NASA Headquarters Oral
History Project
Edited Oral History Transcript
Courtney
A. Stadd
Interviewed by Rebecca Wright
Washington, DC – 7 January 2003
Wright: Today
is January 7, 2003. This oral history with Courtney Stadd is being
conducted in Washington, D.C., for the NASA Headquarters History Office,
Administrators Oral History Project. Interviewer is Rebecca Wright.
Mr. Stadd is currently the NASA Chief of Staff and White House liaison.
Today’s session will focus on his involvement with the area
of commercialization of space.
We thank you for taking time to visit with the project today.
Stadd: It’s
my pleasure.
Wright: You’ve
been involved for the past twenty-five years in identifying, fostering,
and developing market-driven opportunities in space. When in your
career did you begin to work for an end to the “government’s
monopoly on launch services”?
Stadd: I guess
I first developed an interest in this area in the mid-seventies. In
fact, when I was graduating from the Georgetown [University] School
of Foreign Service, [Washington, D.C.] I was approached by a small
group of people who were interested in looking at the economic frontier
of space development, and that led to my working with a former associate
dean of the graduate school at Georgetown, a gentleman called Steve
[Stephen T.] Cheston, who, unfortunately, died a few years ago. He
was a former vice president at Motorola [Incorporated] involved in
their former Iridium satellite project. We formed what we called an
Institute for the Social Science Study of Space, which was the first
such interdisciplinary scholarly effort in the country to look at
the both technical and social economic aspects of space development.
In the midst of that project, we got a grant from NASA, in roughly
1977, to look at some of the economic, social, human factors associated
with space exploration, and along the way I encountered the late Gerard
K. O’Neill, who was a Princeton [University] physicist, who
gained fame for, amongst other things, promoting the idea of space
colonies. I found the prospect of space colonies to be interesting,
but probably a bit fanciful in terms of it being feasible in the near
term. I was fascinated, however, by the social and economic issues
associated with it.
So that began to open up my eyes as to what the opportunities were,
and along the way, I was contacted by a group in California that was
forming a company—at that point we called it Arc Technologies
[Incorporated]; was renamed Starstruck [Incorporated]—and that
company was the first to privately finance and develop a rocket for
commercial use.
So you could see in that period of time—and this is roughly
between ’76, ’77, and 1981, ’82—I got very
much involved in this area. In fact, in the summer of ’77, I
was recruited by the National Space Institute, currently known as
the National Space Society [NSS], to take over their monthly membership
publication, and within about a year or so, I was asked to actually
take over the organization. This was a group that was formed by Wernher
von Braun. He had passed away that June of ’77. Former NASA
Administrator [Dr.] Jim [James C.] Fletcher was the Chairman of the
Board of the National Space Institute.
And that also gave me further exposure to the interesting developments
going on in the commercial world, although part of my charter was
to also follow closely the civil part of the agency, and in fact,
in many ways the NSS became my graduate work, if you will, in terms
of beginning to develop a knowledge of NASA, the space agency, and
the potential of the commercial space market at the time.
So you had this interesting, I guess, at least for me, convergence
of an academic pursuit at Georgetown that, by the way, culminated
in the first scholarly journal—I was the managing editor of
it—called Space Humanization Review, that brought together physicists,
economists, sociologists to look at the various and sundry challenges
and issues associated with space development. Then coincident with
that, my involvement with the National Space Institute, and then—to
put it in chronological order, after I left the Space Institute, I
actually spent a year taking time out to think about my next steps.
In that year, which was roughly ’80-’81, I established
what today is referred to as the World Affairs Council. There are
two of them in Washington. I formed one at Meridian House International.
During that year, I found myself migrating more and more to space-related
issues, and it was during my tenure there when I was approached by
these entrepreneurs in California to help establish this new commercial
launch company. By the way, one of the investors was Steve Wozniak,
the co-founder of Apple Computer [Incorporated]. So this was formed
very much in the wake of the euphoria over the new computer, semi-conductor
industries that were forming at that time in Silicon Valley.
So that’s my way of responding to the initial question of how
I got interested and what brought me to ultimately spend a career
pursuing this area.
Wright: You
originally started out in private industry, and then you made a move
toward public service. Could you share with us how that transition
occurred?
Stadd: Sure.
When I got involved with this company, Arc Technologies, subsequently
called Starstruck, and it was called that because the first president
of Apple Computer, Michael [M.] Scott, who put in the bulk of the
investment, wanted a name that he thought could resonate with the
younger generation, the so-called “Star Trek generation.”
There were a number of us who weren’t exactly ecstatic over
that name; we felt it was a bit too flaky, if you will. But he had
the purse strings and ultimately prevailed. The company went through
another incarnation, and ultimately became known as the American Rocket
Company.
But the group of us who co-founded that effort philosophically believed
that U.S. space industry was suffering from what we referred to as
a lack of product differentiation. That is to say, there was little
diversity in the products and services being offered. Our diagnosis
was that this resulted from the domination of large aerospace companies
and from the monopoly of the government in purchasing those services.
Remember that many of the people I was associated with back in California
were entrepreneurs who came from the emerging, as I mentioned, microprocessing,
semiconductor computer world, who felt strongly that entrepreneurship
was the ticket to accomplishing great things. So it was our feeling
that if the government would only get out of the way and allow the
entrepreneurial sector to put its genius to work, that we could do
great things. So our whole presumption was in favor of looking for
a regulatory regime that was minimal, a licensing regime that was
minimally burdensome.
