because of the situation of the test stands
and the cost overruns that we were encountering there. It was looking
at all the facts and assessing that we were getting further behind
if we didn’t get going, and the only way to get going was to
jump on the testing of the engine at Stennis. The Stennis facilities
were ready, the engine components were well along and could be assembled
as an engine, although prematurely. But in the end, as I indicated
earlier, it seemed to work out very well.
Ross-Nazzal:
I had read somewhere that there had been a discussion of whether or
not to test the engines at Tullahoma [Tennessee] or in Mississippi.
Were you involved in those discussions?
Thompson:
I recall there were some discussions early on because of the altitude-simulation
capability at Tullahoma, and we did have one of the test stands at
Mississippi configured with an ejector system to simulate altitude,
but it wasn’t that much of a trade or an option. It was pretty
clear the real focus was going to be Mississippi.
Ross-Nazzal:
Would you tell us about some of the tests that you witnessed out at
Mississippi. Any that stand out in particular?
Thompson:
Well, the ones that stand out were all the ones that failed, because
they were most dramatic. As I recall, a major milestone before the
first flight was 65,000 seconds, having accumulated that much development
time. I think we finally exceeded that and got up over 100,000 before
the first flight, and a number of tests probably of more than several
hundred. But again, the ones that really stand out were the failures,
the explosions, the turbine blade failures, for example, that would
off-center the rotor and the LOX [Liquid Oxygen] pump would rub, and
of course you’d catch fire. These were all big deals. Every
time we encountered one of these, we were probably between the corrective
action on the test stand and then, bigger than that, the corrective
action on the engine that led to the failure. You were usually set
back one to two months, and so if you have 11 of those, as we had
in the program, that’s right there a little bit more of a year
of just assessing and redesigning and reconfiguring to react to some
kind of a problem. We basically, once we got into testing in Mississippi,
went around the clock, several shifts a day, including weekends, to
try to come as close as we could to the schedule that we finally ended
up at.
Ross-Nazzal:
When there was a failure on the test stand, tell us what happened
from there. Did you take the engine back to California? Did you have
to do any work to the test stands themselves?
Thompson:
Typically after a significant failure we’d convene a failure
review board that consisted of engineering at Marshall and at Rocketdyne,
and that would be chaired by a senior engineer. They would do whatever
analysis they needed to do on a test stand, and then at the appropriate
time they would convene either at Marshall or at Canoga Park, and
then we’d remove the engine from the test stand. Usually it
was a 100 percent loss, although in some cases we did salvage some
parts. The test stand itself—I think most of the damage, with
a few exceptions, was pretty cosmetic and could be repaired quickly.
The program wasn’t slowed down awaiting on the facility to be
repaired; it was awaiting the redesign of whatever caused the problem.
Ross-Nazzal:
You’ve talked about subsynchronous whirl problems with the turbine
blades. What do you think was the biggest challenge that you faced,
the biggest technical challenge, as you were working on this development
and testing of the main engines?
Thompson:
Probably solving the subsynchronous whirl problem in the fuel pump.
We were very surprised by that. It was tough to figure what was really
going on. The bearings were quite worn after just a couple of seconds,
so it seemed pretty clear that we weren’t getting sufficient
cooling to the bearings, but encountering this vortex was something
that stymied us for quite a while. It was finally solved by one of
our senior engineer’s cut and try. I don’t think at the
time we inserted that little paddle did we think it was going to fix
anything, but clearly the vortex was there, and it broke up the vortex
and allowed us to get the coolant to the bearing.
That was the most interesting problem, interesting because it had
a lot of facets to it. It slowed us down probably the longest, about
five or six months as I recall. It was the first big problem we encountered
and it caused us some early schedule problems. Everybody at that time
was very concerned that we couldn’t get the engine to run more
than just a couple of seconds. This coming on the heels of the decision
to go to the ISTB and avoid all the subsystem tests, started to raise
some questions about could we really tackle this thing. After we got
through that, other problems were similar to other programs, like
the J2 and the F1 [engines], the issues with turbine blades and injectors
and that kind of thing. It was that whirl problem that caused us to
pause a long time.
