2 Introduction
The end of confrontation in
space, driven by the Cold War, inevitably
diminished governmental commitments to impressive
space projects and led to tighter space budgets.
The new environment made an international
cooperation in space not just a logical way of
promoting global human development, but also a
potentially resourse-saving approach to solution
of up-to-date tasks.
However, a transitional way
from confrontation to cooperation appeared
blocked by significant problems, which sometimes
raise doubts, whether that is really a way
towards tomorrow. The purpose of this paper is to
address these problems in order to make them
clearer and easier to resolve. The paper begins
with discussion of current situations and
concerns of various space powers. Those conems
are analysed to reveal the general fundamental
problems behind them. Ways of dealing with that
fundamental problems are later discussed, as well
as observed advancements along those ways.
2 Background
A methodological complexity of
the task is determined by the fact, that a
pattern of interactions to be analysed got
drastically complicated after the end of the Cold
War. Previously, a main contradiction developed
between the Eastern and the Western blocks. It
was this main contradiction, which can be focused
on, while neglecting internal peculiarities of
blocks. With respect to space this principal
conflict was sen primarily in confrontation, or a
space race, between the United States and the
Soviet Union.
Nowadays the Eastern and the
Western blocks, which earlier could be considered
as monolithic, revealed their internal structure
and conflicts between their constituent elements
can no longer be ignored. Moreover, an
international space arena now features additional
participants, which earlier could not be taken
into consideration. Those are China, India,
Israel and, in a perspective, a number of states
from South-East Asia. (We will not further
discuss this issue, just note, that it will have
increasing importance in a future.)
Nevertheless, fundamental
problems of relationships between space powers
get their reflection at all the levels, including
various levels:
- general East-West
interactions (inter-block relations);
- inter-state relations,
either inter-block (i.e. that of between
an Eastern and a Western state) or
in-block (between two countries within a
block);
- in-country interactions
(between different forces within a single
state).
Let us consider internal
situations in different space powers and basic
disagreements between them. A primary emphasis
will be given to relationships, involving
countries of the former Soviet Union, as the most
controversial and less clear.
2 Space Powers Problems and Concerns
East (Former Soviet Union)
Russia is a
principal successor of a space program of the
FSU. As such, it carries a burden of sustaining
scientific and technological capabilities and
infrastructure, which before long employed about
800 thousand people in rocket and space sector
and performed up to one hundred space launches
per year. Russia also got a burden of prestige of
the great space power, one of the top two in the
world. A self-rating of the national space
program by majority of people, associated with
it, is in the best terms described by
"Number 1.5", rather than second to the
American.1
Understandably, Russia has
major difficulties in keeping technological
capabilities and space-related infrastructure of
the former Soviet Union. A workforce in
space-related industry squeezed down to 560
thousand in 1993. A level of funding is even hard
to estimate at all with the inflation of 10 to 30
per cent a month throughout
1992 -1993 and funding apporiations taking place
on an occassional basis, rather than through a
steady process. For example, during the first
half of 1994 the Russian Space Agency got only 10
per cent of its annual request.2
A notion of "international
cooperation" has a diverse meaning for
Russia. First, there are two different basic
arenas for international activity - one is the
FSU or a "near abroad", and another is
a "far abroad", i.e. the West and the
Third World countries. Moreover,
"cooperation" has at least two aspects
for each of the two arenas.
One aspect of an inter-FSU
cooperation is a sustainance of a
production cooperation, established under the
USSR. Historically, final space products were
assembled mainly in Russia, with cooperative ties
spread across the Soviet Union. After Russia
accepted a full responsibility for continuation
of space program of the former Soviet Union, it
got a constant pain of sustaining a production
cooperation to keep the program running.
Another aspect of an inter-FSU
cooperation is what was supposed to be a joint
use of results from space activity, both in terms
of scientific research and space applications.
That shared use of benefits from space activity
had to come along with joint funding of it.
However, Russia does not see
appropriate commitment from other members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States to invest into
space program. Hence, Russia believes, that other
republics of the FSU are unwilling to carry a
fair proportional share of space programs burden.
(This applies not only to space program. As
during the Soviet Union, Russia remains a donor
for most of other republics, with up to 8 per
cent of Russia's GNP donated to them.3)
Along with a general reluctance
to sustain other republics at Russian expense,
specific concerns may occasionally arise about
business unreliability of contacts with some FSU
states. Those are fuelled by permanent
policy-driven tensions between various republics,
with Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-Kazakh
relations being of especial importance for this
consideration. Kazakhstan draws a severe
criticism for its "exorbitant demands"
for leasing the Baikonur Cosmodrome out to
Russia. Those demands are considered as little
but desire to raise Kazakhstan's national
well-being at Russia's expense.