Because I had spent some time in Washington, both at Georgetown, at
National Space Institute, the World Affairs Council, I was the only
person associated with the company who,
(a) had a business suit (remember this was Silicon Valley where informal
attire was typical), and, (b), had knowledge of Washington. So it
fell to me to go back to Washington and to carry the water in developing
a licensing and regulatory regime that would be philosophically along
the lines that I mentioned earlier, being supportive of this type
of entrepreneurial effort.
I also want to give major credit to a gentleman called Jim [James
C.] Bennett, who was a colleague and one of the co-founders of this
company, who had articulated a deregulatory philosophy regarding the
launch industry, that put a big premium on performance-based regulation
versus the classic certification approach that the Federal Aviation
Administration historically had taken to aviation, where you get down
to every single component and certify its safety, and so forth.
By the way, that was an understandable approach, given the fact that
you’re dealing with human life, given the amount of traffic
you’re talking about. But in the case of this fledgling rocket
industry, the view was, you’d have very few events, the existing
and proposed commercial rockets did not involve flying people, and
that’s why we promoted the idea. And I do give Jim Bennett credit
for helping author that philosophy that it ought to be based on a
performance-based regime. That is, the company in question, the company
seeking license from the government to launch, the onus ought to be
on the company to stand up to a general set of safety criteria, and
as long as we demonstrate how we’re going to avoid posing a
threat to human populations, then we ought to be licensed and allowed
to conduct our business.
Well, when I came back to Washington, it fell to me to help organize
a coalition of companies. And it was an interesting time back in the
early eighties. We had many more aerospace companies, I might add,
than we have today. General Dynamics [Corporation] was very much in
the aerospace launch business. Obviously, we had Martin Marietta [Corporation],
you know. We had a bunch of companies. So, myself, along with other
rocket company representatives, formed an ad hoc coalition of big
companies and small companies. The larger companies were interested
in ensuring that the Space Shuttle, which at that point was just emerging
as an operational entity, did not end up as a de facto monopoly in
the space market and thereby wipe out opportunities for commercial
satellite business for the big companies. That basically was the fundamental
agreement, if you will, that brought the small fledgling companies
together with the larger companies to work together in trying to get
the government to put in place a regulatory regime that would be supportive
of this new commercial rocket industry.
We hired Covington & Burling. The reason for that is that we were
looking for a well-established law firm in Washington. I interviewed
many of the top law firms in Washington, which was a pretty bold thing
to do when you were a new-start company, and walking into these very
fancy, well-furnished law firms, in many cases, old traditional Washington
law firms. And the law firm that impressed us the most was Covington
& Burling, in particular a young lawyer who’s now, I understand,
a partner, a full-fledged partner, but back then was an associate,
a guy called Dr. Richard [A.] Meserve, who was both a physicist and
a lawyer, and probably no one is aware of this, but Richard really
was the prime draftsman of what ultimately became the 1984 Commercial
Space Launch Act.
This is a case I’ll have to come back later on and fill in the
blanks, but there was a former Hawaiian congressman, Danny [Daniel
Kahikina] Akaka, who was the original sponsor, and Diana [P.] Hoyt,
who is currently working here at NASA Headquarters [Washington, D.C.],
I first met Diana back in the early eighties, when she, on behalf
of the congressman, was supporting legislation promoting commercial
space. So, between Diana Hoyt’s support and ultimately that
of the House Science Committee, we ultimately got passed the 1984
Commercial Space Launch Act, which authorized the Department of Transportation
to put in place this regulatory licensing regime based pretty much
on this philosophy I talked to you about earlier, this performance-based
approach to regulation. I can spend a few moments, if you wish, talking
about some of the debates that went on surrounding that.
There was great interest by industry in having the Department of Commerce
be the lead agency. Again, it was our feeling that the FAA [Federal
Aviation Administration] was exactly the opposite of what regulatory
model that we wanted in place. The Commerce Department had historically
housed a number of regulatory bodies—I might add, including
the FAA at one point—that it had spun out over the decades.
So we thought it was historically consistent to suggest that they
stand up a small licensing regime for this new industry.
Secondly, frankly, because Commerce’s charter is to promote
and advocate U.S. industry, we felt that we would be in friendlier
hands if it was hosted at the Department of Commerce. The former head
of NOAA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Tony
[Anthony J.] Calio, no stranger to NASA—he was formerly Associate
Administrator [for Space and Terrestrial Applications] at NASA back
in the very early eighties, had worked here in the seventies—was
very supportive of our efforts, and I got to know Tony Calio, worked
very closely with him, and he managed to make the case to then Secretary
of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige, who was excited by the idea of Commerce
being the lead for this new industry. Mr. Baldrige had a very close
working relationship with President [Ronald] Reagan.
So we had legislation that called for Commerce to be the lead and
we had managed to persuade the Commerce Department and key officials
to support it. We—i.e., our colleagues from this ad hoc coalition—talked
to people in the White House and felt we had support there as well.
But then the Department of Transportation began to press its case
to be the lead agency for this emerging industry. For them, they appeared
to be the only logical choice. After all, they are in the transportation
business. They have a multitude of modes, from maritime, railroad,
highway, to aviation in which they license, and there were a number
of people over there who felt that they were a better, more appropriate
candidate than the Department of Commerce. Nonetheless, we strongly
pushed for Commerce, again fearful that the FAA would get its clutches
on it and thwart the emergence of this new industry.
