2 Introduction

The end of confrontation in space, driven by the Cold War, inevitably diminished governmental commitments to impressive space projects and led to tighter space budgets. The new environment made an international cooperation in space not just a logical way of promoting global human development, but also a potentially resourse-saving approach to solution of up-to-date tasks.

However, a transitional way from confrontation to cooperation appeared blocked by significant problems, which sometimes raise doubts, whether that is really a way towards tomorrow. The purpose of this paper is to address these problems in order to make them clearer and easier to resolve. The paper begins with discussion of current situations and concerns of various space powers. Those conems are analysed to reveal the general fundamental problems behind them. Ways of dealing with that fundamental problems are later discussed, as well as observed advancements along those ways.

2 Background

A methodological complexity of the task is determined by the fact, that a pattern of interactions to be analysed got drastically complicated after the end of the Cold War. Previously, a main contradiction developed between the Eastern and the Western blocks. It was this main contradiction, which can be focused on, while neglecting internal peculiarities of blocks. With respect to space this principal conflict was sen primarily in confrontation, or a space race, between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nowadays the Eastern and the Western blocks, which earlier could be considered as monolithic, revealed their internal structure and conflicts between their constituent elements can no longer be ignored. Moreover, an international space arena now features additional participants, which earlier could not be taken into consideration. Those are China, India, Israel and, in a perspective, a number of states from South-East Asia. (We will not further discuss this issue, just note, that it will have increasing importance in a future.)

Nevertheless, fundamental problems of relationships between space powers get their reflection at all the levels, including various levels:

• general East-West interactions (inter-block relations);

• inter-state relations, either inter-block (i.e. that of between an Eastern and a Western state) or in-block (between two countries within a block);

• in-country interactions (between different forces within a single state).

Let us consider internal situations in different space powers and basic disagreements between them. A primary emphasis will be given to relationships, involving countries of the former Soviet Union, as the most controversial and less clear.

2 Space Powers Problems and Concerns

East (Former Soviet Union)

Russia is a principal successor of a space program of the FSU. As such, it carries a burden of sustaining scientific and technological capabilities and infrastructure, which before long employed about 800 thousand people in rocket and space sector and performed up to one hundred space launches per year. Russia also got a burden of prestige of the great space power, one of the top two in the world. A self-rating of the national space program by majority of people, associated with it, is in the best terms described by "Number 1.5", rather than second to the American.¹

Understandably, Russia has major difficulties in keeping technological capabilities and space-related infrastructure of the former Soviet Union. A workforce in space-related industry squeezed down to 560 thousand in 1993. A level of funding is even hard to estimate at all with the inflation of 10 to 30 per cent a month throughout 1992 -1993 and funding apporiations taking place on an occassional basis, rather than through a steady process. For example, during the first half of 1994 the Russian Space Agency got only 10 per cent of its annual request.²

A notion of "international cooperation" has a diverse meaning for Russia. First, there are two different basic arenas for international activity - one is the FSU or a "near abroad", and another is a "far abroad", i.e. the West and the Third World countries. Moreover, "cooperation" has at least two aspects for each of the two arenas.

One aspect of an inter-FSU cooperation is a sustainance of a production cooperation, established under the USSR. Historically, final space products were assembled mainly in Russia, with cooperative ties spread across the Soviet Union. After Russia accepted a full responsibility for continuation of space program of the former Soviet Union, it got a constant pain of sustaining a production cooperation to keep the program running.

Another aspect of an inter-FSU cooperation is what was supposed to be a joint use of results from space activity, both in terms of scientific research and space applications. That shared use of benefits from space activity had to come along with joint funding of it.

However, Russia does not see appropriate commitment from other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States to invest into space program. Hence, Russia believes, that other republics of the FSU are unwilling to carry a fair proportional share of space programs burden. (This applies not only to space program. As during the Soviet Union, Russia remains a donor for most of other republics, with up to 8 per cent of Russia's GNP donated to them.³)

Along with a general reluctance to sustain other republics at Russian expense, specific concerns may occasionally arise about business unreliability of contacts with some FSU states. Those are fuelled by permanent policy-driven tensions between various republics, with Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-Kazakh relations being of especial importance for this consideration. Kazakhstan draws a severe criticism for its "exorbitant demands" for leasing the Baikonur Cosmodrome out to Russia. Those demands are considered as little but desire to raise Kazakhstan's national well-being at Russia's expense.