Ross-Nazzal:
What was the media interest like in the Shuttle main engines as you
were facing all of these different challenges? Was there a great deal
of interest at that point?
Thompson:
Yes, certainly they were primarily interested every time we had a
major failure. “What does this mean to the schedule?”
The first Shuttle was launched in ’81, I think it was three
or four years late. I think the Shuttle probably paced that schedule
as well as the Orbiter. Both of them were struggling with some technical
issues. All the systems seemed to really mature, coming together so
we could seriously look at a launch about 1980, and from there on
we knew sometime in ’81 we’d get it off.
Ross-Nazzal:
How were you able to follow the progress of the project, being as
you had work going on in California, work in Mississippi, and at Marshall?
How were kept apprised of all the different components and different
issues facing the engine? Did you have other management below you
keeping track?
Thompson:
We had other people in the program that were assigned to stay on top
of the various subsystems, and we had constant reviews, both at Marshall
as well as at the contractor site. Not only within the project, but
also within the Center that were Shuttle-focused, not only including
the Shuttle main engine, but the solid rocket boosters and the external
tank as well. Then we had a number of meetings and reviews with Headquarters,
so it was a very review-focused time. You were almost constantly in
some kind of a review or budget cycle or something else. It was a
very exciting time, looking back on it. A lot of pain, but exciting
nonetheless.
Ross-Nazzal:
What were your hours like during those years that you were the project
manager?
Thompson:
I’m an early person, so I would usually get to work around 6:30
and then leave in the evening sometime. On TDY [temporary duty], the
hours seemed to be a little longer. Down at the test sites, Stennis,
there were always things to do and be concerned about.
Ross-Nazzal:
There was some involvement by the National Research Council with the
main engines. Can you talk about their involvement and their suggestions
to improve the main engines?
Thompson:
I think they first got involved back in the days of the subsynchronous
whirl. Perhaps the [NASA] Administrator [Robert A. Frosch] or John
Yardley asked the National Research Council to take a look at the
Shuttle engine because of the criticality, and it was problem plagued
at that time. The Research Council appointed Professor Gene [Eugene
E.] Covert from MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge]
to head a team or a panel. They came down to Marshall on several occasions
and out to Rocketdyne in Canoga Park, got heavily involved in the
program, offered advice, reviewed status and progress, and eventually
were satisfied with the outcome. They were very helpful.
Ross-Nazzal:
You didn’t find that particularly challenging, working with
another group coming in and having some oversight?
Thompson:
No. I mean, probably your first reaction is, “Oh no, not another
one.” But once you get through that, we worked well together.
It was not contentious, there was no tension as I recall. It was just
a tough problem and we welcomed the help.
Ross-Nazzal:
Tell us about your relationship with John Yardley, who was AA [associate
administrator] for Manned Space Flight at that time, and his impact
on the main engines.
Thompson:
I really liked John. To me, he was the glue that held the Shuttle
Program together, and it took a toll on his life too. John was on
the road quite a bit. He was very tough, he was very demanding. I
mentioned I usually came in early, six-thirty, seven o’clock,
but wherever I was, I could expect a call from John at seven o’clock
Washington [DC] time. So if you’re out in California, that’s
four o’clock in the morning, and he knew where I was and he
stayed in touch. It was tough.
Ross-Nazzal:
I understand that you tested the engine with a number of flaws to
prove its worthiness at some point. Did he approve of those ideas?
Thompson:
Yes. Probably the best way to say it is he tolerated it. He wasn’t
particularly enamored with the idea—as you’re into the
certification program within about a year of the first flight, where
there’s a lot at stake—of testing the engine with cracked
turbine blades. But we had confidence in what we were doing. For example,
on the turbine blades the crack grows at a certain rate. Even after
we inspected the blades, we knew that a small crack could develop.
If you lost a blade in flight and you imbalanced the rotor, particularly
on the LOX pump, it rubbed, you were going to have a major explosion
and you’d lose the Shuttle. There was a lot at stake in terms
of knowing the rate at which the cracks grew, at which they became
critical and broke.
So we felt we had to develop that confidence, or we were just going
to be rolling dice. If we could run the tests where we had everything