Again, this is a little-told story, but roughly in the—I have
to be reminded of the time frames, but I think we’re in the
maybe summer, spring, summer of ’84, there was a meeting at
the White House, chaired by the President. One of the topics was the
issue of who should be the lead, and then Secretary of Transportation
Elizabeth Dole told the President she thought this was a classic case
of deregulation. She argued that she could oversee this industry with
a small team of regulatory experts and that it was very appropriate
and logical for DOT [Department of Transportation] to take on this
job.
I understand that one of the President’s aides passed a note
to Secretary Baldrige asking whether he’d be open to dividing
the authority with the Department of Transportation so that Commerce
would have the promotional role and DOT would have the licensing and
regulatory role. I was informed that the Secretary decided at that
instant, no, that he felt a divided authority was a weakened authority,
and that if, in their wisdom, the White House—the President—opted
to have DOT take over licensing, he was not going to stand in its
way. And that ultimately turned out to be the case.
We were disappointed in Commerce, but to the credit of Secretary Dole,
she had her senior staff call myself and other members of this ad
hoc coalition, and they went out of the way to assure us that this
issue had the personal attention of the Secretary, that she would
do everything she could to assure that our industry did not fall victim
to over-regulation, and that it would not fall into the clutches of
the FAA, and so forth and so on.
Whether we liked it or not, the reality was that the President had
spoken. We took some solace, although we continued to be anxious about
how DOT would treat us. The Congress fell in line pretty quickly,
and once the President had issued his executive order, the lead agency
was changed in the legislation to be the Department of Transportation,
and that was the reality.
I remember Congressman [Ed] Zschau, a former congressman from Silicon
Valley, was also another key advocate for this legislation, and Congressman
[Manuel] Lujan [Jr.], on the Republican side—both were on the
Republican side—were great advocates and very effective at pushing
this legislation. And I recall that the day the President held a White
House event to announce this new executive order, the White House
called those of us in industry and asked us to bring models of our
different rockets, so we could array them around the President’s
dais. That was a big day for us, and I remember arranging to take
Congressman Zschau up to the White House, and I remember renting a
limousine. I remember him coming out and saying, “Gee, you know,
I’m supposed to do that for my constituents; it doesn’t
work the other way around.” But we were so excited.
I remember having our people in the company build a model, which is
no trivial thing for a small company—big companies do it all
the time—but particularly one that we knew was going to be in
the White House. We took special care with it. So I remember being
sent this model of our rocket, which was actually a hybrid propellant,
and the way they cut the propellant, the rocket, the way it was sent
to me, was sent to me very well packaged, but it was a bit unstable,
so when I got to the White House, I remember looking for different
ways to prop it up, because it didn’t have a fancy base as some
of the other ones did. I don’t remember a single thing the President
said during the event; I just remember looking at this rocket, apprehensive
that it was going to fall over at any point during the proceedings.
But that was a big deal for the commercial industry. It culminated
two years of very hard work. It was a singular milestone in the history
of commercial space in this industry, the first time the United States
Government—the Congress, the White House—had formally
acknowledged and formally put in place a licensing regime for this
new industry.
Although our competitor at the time, Space Services Incorporated [SSI],
chaired by David Hannah [Jr.], had successfully launched their own
privately financed rocket, from Texas—it also was a demonstration—we
actually also ultimately launched our own. I think it was in the late
summer of ’84 after several failures. In our case, we launched
our vehicle directly out of the water.
What made ours markedly different was, unlike the Space Services people,
from whom I take away nothing—Deke [Donald K.] Slayton was head
of the effort; as typical, Deke Slayton did a marvelous job—but
in our case, everything was privately built and financed. In contrast,
SSI used a Minuteman stage that was creatively—legally, but
creatively—arranged by former NASA General Counsel [S.] Neil
Hosenball. In a sense, what Neil arranged was a permanent lease of
this first-stage Minuteman to this private company. This was very
creative thinking.
As I mentioned earlier, we, on the other hand, actually built everything,
the propellants, the casings, the fairings, the nose cones, everything
was done in an industrial plant in Redwood, [California], and what
made that possible was using this benign hybrid propellant. In fact,
the Navy had done a lot of work with it, as well as United Technologies
[Corporation]. We were trying to improve the state of the art with
that hybrid propellant at that time.
I was called by Tony Calio on behalf of the Office of the Secretary,
after the executive order was signed and as the legislation was making
its way through, and I was asked if I might be interested in coming
to join the Department of Commerce as the first person dedicated to
space commercialization. It coincided with a reality that was beginning
to quickly descend on Starstruck, which was that unlike the computer
industry, unlike the experiences that a number of the former computer
executives associated with the company were accustomed to, reducing
theory to practice in the rocket business is formidable.
This is not to say the computer industry is not complex in its own
right. It is to say that building rockets, flying them successfully
is, in its own right, very, very complicated. I think that when the
management began to recognize how large and sustained the nonrecurring
capital investment threatened to be, after they’d put in a fairly
significant investment just to get to the demonstration point, to
the testing point, let alone to the point where we could declare it
operational, that’s when they got cold feet. That’s when
they decided that perhaps they needed to pull up stakes.
So the company was going through some churning, and as I looked at
that churning, looked at where my expertise was beginning clearly
to develop here in Washington, my feeling was that I could better
serve this embryonic, fledgling industry here in Washington than elsewhere.