As a result of these tensions and perceived uncertainty about long term relationships, there is a strong trend in Russia to develop a self-sustainance in space activity, especially in defense-related programs.

A cooperation with Western countries got a powerful stymulus with a sharp cut of internal financing during the last year of the USSR and immediately after its demise (in 1991-1992).

An international cooperation was then considered as the way of salvation of national scientific and technological capabilities. It was then, when the industry and the science rushed to all kinds of cooperative ties with foreigners. Noteworthy, in that movement Russia did not draw a clear distinction between non-commercial joint international projects, like space science missions, and commercial space market operations, like launch services. That mix-up of a non-commercial cooperation and a competition for a share in a global market had an objective reason. By the time, when that rush to an international arena started, Russia can not perform on her own even space science missions, and it had to break an established principle of international cooperative projects, a principle of no-fund-exchange.

That principle had to be stepped out from first to maintain operations of the Granat astrophysics observatory beyond a designed lifetime and later to prepare the Mars'94 mission.

Having scored just a little success in attempts to join global space market and sometimes having faced an open opposition from the U.S. and other Western powers to those attempts, a significant part of Russian space industry and policy-makers considered the Western opposition as a coherent policy to destroy the former Cold War adversary, using a "cooperation" just as a new cover.

To complete a Russian picture it is necessary to note, that within the national space program there are some tensions and discrepancies between the Russian Space Agency (RSA), which supervises a civil space program and the Space Forces of Russia (SFR), responsible for all space launches and spacecraft control.

As a military Force, which bears primary responsibility for military space systems operations, the SFR favours a self-reliance in the space program. It claims necessity of assured access of Russia to space, which, as stated, can not hinge on relationship with another state, not even friendly and a member of the CIS. Hence, the SFR presses for development of new launch facilities in Russia instead of the Kazakhstan-based Baikonur.

As to an international and commercial activity, the SFR also has claims against the RSA, which, allegedly, uses servicemen to do all dirty job and does not even pay properly, not to say about investing into the SFR's overworn infrastructure.

The RSA does not has its own infrastructure, historically operated by the Space Force. Under current stiff conditions it can neither establish a new infrastructure, nor even maintain appropriate segments, if transferred from the SFR, as recently decided.

The RSA is more abound to an international coperation by virtue of its mission, which gives it a responsibility for both representing Russia in international cooperative projects, and for licensing Russian companies for commercial space services operations, including those, provided to foreign customers. The latter is seen by the RSA as an important way of self-support for a national space industry. Yuri Koptev, the General Director of the RSA, estimated that "participation in international space projects could provide Russia annual income of 200-220 million dollars".⁴

Ukraine has a second rating in terms of rocket and space potential among republics of the former Soviet Union. Accordingly, Ukraine also has grave concerns about keeping unique scientific and technological capability as well as many tens thousands of space-related jobs.^*

In addition to troubles Russia has in this respect, Ukraine also experiences a special problem. As its space production is oriented to a Russian consumer, Russia's claims about self-reliance are considered as an intention to kill the Ukrainian space industry. Moreover, Russia is accused of making unfair profits from Ukrainian hardware, which is purchased for rubles and used in missions, for which Russia gets hard currency. Russia and the West together are also accused of preventing Ukraine from entering a global space market.

------------------------------------------------------------------

* No exact figures are known to the author, but estimated employment in rocket and space industry in Ukraine is between 60 and 80 thousand people.

Kazakhstan has a special place in the FSU with respect to the space program heritage. It does not possess a substantial space-related industry, but hosts a key element of space infrastructure, the Baikonur Cosmodrome, which is the sole site for all manned and interplanetary missions as well as for launches of geostationary satellites and heavy reconnaissance spacecraft. Kazakhstan is interested in getting maximum payback from the space infrastructure, which it can not use on its own anyway.

