.What happens to those
capabilities with a demise of the Cold War?
Let us demonstrate this at an
example of the former Soviet Union.
It was the FSU, which had to
experience the most drastic cuts in ICBMs as a
matter of started strategic arms reduction,
because of its heavy reliance on ICBM component
for a strategic deterrence.
The Soviet ICBM force has been
reduced from maximum 1600 to 1400 before START
and more than 400 SS-20 mobile IRBM were
destroyed under INF treaty.
With START-1 and START-2
treaties implemented, yet more significant cuts
are underway, which would result in about 500
ICBMs.
More important, programs for
ICBM development and modernization were also cut,
leaving associated industry underemlpoyed, if at
all. Of three ICBM modernization programs started
before break-up of the USSR - that of the SS-18,
SS-24 and SS-25 - the first two were Canceled.
The SLBM development program was limited to the
modernization of one missile, the SS-N-20.
Note, that after break-up of
the USSR in 1991 essentially two rocket powers
appeared instead - Russia and Ukraine. Although
Russia became a formal successor to the USSR on
nuclear weapons issues, Ukraine possess
significant capbilities including production
facilities for the SS-24 and SS-18 ICBMs as well
as for space launchers and guidance systems.
Thus, after restructuring
theex-Soviet ICBM force, only two Russian
dedicated missile manufacturers - Nadiradze
Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, which
built the SS-25, and Makeev State Rocket Center,
solely responsible for SLBMs, retained
governmental orders for that business. Other
traditional manifacturers of ICBMs - Russian KB
Salyut of Moscow and Ukrainian KB Yuznoye of
Dniepropetrovsk - got out of missile orders and
had to search for other application to their
capabilities.
A first natural alternative is
to apply an idle missile capacity to national
space programs. This trend is yet more apparent,
because in all leading missile and space powers,
but perhaps the United States, missile and space
industries are inseparably tied and ICBMs and
SLVs are mostly manufatured by the same
enterprises.
What promise
do national space programs of leading rocket
powers hold?
National space programs of
leading rocket powers hold a little promise to
employing additional capabilities.
- Government-funded space
efforts are being trimmed and space
budgets are being cut by basically all
leadingspace powers, as high-profile
prestigeous space projects lose political
backing in a post-Cold War environment.
In the United States, NASA
faces first real-figures cut of its budget for 20
years since the Apollo program. European Space
Agency lost 10% of its $3 billions annual budget
in 1993 and have to trim $4 billion more from its
spendings before the end of the decade.
Budget fugures for Russia and
Ukraine bear little sense because of high
inflation rates and irregularity of funding
availability. However, difficult times the
Russian space program has can be easily seen from
a sharp decline in space launches since 1991.
- commercial sector has not
developed to such a great extent as it
was hoped some time ago. Moreover,
allegedly lucrative market of space
technology just marginally relates to
missile technology. Basically, only space
launch services could employ idle missile
capabilities. Note, however, that in
terms of global space market revenues
this sector accounts for only 1/10.
The annual amount of commercial
space launches does not exceed 15-20. The worse,
this slice of a pie is already shared by existing
providers of space launch services
Nevertheless, it is this narrow
sector, which is targeted by all missile
manifactures and owners of surplus ballistic
missiles.
In the FSU basically all
now-operational ICBMs and SLBMs are considered
for space launch aplications:
- The SS-19 two-stage ICBM
is being equipped with a new third stage
to make a so called Rokot space launcher;
- The Makeev's SS-N-6 and
the SS-N-8 single- and two-stage SLBMs
are tested in suborbital microgravity
research mode in 1991-1992;
- The Start series of launch
vehicle is developed on the basis of the
SS-25 mobile ICBM (first test occured on
March 25, 1993);
- The Ukrainian industry
suggests a development of a series of
modular space launchers from standard
stages of the SS-24 ICBM. A launcher,
called "Space Clipper" is
supposed to be fired from a container
dropped from the An-124 transport plane;
- The Ukrainian-built SS-18
heavy ICBMs are also considered as a
potential space launchers;
- Makeev Design Bureau
proposes its newest SLBM. the SS-N-23
(Shtil'), for air-drop launch from the
II-76 cargo plane. It also designs a
four-stage "Surf" launch
vehicle, composed of the first stage of
the SS-N-20 and the complete SS-N-23 and
to be launched from a sea-floating launch
facility.
Similar activity is underway in
the United States, where the MX first stage is
modified for use in new commercial space launch
vehicles (Taurus, Conestoga) and use of surplus
Minuteman ICBMs is considered.
However, the amount of surplus
ICBMs completely overwhelms any real demand.
For example, in the FSU a total
amount of potentially available surplus missiles
include about 300 of the SS-18s. up to 300 of the
SS-19s. and about 200 SS-N-23s.
In the U.S. there are more than
300 Posidon C-3, about 400 MInutemans and about
50 both Peacekeepers (MX) and Titans.
Not, surprisingly, from a
variety of ex-Soviet proposals for conversion of
ICBMs into sa[ce launchers only one has a
governmental customer - the Rokot, ordered by the
Space Forces, and this is the only project which
is completed with the launcher tested and
commissioned for operation. The Start project,
which from its origin was funded by commercial
companies has now run into financial troubles and
its second launch is delayed, the Surf project is
supported by the US Sea Launch Investors group,
but an original stage is to be funded by Russians
on their own and that project is also delayed.
Yet less of a surprise, an
advent of new suppliers to already overssuplied
narrow market draws severe criticism from
established space launch services suppliers and
accusations of "subsidized" services,
based on ICBMs, as an "unfair
competition".
To avoid those accusations, the
US government currently limits use of surplus
ICBMs to governmental contracts only. However,
until now all users for such services ARE
governmental.
Taking into account the
abovementioned status of the national
spaceactivities in the leading rocket powers, one
can judge, that national governments of the
leading rocket powers are able to consume an
excessive capabilities internally.
What can be done to employ that
capabilities, other than proliferating missile
technology to other countries?
An obvious general answer -
increase the market.3
Expansion can be sought either
inside of the established arena or outside of it.
On an internal arena, hopes for growth of demand
for launchers are associated with advances in
lightweight satellite technology (which would
bring more satellite within a payload capability
of ICBM-derived launchers) and for a success of
proposed low-orbit personal communications
satellite project, which would demand a large
amount of launches.4
However, an outcome of those
trends remain highly uncertain at least for
nearest years. Because of this uncertainty, right
now this option (which could be called Option
0) does not have any influence on missile
proliferation issues, nor there is any practical
way to influence execution of that Option.
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