So, after some deliberation, I called back Commerce. I accepted the
opportunity, and sometime early ’85, as I recall, late ’84,
’85, I took the job. I showed up at the Department of Commerce
as Special Assistant in the Office of the Secretary for Space Commercialization.
They housed me in the Office of General Counsel, which sounds unusual,
but it bespeaks the interesting approach that Secretary Baldrige had
concerning the use of his general counsel. He really looked to his
legal shop to do a lot of his policy analysis and advocacy, so the
general counsel shop that I entered at that point was really a hotbed
of activism on behalf of the Secretary. And this was a Secretary,
as you might expect of a Reagan appointee at the time, who put a big
premium on deregulation, a big premium on market-driven initiatives,
and, therefore, the type of philosophy that I enunciated earlier,
that we had generated when I was with this rocket company, very much—I
found a very fertile and congenial environment when I came to work
at Commerce.
So I feel really fortunate that I was able to operationalize that
experience in industry and had the opportunity to go into government
and work at a senior level, my first job, to help translate theory
into policy. In that position, I worked closely with a Robert [H.]
Brumley, who was at that point a special assistant to the general
counsel. He ultimately became general counsel. Robert Brumley was
a very interesting person -- what I would refer to as an entrepreneurial
bureaucrat, pretty innovative.
The biggest issue, we felt, in the ’84, ’85, ’86
time frame, was the prospect of NASA dominating the space launch industry,
through the Space Shuttle, which at that point had been declared operational,
and by that point, the agency had declared a policy of encouraging
as much commercial business on the Space Shuttle as possible, in addition
to the civil and some military missions that they were supporting.
It was clear that in response to this perceived major subsidy by the
government, that the Europeans were greatly motivated to likewise
subsidize their entry into the foreign market, the Ariane rocket family.
So those of us either associated with the rocket industry directly
or, at that point, in my case, at the Department of Commerce, felt
that unless we put some policy breaks on what was happening in the
U.S., we would end up devastating the established expendable launch
industry with players such as Martin Marietta and General Dynamics,
as well as clearly resulting in the stillbirth of the emerging entrepreneurial
rocket industry.
So that theme occupied much of our time and effort at the Department
of Commerce, and there were innumerable interagency meetings involving,
obviously, NASA, Department of Transportation, those of us at Commerce,
the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Office of Management
and Budget, Defense personnel, grappling with the appropriate policies
that would allow for a viable space shuttle, while at the same time
encouraging the emergence of a viable U.S. industry that could take
on not only the European entry, Ariane, but take on any other foreign
launch competition that at that point looked like they might be coming
into being. Certainly we knew that Japan, China and the Soviet Union,
at the time, were certainly potential threats, although we, at that
point in the mid-eighties, did not have a handle yet on the nature
and scope of those threats.
So a great deal of time was invested in the interagency world in pushing
the agency to develop a full-cost methodology for determining pricing
on the Space Shuttle. We went through innumerable variations on additive
costs, average costs. There were innumerable studies that were put
out, both by the government, Congress as well as private-sector think
tanks, regarding this whole effort. We at the Commerce Department,
along with our then, at that point, allies at the Department of Transportation,
were very adamant if the agency was going to continue to launch commercial
payloads, that they had to do it at the full cost.
And if you’ll allow me to provide a sidebar observation, in
roughly around that time period, maybe ’83, ’84, another
individual no longer with us, I regret to tell you, Phil Salin, who
died of liver cancer a few years back, he was a senior executive with
Arc Technologies, was a Stanford [University] graduate, and I arranged
for him, working with the Republican minority at the time—and
a bit of what I have to admit was a bit of rear-guard guerrilla action—managed
to get for the first time on the public record an analysis of what
launching on the Space Shuttle really costs. When the majority on
the committee—at that point it was called the Committee on Space;
now I think it’s called Space and Aeronautics Committee—when
they got wind of this testimony, I’ll never forget, when I showed
up at the hearing, there were maybe, I think, one or two members.
Now, normally these hearings on space, there weren’t a lot of
members that would show up at a normal—but this was extraordinary
in how few there were, and I recall in the audience that there were
an inordinate number of not only NASA personnel, but Shuttle contractor
personnel sitting in the audience. People were both, I think, unhappy
with the message, but I think, to a large extent, viewed Phil Salin
as representing a fly-by-night entrepreneurial venture—these
are my words, but I’d be surprised if that wasn’t what
the perception was among the people in the audience, and certainly
among the majority staff on the committee at the time.
But there was no walking away from the fact that Phil was absolutely
brilliant. He was a brilliant economist. He had spent a great deal
of time in research in systematically analyzing what the costs were.
He systematically, which was typical of Phil, went through all the
available public information regarding the infrastructure costs associated
with the Space Shuttle. So I believe that any history that looks at
the dynamic or the debates between the role of the Shuttle and its
impact on the commercial launch industry, by rights, needs to start
with Phil Salin’s statement, which I think has held up pretty
well in history. When you correct it for inflation and so forth, he
got it pretty right in terms of the huge costs associated with launching
these payloads.
And, of course, the agency had no interest in charging full cost,
because if they did that, it would act as an immediate, you know—discourage
the interest of the commercial satellite industry immediately, so
they had no interest in acceding that point about how much it really
cost.