As a result of these tensions
and perceived uncertainty about long term
relationships, there is a strong trend in Russia
to develop a self-sustainance in space activity,
especially in defense-related programs.
A cooperation with
Western countries got a powerful
stymulus with a sharp cut of internal financing
during the last year of the USSR and immediately
after its demise (in 1991-1992).
An international cooperation
was then considered as the way of salvation of
national scientific and technological
capabilities. It was then, when the industry and
the science rushed to all kinds of cooperative
ties with foreigners. Noteworthy, in that
movement Russia did not draw a clear distinction
between non-commercial joint international
projects, like space science missions, and
commercial space market operations, like launch
services. That mix-up of a non-commercial
cooperation and a competition for a share in a
global market had an objective reason. By the
time, when that rush to an international arena
started, Russia can not perform on her own even
space science missions, and it had to break an
established principle of international
cooperative projects, a principle of
no-fund-exchange.
That principle had to be
stepped out from first to maintain operations of
the Granat astrophysics observatory beyond a
designed lifetime and later to prepare the
Mars'94 mission.
Having scored just a little
success in attempts to join global space market
and sometimes having faced an open opposition
from the U.S. and other Western powers to those
attempts, a significant part of Russian space
industry and policy-makers considered the Western
opposition as a coherent policy to destroy the
former Cold War adversary, using a
"cooperation" just as a new cover.
To complete a Russian picture
it is necessary to note, that within the national
space program there are some tensions and
discrepancies between the Russian Space Agency
(RSA), which supervises a civil space program and
the Space Forces of Russia (SFR), responsible for
all space launches and spacecraft control.
As a military Force, which
bears primary responsibility for military space
systems operations, the SFR favours a
self-reliance in the space program. It claims
necessity of assured access of Russia to space,
which, as stated, can not hinge on relationship
with another state, not even friendly and a
member of the CIS. Hence, the SFR presses for
development of new launch facilities in Russia
instead of the Kazakhstan-based Baikonur.
As to an international and
commercial activity, the SFR also has claims
against the RSA, which, allegedly, uses
servicemen to do all dirty job and does not even
pay properly, not to say about investing into the
SFR's overworn infrastructure.
The RSA does not has its own
infrastructure, historically operated by the
Space Force. Under current stiff conditions it
can neither establish a new infrastructure, nor
even maintain appropriate segments, if
transferred from the SFR, as recently decided.
The RSA is more abound to an
international coperation by virtue of its
mission, which gives it a responsibility for both
representing Russia in international cooperative
projects, and for licensing Russian companies for
commercial space services operations, including
those, provided to foreign customers. The latter
is seen by the RSA as an important way of
self-support for a national space industry. Yuri
Koptev, the General Director of the RSA,
estimated that "participation in
international space projects could provide Russia
annual income of 200-220 million dollars".4
Ukraine has a
second rating in terms of rocket and space
potential among republics of the former Soviet
Union. Accordingly, Ukraine also has grave
concerns about keeping unique scientific and
technological capability as well as many tens
thousands of space-related jobs.*
In addition to troubles Russia
has in this respect, Ukraine also experiences a
special problem. As its space production is
oriented to a Russian consumer, Russia's claims
about self-reliance are considered as an
intention to kill the Ukrainian space industry.
Moreover, Russia is accused of making unfair
profits from Ukrainian hardware, which is
purchased for rubles and used in missions, for
which Russia gets hard currency. Russia and the
West together are also accused of preventing
Ukraine from entering a global space market.
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* No exact figures are
known to the author, but estimated
employment in rocket and space industry
in Ukraine is between 60 and 80 thousand
people.
Kazakhstan has a
special place in the FSU with respect to the
space program heritage. It does not possess a
substantial space-related industry, but hosts a
key element of space infrastructure, the Baikonur
Cosmodrome, which is the sole site for all manned
and interplanetary missions as well as for
launches of geostationary satellites and heavy
reconnaissance spacecraft. Kazakhstan is
interested in getting maximum payback from the
space infrastructure, which it can not use on its
own anyway.