In lengthy and, as of this writing, yet to be completed debates over Baikonur Kazakhstan first rejected Russian proposals to make Baikonur a Russian military base on grounds of a national sovereignty. Later it set reimbursement requirements, which Russia can not accept. Original claims went as far as $3 billions a year. Those seemed to be negotiated down to $115 millions when the agreement was signed by Presidents Yeltsin and Nazarbayev on 28 March, 1994. However, soon after that it was claimed, that $115 millions due each month, rather than a year. Later was admitted, that $115 million is an annual payment, but it was claimed to be just a start-up amount for leasing just space, of the test range, with extras due for ecological damage, etc., etc.⁵

Kazakhstan's utmost desire - to see Baikonur demilitarized and converted into International Spaceport to perform commercial launches - again demonstrates interrelation of international cooperation and space commerce in views of ex-Soviet states.

West

United States, the leading space power, faces space budget cuts, and appropriate challenge of keeping a skilled workforce, space-related infrastructure, and ensuring competiveness of an American space technology at a global market.

In 1993 aerospace industry^* employment in the U.S. reduced by 13% to 909 thousand and 1994 is expected to bring additional 5.4% reduction.⁶ The National Aeronautics and Space Administration instead of 10% increase of its annual budget is now going to face flat funding until the end of a decade (equivalent to estimated 4% loss in real terms)

With respect to the task of ensuring a global competiveness of the American space technology, the U.S. had already problem with stiffening competition from Europe, particularly in space launch services and in space imagery sales. Nowadays, American suppliers perceive yet more impressive threat from Russian services.

A Russian intervention into established markets is mostly considered by the U.S. industry as a subversive action. The USSR and later Russia has been accused of an unfair competition and an intentional dumping, based on a subsidized nature of the Soviet economy and intended to destroy the American defense-related industry.

Whenever projects for joint developments with Russia are discussed, concerns are raised about reliability of Russia as a partner and benefits from such an cooperation in terms ofresourse-savings are doubted.

------------------------------------------------------------------

* Note, that for Western countries employment figures represent cumulative workforce emioyed aviation and in missile and space industry, while in the former Soviet Union - exclusively in rocket and space industry.

Europe also experiences budget pressure for space programs. The European Space Agency got a 10% budget cut for 1994 and have to trim $4 billions from its programs through the rest of a decade.⁷ To meet that, ESA had to freeze Hermes spaceplane and scale back other ambitious man-related projects. In Europe only France was able to keep a significant national space program along with participation in ESA activities. Despite overall French aerospace industry employment lost some 7000 jobs in 1991-1992 from a total of 119 thousand,⁸ the French space agency, CNES was able to keep a slight but increase in budget outlays.

The European space industry, which fought for a long time for a competiveness against the American one, believes, that the American industry enjoys more support from the government, and a competition between Europe and the U.S. is not quite fair.

Europeans are also concerned about a Russian penetration into a global space market. However, their reaction seems less noisy, either because of their less reliance on their governments, or because they are sure that their positions at market niches, already won from the Americans are sound.

Japan has just reached a long-standing goal of a technological independence in its national space program. Today Japan is perhaps in the most favourable condition compared to other space race participants, who took start during the Cold War. Unlike them, Japan has a steady growth of space budget amounted to about 7% a year.⁹

Japan, with its traditions of a stable policy and assured succession, always had difficult times in cooperating with the U.S. and other Western countries, because of typical for the West rapid policy changes.¹⁰

One could only imagine Japanese expectations from pursuing joint projects not only with the Western countries, but also with Russia, policy of which is now famous for unpredictability. No direct comments about that are known to the author. Nor Japanese were heard as complaining about improper treatment at a global market, despite the fact, that their position there is yet far from desired.

2 Problems essence

From the above discussion one can derive, that the first fundamental problem behind all discussed internal problems is an unapproriate structure of the national space programs. Major goals of national space policies as well as associated establishments and infrastructures, developed during the Cold War, do not fit the post-Cold War environment.

During decades of the space race space agencies of major space powers got accustomed to big projects and appropriate funding, to favourable attitude of top leaders. With an inflated staff and reduced flexibility and performance-driven approach they were not prepared for more stiff and competitive environment.

Mechanisms for setting tasks to national space programs also proved far from appropriate because of decades of more or less distorted goal-setting in accordance with the Col