And we got into very, very intense debates. Now I’ll shift you
back to the mid-eighties, these interagency debates, where we at Commerce
Department and Transportation were pushing hard for full cost. Frankly,
it wasn’t until the horrible tragedy of the Challenger accident
in January 1986, when things dramatically changed. In fact, in the
months leading up to the Challenger, there was every sign that the
U.S. launch industry was beginning to pack it in, that they saw little
prospect for NASA, for the government, rethinking its policy toward
launching commercial satellites, and with the prospect of competing
against subsidized foreign competition, few of them saw any real opportunity.
Unfortunately, it took the trauma of the Challenger loss to regalvanize
the interagency world to go back and look at what the appropriate
role of the Shuttle ought to be. So I got heavily involved in that
whole effort in the months following the Challenger, when we developed
a new space policy, actually, a national space policy that included
a commercial section. And although we got into heated debates, again,
the agency obviously was in much less of a position to argue that
perhaps it was inappropriate for the Shuttle to be putting astronaut
lives at risk in supporting “vanilla variety” commercial
satellites, as we used to put it. Obviously, there’s nothing
“vanilla variety” about launching anything, but as compared
to those research-related efforts on the Shuttle that did require
intimate astronaut involvement, we made the argument, among other
arguments, that there’s really no real justification to put
an astronaut at risk in launching satellites that could be as effectively
launched by other means.
Other arguments included that we did have an industry on the verge
of collapse, and that overnight we could create a market base for
this industry, and that the agency, which at that point it wasn’t
clear when the Shuttle was going to be back in business—of course,
we know, in retrospect, it took almost two years, over two years,
to come back to business, and that during that time, we anticipated
that there’d be quite a backlog of missions for the agency to
work off of, and that during that interim period, rather than handing
it on a silver platter to the foreign competition, let’s give
our U.S. industry a chance to go after that industry.
But to show you the nature of the recalcitrance that we were facing
even up until the eve of the President announcing a new policy, the
agency was still fighting this and, in fact, there was even the prospect
of some of our allies in the interagency world accepting the NASA
compromise, which was that NASA would phase itself out of launching
this industry, over time.
We at Commerce, led by Secretary Baldrige, refused to surrender our
adamant position. Our feeling was that the agency at that point, at
least in the eyes of the Secretary, had lost its credibility. He had
fought too many battles, or we had fought too many battles on his
behalf, before and after the Challenger accident, for him to believe
that the agency, once it was back on its feet, once the Shuttle was
back successfully operating, that it would indeed give up this lucrative
satellite market.
So he was adamant that the President should support taking NASA immediately
out of launching the commercial satellite, unless the President deemed
it on a case-by-case basis to be appropriate, and there were some
other exceptions, but by and large, our view was that they should
be totally out of that business.
I still have, somewhere in my own personal archives, a copy of the
options paper that was delivered to President Reagan by then Chief
of Staff Don [Donald T.] Regan, and, actually, it’s an interesting
piece of paper, because the President initially checked off an option
that was one that we opposed. It was one that supported the phasing-in.
What I have is a copy of where the Chief of Staff brought it back
to him, and the President crossed out and put his “RR”
next to the option that ultimately became incorporated into the national
space policy, that ultimately became legislated sometime later, and
that was the prohibition on NASA launching commercial satellites,
subject to some very strict exceptions.
There’s another individual who deserves her day in the sun,
and that is a lady by the name of Madeline Johnson. Madeline Johnson
at that point was Director of the Office of Commercial Space Transportation.
She had the boldness to insist on being on the White House dais when
the President’s press secretary announced that the President
had just decided that the Shuttle would not be launching commercial
satellites, and she did those of us who advocated that position and
others who were in the industry at the time a huge service, because
she grabbed the microphone and declared in no uncertain terms that
NASA would no longer be in the business of launching satellites, and
that sound bite is what went out on the wires and, in fact, really
preempted any reinterpretation that the advocates for a different
policy approach might have spun, if it hadn’t been for her taking
the initiative.
I’ve always believed that Ms. Johnson, who soon thereafter left
the space community, to pursue other professional interests is yet
another person to whom we owe a bit of tribute. To those of us who
believed in sending a very clear signal to the marketplace, she did
a very important deed at that point. I have no doubt that those at
NASA at the time, and the contractors, who were very much opposed
to this new policy, would have done everything they could to support
a different interpretation.
By the way, not out of malice aforethought, but because they were
very, very well-intentioned people, who really felt, in their heart
of hearts, that the Space Shuttle was the most appropriate vehicle,
and that the expendable launch vehicles were yesterday’s technology,
and that the more business we could get for the Space Shuttle, that
meant more launch events, and that meant, over time, that the economics
would drive toward lower cost.
I was a member of the school of thought who believed that the capital
investment in the Space Shuttle and its supporting infrastructure
was so huge, and that particularly in the wake of the Challenger accident,
the care and feeding that it took to maintain the Shuttle, the costs
associated with that, were so large that it was very unlikely that
we would ever achieve the traffic model that would result in the lower
costs that some of the proponents suggested at the time. And again,
I also felt strongly that when it came to launching commercial satellites,
it was best to have our industry do that.
Now I loop back to a point I made earlier, which was this focus on
product differentiation. There were those of us who felt that the
Shuttle had a very important mission. It is impossible to imagine
today the great achievements we’ve made in space in the past
twenty-some-odd years, in the absence of the semi-reusable launch
vehicle. Certainly the engineering achievement of the Space Station
would have been impossible, or, at least, would have been far, far
more difficult, formidable, in its absence.