In lengthy and, as of this
writing, yet to be completed debates over
Baikonur Kazakhstan first rejected Russian
proposals to make Baikonur a Russian military
base on grounds of a national sovereignty. Later
it set reimbursement requirements, which Russia
can not accept. Original claims went as far as $3
billions a year. Those seemed to be negotiated
down to $115 millions when the agreement was
signed by Presidents Yeltsin and Nazarbayev on 28
March, 1994. However, soon after that it was
claimed, that $115 millions due each month,
rather than a year. Later was admitted, that $115
million is an annual payment, but it was claimed
to be just a start-up amount for leasing just
space, of the test range, with extras due for
ecological damage, etc., etc.5
Kazakhstan's utmost desire - to
see Baikonur demilitarized and converted into
International Spaceport to perform commercial
launches - again demonstrates interrelation of
international cooperation and space commerce in
views of ex-Soviet states.
West
United States,
the leading space power, faces space budget cuts,
and appropriate challenge of keeping a skilled
workforce, space-related infrastructure, and
ensuring competiveness of an American space
technology at a global market.
In 1993 aerospace industry*
employment in the U.S. reduced by 13% to 909
thousand and 1994 is expected to bring additional
5.4% reduction.6 The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration instead of 10% increase of its
annual budget is now going to face flat funding
until the end of a decade (equivalent to
estimated 4% loss in real terms)
With respect to the task of
ensuring a global competiveness of the American
space technology, the U.S. had already problem
with stiffening competition from Europe,
particularly in space launch services and in
space imagery sales. Nowadays, American suppliers
perceive yet more impressive threat from Russian
services.
A Russian intervention into
established markets is mostly considered by the
U.S. industry as a subversive action. The USSR
and later Russia has been accused of an unfair
competition and an intentional dumping, based on
a subsidized nature of the Soviet economy and
intended to destroy the American defense-related
industry.
Whenever projects for joint
developments with Russia are discussed, concerns
are raised about reliability of Russia as a
partner and benefits from such an cooperation in
terms ofresourse-savings are doubted.
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* Note, that for
Western countries employment figures
represent cumulative workforce emioyed
aviation and in missile and space
industry, while in the former Soviet
Union - exclusively in rocket and space
industry.
Europe also
experiences budget pressure for space programs.
The European Space Agency got a 10% budget cut
for 1994 and have to trim $4 billions from its
programs through the rest of a decade.7 To meet that, ESA had to freeze Hermes
spaceplane and scale back other ambitious
man-related projects. In Europe only France was
able to keep a significant national space program
along with participation in ESA activities.
Despite overall French aerospace industry
employment lost some 7000 jobs in 1991-1992 from
a total of 119 thousand,8 the French space agency, CNES was able
to keep a slight but increase in budget outlays.
The European space industry,
which fought for a long time for a competiveness
against the American one, believes, that the
American industry enjoys more support from the
government, and a competition between Europe and
the U.S. is not quite fair.
Europeans are also concerned
about a Russian penetration into a global space
market. However, their reaction seems less noisy,
either because of their less reliance on their
governments, or because they are sure that their
positions at market niches, already won from the
Americans are sound.
Japan has just
reached a long-standing goal of a technological
independence in its national space program. Today
Japan is perhaps in the most favourable condition
compared to other space race participants, who
took start during the Cold War. Unlike them,
Japan has a steady growth of space budget
amounted to about 7% a year.9
Japan, with its traditions of a
stable policy and assured succession, always had
difficult times in cooperating with the U.S. and
other Western countries, because of typical for
the West rapid policy changes.10
One could only imagine Japanese
expectations from pursuing joint projects not
only with the Western countries, but also with
Russia, policy of which is now famous for
unpredictability. No direct comments about that
are known to the author. Nor Japanese were heard
as complaining about improper treatment at a
global market, despite the fact, that their
position there is yet far from desired.
2 Problems essence
From the above discussion one
can derive, that the first fundamental
problem behind all discussed internal
problems is an unapproriate structure of the
national space programs. Major goals of
national space policies as well as associated
establishments and infrastructures, developed
during the Cold War, do not fit the post-Cold War
environment.
During decades of the space
race space agencies of major space powers got
accustomed to big projects and appropriate
funding, to favourable attitude of top leaders.
With an inflated staff and reduced flexibility
and performance-driven approach they were not
prepared for more stiff and competitive
environment.
Mechanisms for setting tasks to
national space programs also proved far from
appropriate because of decades of more or less
distorted goal-setting in accordance with the
Cold War demands.
This is not to say, that all
space-related structures were completely
unappropriate. However, it was a presence of an
irrational component, which determined severity
of a restructuring problem after the Cold War was
over. The larger was that irrational component,
the greater problems national space program runs
into.
The above consideration,
demonstrates, that the more efforts country spent
to the Cold War-driven space race, the more its
space program suffers after the end of the Cold
War. The two key players in the space r |