But with that said, we’re still a country that today, as I speak
to you in the year 2003, we’re in a marketplace that is very
much suffering from the lack of diversity of launch vehicles in various
weight classes, and a number of us foresaw that prospect, and although
we do not have the innovation diversity that we had hoped for, the
past twenty-some-odd years has only convinced me more that if the
Shuttle advocates had prevailed, or continued their monopoly, that
it would have dealt a devastating blow to the launch industry.
So as much as today’s industry is suffering, at least we have
an industry to suffer. I would suggest that we probably would have
entered the nineties with very few suppliers left, the exception being
the Department of Defense, that would have sought various artificial
means to ensure an expendable launch vehicle system. And, of course,
the evolved expendable launch vehicle, EELV, is the Department of
Defense’s answer to filling that void. But there’s no
question that we would have been, I think, in even worse straits if
we had followed that path.
Wright: Let’s
talk some about the Office of Commercial Space Transportation. You
mentioned Madeline Johnson was the director. You took that position
as well.
Stadd: Yes.
Wright: Tell
us about your expectations of the job and what you were hoping to
accomplish with that directorate.
Stadd: Sure.
I should add that while I was still at Commerce, and in the wake of
the President’s decision to take the Shuttle out of the launching
of the commercial satellite business, the Secretary had supported
establishing an Office of Space Commercialization. Bob Brumley and
myself were the co-architects of that office. It was our feeling that
there needed to be an office solely dedicated to promoting and supporting
this fledgling industry, and by that I mean not only launch industry,
but also the Earth-observation industry, which at that point was also
embryonic. There were also some very interesting entrepreneurial communications
initiatives. There was also at that point the very much fledgling
global positioning system industry. So there were a number of industry
sectors where we felt having a policy advocate at the Department of
Commerce made a lot of sense.
So we took a rib out of the International Trade Administration, ITA,
which is the international expert arm of the Department of Commerce,
and established this office, much to the chagrin, I might add, of
the people who were at ITA, who were managing a long-established aerospace
office. But our feeling was that that office was doing its job of
care and feeding for the established aerospace industry, but that
there really needed to be a voice for the entrepreneur. And, by the
way, by entrepreneur, I mean not only the new-start companies, but
I mean the intrapreneurs within the established aerospace companies
who were seeking new product lines in the commercial space industry
as well. We thought by establishing such a small office within the
Office of the Secretary, we would give it a cabinet voice. And even
though Commerce is very small, when you have a secretary with as close
a relationship as the late Secretary Baldrige had with the President,
there’s a lot that you can gain from that type of agility and
that type of access.
So I was offered the job to run that office, and I would have done
that except that I got a call from the Office of the Secretary of
Transportation, and they offered me to take over this Office of Space
Transportation. So Madeline Johnson, for a number of different reasons,
had decided to leave the department, and I was approached to take
that job. I remember I went over and met both with Jim [James H.]
Burnley, the Deputy Secretary of Transportation, who ultimately became
the Secretary of Transportation when Secretary Dole left a year and
a half later to help support her husband’s run for the presidency
at the time. So it was lucky, because I was able to develop a relationship
with him early on, but I met the Secretary, we bonded, we very much
shared the same vision for this industry.
I found myself, by 1986, now the head of an office that was a product
of an executive order and legislation that I was originally sent to
help put in place. Of course, it was a different agency than I originally
had in mind, but it says something, perhaps, about the small world
of Washington. But the irony was not lost on me or anyone else who
knows of my role in this industry.
I found myself in a fairly unique situation. There are people in the
academic world who study space policy. There are people in the industry
world who advocate policy change. But there are probably, for better
or for worse, few people who are able to view it from all three standpoints,
and between the mid-seventies and the mid-eighties, I had that unique
opportunity. I also benefited because commercial space was so new,
and there was such a dearth of people crazy enough, like myself, to
try to make a living at it, that I never kid myself to think that
I had any special talent or intelligence or skill; it’s just
that, as in things like that in life, I was in the right place, right
time.
So when I took the job both at Commerce and then specifically at the
Department of Transportation, I recognized the unique opportunity
and the responsibility that I had, because I realized everything I
was doing would set a precedent. No one had ever licensed a private
rocket before. Today, you tell somebody that in the year 2003, and
they accept it as reality, but a short seventeen years ago, when you
would mention that to your colleagues in the Department of Transportation,
in the other modes, FAA, Coast Guard and company, they did look at
you sort of funny. “You’re telling me that the government
is going to countenance private people to go off and engage in something
that is potentially dangerous?” After all, what is a rocket
but it’s a controlled explosive.
But through the bipartisan support that we had on Capitol Hill—and
I give credit to a number of the members on the Hill who had the vision
to support the industry, President Reagan, that White House, and to
Secretary Baldrige and Secretary Dole who, again, had the boldness,
the vision—we set about to do just that. And she kept her promise,
her deputy, Jim Burnley, kept to the promise as well, when he became
Secretary, which was to not allow this office to become captive to
the traditional certification approach to regulation.
So we took the executive order, we took the law, and I had some very
talented members of the team, Gerald [C.] Musarra, who’s now
a Vice President at Lockheed Martin, at that point was sort of a junior
civil servant at the time, I recognized early on that he is a very
talented lawyer, and he ultimately became my de facto chief counsel.
I give Gerald a lot of credit for being the architect and helping
to translate the law, the policy, into the regulations.
Another gentleman, Norm Bowles, was a gentleman who helped, managed
operationalizing the licensing in our office.
By the way, to show you what a small world it is, not only is Gerald
now Vice President of Lockheed, but about a month ago, I had the privilege
of being in the audience when the President [George W. Bush] hosted
the President’s Quality Management Award ceremony at the Ronald
Reagan Building, which is the highest management award you can be
given by the President, and lo and behold, after not having seen him
for many, many years, Norm Bowles stands up to accept an award from
the President for his management of the FAA Oakland facility. We had
some good people, is my point, who’ve gone on to other things
in life.
But we spent that first year, ’86, part of ’87, really
putting in place the machinery to license, and if memory serves, I
believe I issued the first license for Space Services, which, unlike
Starstruck, had gone from its test to actually signing up a payload
and had put in an application to be the first licensed company. That
was a proud day, to do that.
And we issued the regulations, the first set of regulations ever,
for a private rocket industry, and we tried to hold to our promise
that they would be based on what I referred to as performance-based
philosophy, where we try to establish a minimally burdensome set of
safety criteria.
I might add that our efforts were controversial, so I think it’s
worth taking a moment to remind people of the context. NASA was still
unhappy about the policy, but one thing about this agency, it was
true then, and I can guarantee you it’s true today, once the
policy decision is made, they do salute the flag and implement. You
know, there were people in NASA that were really making their best
efforts to try to work with us, but it was clear that it was hard
for them to take seriously this small band of people at DOT that were
daring to get involved with an area that was theirs and the Department
of Defense’s exclusive concern. And this whole regulatory business
was really alien territory for an agency dominated by engineers used
to working on the cutting edge of, in this case, launch technology.
The agency is certainly not a regulatory body and, in fact, at one
point in the interagency debates and, in fact, even at some point
when the Congress was debating this ’84 Commercial Launch Act,
there was some thought given to whether NASA ought to be the lead.
In my judgment, saner heads prevailed and said NASA is a research
agency; it is not a regulatory agency. Fortunately, that was the dominant
thinking.
But the Department of Defense, Air Force, also had its concerns about
this new office. The Air Force, rightly, felt that they were the resident
experts on national range safety, and, again, they were asking, what
were these upstarts doing in this civil agency, what value-added did
they have to offer. And, frankly, when I first took the office over,
it was an uphill effort to persuade both NASA and, in many ways more
importantly, the Air Force, because we were, more than NASA, rubbing
up against prerogatives that were long associated with the Air Force
in the area of range safety.
Now, the approach I took was to, first of all, very much concede the
expertise to the Air Force in this area, and to develop a partnership
with them. I arranged for detailees from the Air Force to come work
in our office. I tried to foster as effective a collaboration as possible.
Then-Secretary of the Air Force Pete [Edward C.] Aldridge was a great
help in trying to foster that environment. But I would be less than
forthright if I didn’t say that there was a lot of time and
effort and a lot of time—many, many, many, many months—devoted
to building bridges with the Air Force, as well as with NASA. But,
again, because of the safety, the idea of DOT putting together a regulatory
governance model at the ranges, it meant we had to work very closely
with the Air Force.
On the Hill, I encountered some hostility from the oversight committee.
There were members on the Hill, mostly Democrat, who felt that the
Department of Transportation was a trespasser into an area of expertise
that had been long the sole preserve of NASA, and they felt that we
were driven more by mindless ideology than by practical concern. So
a lot of my time and effort was spent trying to educate and trying
to reach out, and I did that in a number of ways. I took the advisory
committee that had already been created before I got to Transportation,
and then I, working with the Secretary, populated it with as many
respected people as I could recruit in industry, and those industry
people were very helpful in helping advance our credibility in the
community, particularly with Capitol Hill.
I don’t know what else you want me to add.
Wright: One
of the things that you were talking about was the range safety, which
brings up the issue of insurance. How did you cover that issue? What
were the debates? What was the discussion evolving with that?
Stadd: Realize
that this was a steep learning curve for the government, i.e., regulating
the private launch industry. We at the Department of Transportation—now,
this is where we earned our spurs. This is where we began to demonstrate
why we were, if not uniquely qualified, why we brought such value-added
to the table, and that is, that as an agency that since 1967 has been
in the regulatory business, we recognize that anytime you mix government
oversight, safety oversight, in industry, and whatever it may be,
in the maritime or aviation or highway business, where you’re
putting the public at some level of risk, you have to do a risk management
analysis, which brings you into the liability exposure world.
So we knew fairly early on that at some point we were going to dealing
with the issues of indemnification, liability, risk management. It
was brought to the fore by the leading underwriter at the time, INTEC
[International Underwriters Inc.], which has subsequently been taken
over by a European company. Rick [Frederick H.] Hauck, who was the
first commander of Discovery after the Challenger accident, now heads
up that U.S. subsidiary. The former chairman of INTEC, Jim [James]
Barrett, along with Norm [Norman R.] Augustine, who was the President
at that time of Martin Marietta, met with me and talked about how
they were going to find it untenable to finance satellites, particularly
the very expensive satellites, without some level of government indemnification.
That is, they needed something that they could take to the marketplace
and tell their insurers that the government was standing behind them
in the event of a catastrophe. Otherwise, if they had to go to the
marketplace with an open-ended exposure they did not believe that
their own board of directors, who had critical fiduciary obligations,
would stand for it, for that form of exposure, nor did they believe
that they could afford the premiums even if they could get insurance
to cover that level of exposure. Nor, should I add, did they feel
that their boards would support the level of self-insurance that would
be required to cover that level of exposure.
At this point, let me give credit to Gerald Musarra. He and I drew
our sleeves up, and from our deliberations and discussions with experts
in the field, we ultimately proposed this concept of tiering the indemnification,
so that the industry would carry a significant share of exposure,
but at a certain point—and I can’t recall if it was a
half a billion or a billion at this point, maybe a little more than
that—the government would accept indemnification beyond a certain
point.
So we took that tiering concept. I want to give credit to the Office
of Management and Budget, which felt that we made a good case. The
White House did support us. And we then took that to Capitol Hill,
and Marty Kress, who ultimately came to work at NASA, now retired,
at that point was working on the Senate Commerce Committee, and I’ll
never forget, Marty and I took a walk somewhere in early ’88,
as I recall. We actually walked around Capitol Hill, around the Senate
buildings, and he was on the majority, he was a Democrat, I was obviously
a Republican for Reagan, and we walked around and we discussed this
proposal. He talked to me about the different issues that he’d
have to deal with, with his members. But ultimately from that walk
that afternoon, came an agreement, and Marty was a very effective
advocate for this amendment. And through our efforts on the executive
branch side, his on the legislative side, we ultimately were able
to get support for this amendment that resulted in this tiering, which
had a sunset clause attached to it, and it has been renewed, I gather,
subsequently, a number of times since.
That clearly was critical to allowing the industry to move forward
and to get the financing, the investment required to continue to launch.
The industry had many other competitive challenges, but we mitigated
the risk management as much as we could. It took, as in all these
cases, it took give and take. Obviously, the industry would have loved
the government to pick up as much of the indemnification as possible,
and obviously, the government’s side wanted to be careful to
what extent we were artificially supporting the industry. And I feel
that history has confirmed that I think we came up with a good compromise,
which has served all parties since.
Wright: Before
we close today, could you give us an example of some of the industry’s
competitive challenges that they were going through at the same time
you were going through all your challenges?
Stadd: Yes.
Part of it was cultural. These companies had been long accustomed
to being primary vendors to the U.S. Government. None of them had
any commercial experience. So for them, it was really a huge, almost
trauma to the system to get out and do commercial marketing, do the
type of loss leader marketing and so forth, and the type of business
development with new commercial actors that they hadn’t dealt
with before. They were very accustomed to dealing with government.
One could argue that these large aerospace companies were, in many
ways, extensions of the government by culture and mindset. After all,
that was, in fact, their customer base. So if I had to pinpoint the
biggest challenge, it was pretty much a culture challenge for these
people.
The other big challenge was dealing with foreign competition, the
prospect of dealing with subsidized competition. And the other big
role that we tried to play at DOT was to help advocate on behalf of
the industry to ensure that our United States trade representative
recognized the importance of this industry to the extent of putting
it on that person’s radar in negotiations with Europe and other
countries. So I would say those probably were the biggest challenges.
The other big challenge was convincing the government that, again,
formerly had been the owner of these launch systems, to stand back
and view them as launch services. I think another challenge they had
was, indeed, to retrain the government to be a true customer. Although
we’ve made huge strides since then, back then, that was a steep
hill to climb.
I would like to say a couple points about the office. What’s
interesting about regulatory offices is that oft times they find themselves
walking a thin line between bringing the level of clinical independence
to regulation that is fundamental on behalf of the American public,
while at the same time providing an appropriate level of advocacy
and promotion. By the way, the Federal Aviation Administration has
encountered this dilemma for decades, and, I would submit, most other
agencies, as well.
So, in addition to my dealing with the credibility issue of this new
office, and building the regulation and licensing regimes, I also
had to walk that line vis-à-vis appropriate and effective promotion.
Frankly, at that time there was no voice other than the fledgling
efforts of the Department of Commerce, and, of course, I had left
Commerce, so there was at that point really—you know, there
was a bit of a vacuum. I don’t want to make this sound egocentric,
and I’m proud to say that we made efforts to fill that vacuum
at Commerce over time.
But, really, it fell to the Department of Transportation, it fell
to my office to fill that void and be the advocate, so I spent a great
deal of my time between ’86–’88 talking to as many
of the aerospace fora as I could get to, to educate to them as to
our charter, the scope and nature of our activities, as much time
as I could educating the Department of Defense, NASA, Commerce, and
the White House personnel, including the United States Trade Representative
Office as to our issues. The Commercial Space Transportation Advisory
Committee, COMSTAC, as I mentioned earlier, was invaluable in terms
of surfacing the issues that they felt required support by our office,
by the government.
And again, I constantly had to view all that through the lens of “Is
that an appropriate role for us as an advocate?” And it was
a challenge. It was a fascinating time, and, again, I realized that
I had a really unique opportunity to help shape, form an office almost
from its birth, although I do want to give credit to Jenna Dorn, who
had been a director for a short period of time and Madeline Johnson.
But the bulk of that effort fell on our watch really—Jenna went
on to serve Secretary Dole very ably and is currently head of the
Federal Transit at the Department of Transportation.
But by the time I came on board, there was a host of challenges we
had to face at that point, and at some point in the interview I could
give you my observations about where I think that office has gone,
both positive and negative.
Wright: We’ll
do that. With the time today, it’s probably a good time to close,
and we can start back up tomorrow.
Stadd: Great.
Good. I’ll look forward to it.
[End of interview]